Organics v. Cnty. of San Diego
| Decision Date | 05 March 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 15-CV-854 JLS (MDD) |
| Parties | OCEANSIDE ORGANICS; OCEANSIDE FARM TO TABLE, INC.; ALAN SHELTON; JUSTINE SHELTON; RON MIROLLA; LISA RIGG; MICHAEL WINKLEMAN; SARAH DYAL; ANTHONY CARBONNE; RICHARD DAVIS; DAVID SNYDER; DUANE LEWIS; SANDRA LEWIS; WAYNE LARSON; SHAWN SMITH; KYLE SNELLER; BUCK HUTCHERSON; LOGAN PIERCE; BROOK BISHOP; RON BOCIAN, Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, SAN DIEGO COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT; WILLIAM GORE; TIM CLARK; MATT STEVENS; and DOES 1-10 inclusive, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
ORDER: (1) GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT; AND (2) DISMISSING WITHOUT PREJUDICE PLAINTIFFS' THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint. ("MTD," ECF No. 40.) Also before the Court is Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to, ("Opp'n," ECF No. 42), and Defendants' Reply in Support of, ("Reply," ECF No. 43), the Motion to Dismiss. Having considered the parties' arguments and the law, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint.
Plaintiff Oceanside Organics is a "closed loop marijuana collective" operating in San Diego County, California. (Third Am. Compl. ("TAC"), ECF No. 40, ¶ 19.) The other plaintiffs are Oceanside Organics' eighteen individual members and a corporation formed to purchase the property upon which Oceanside Organics grows its medical marijuana. (Id. ¶¶ 3-18, 20.)
Plaintiffs agreed to contact local law enforcement to ensure the legality and compliance of their collective. (Id. ¶ 28.) In mid-July 2014, Plaintiffs' counsel contacted Defendant Tim Clark, a Deputy Sheriff with the San Diego County Sheriff's Department. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 29.) In the course of their correspondence, Plaintiffs' counsel provided to Defendant Clark "copies of all valid recommendations" for medical marijuana. (Id. ¶ 30.) Plaintiffs also "acquired state medical marijuana cards as requested by [D]eputy Clark." (Id.) According to Plaintiffs' counsel, "Deputy Clark repeatedly indicated to [Plaintiffs' counsel] that no legal action would be taken against the collective operation and that nobody at the cultivation site would be subject to arrest." (Id.) Defendant Clark "thanked attorney Callaway for the transparency and stated that the collective members were 'golden' and the cultivation operation was operating legally." (Id.)
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs allege "Deputy Clark conspired with [D]eputy Stevens[, another Deputy Sheriff with the San Diego County Sheriff's Department,] to have an illegal search warrant issued[,] which was based on a knowingly false affidavit." (Id. ¶¶ 23, 31.) Specifically, Defendants "falsely sw[ore] under oath that the marijuana was being cultivated illegally, despite the knowledge of both [Defendants] that the marijuana was being cultivated legally." (Id. ¶ 31.) On September 12, 2014, Plaintiffs' property was raided, (id. ¶¶ 29, 32), and Plaintiffs Shawn Smith and Kyle Sneller were arrested byDefendants Clark and Stevens "without probable cause," (id. ¶¶ 14, 15, 29, 32, 50, 55). "At the time of the raid . . . , there were over 20 valid members of the collective and 31 medical marijuana plants on site." (Id. ¶ 32.)
(Id. ¶ 25.) "As a proximate result of the custom, policy and practice of the County of San Diego an illegal warrant was issued, [and the] illegal raid . . . t[ook] place . . . ." (Id. ¶ 39.)
On April 17, 2015, Plaintiffs filed their original Complaint, setting forth six causes of action against Defendants Stevens and Clark or "all Individual Defendants" under both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California law. (See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 40-64.) Plaintiffs also alleged a separate cause of action under section 1983 against Defendants County of San Diego and the San Diego County Sheriff's Department. (See id. ¶¶ 35-39.) The complaint also named Sheriff William Gore as a defendant, alleging only that he "is the chief policymaker and decision maker for the San Diego County Sheriff's Department on all issues regarding proper police training." (Id. ¶ 21.)
Defendants filed their first motion to dismiss on June 22, 2015, (ECF No. 5), and Plaintiffs filed their Request for Preliminary Injunction on June 25, 2015, (ECF No. 7). On November 30, 2015, the Court granted the County Defendants' motion to dsimiss and denied Plaintiffs' request for preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 22.) Plaintiffs have filed First and Second Amended Complaint (ECF Nos. 23, 32), both of which have beendismissed in their entirety pursuant to Defendants' corresponding motions to dismiss. (ECF Nos. 31, 39.) Plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint on May 1, 2017 and Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss on May 15, 2017.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the defense that the complaint "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted," generally referred to as a motion to dismiss. The Court evaluates whether a complaint states a cognizable legal theory and sufficient facts in light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Although Rule 8 "does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' . . . it [does] demand more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In other words, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). A complaint will not suffice "if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
In order to survive a motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A claim is facially plausible when the facts pled "allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). That is not to say that the claim must be probable, but there must be "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. Facts "'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability" fall short of a plausible entitlement to relief. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Further, the Court need not accept as true "legal conclusions" contained in the complaint. Id. This review requires context-specific analysis involvingthe Court's "judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 678 (citation omitted). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'show[n]'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id.
Where a complaint does not survive 12(b)(6) analysis, the Court will grant leave to amend unless it determines that no modified contention "consistent with the challenged pleading . . . [will] cure the deficiency." DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) ).
Plaintiffs' first cause of action claims violation of civil rights under section 1983 against Defendants County of San Diego and San Diego County Sheriff's Department, (collectively, the "County Defendants"). A government entity may not be held liable under section 1983 unless a policy, practice, or custom of the entity can be shown to be a moving force behind a violation of constitutional rights. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). To establish liability for governmental entities under Monell, a "plaintiff must show: (1) that [the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional right; and, (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation." Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Oviatt ex rel. Waugh v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992)).
[T]here are three ways to show a policy or custom of a municipality: (1) by showing "a longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local government entity"; (2) "by showing that the decision-makingofficial was, as a matter of state law, a final policymaking authority whose...
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