Orient Ins. Co. v. Leonard
| Decision Date | 07 October 1902 |
| Docket Number | 874. |
| Citation | 120 F. 808 |
| Parties | ORIENT INS. CO. v. LEONARD. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
D. J Schuyler, for plaintiff in error.
Myron H. Beach, for defendant in error.
From a judgment in favor of Mr. Leonard for the full amount of a fire insurance policy issued to him by the Orient Company entered as the result of a second trial, this writ is prosecuted.
Mr Leonard, as lessee, occupied a six-story brick warehouse on Lake street, in Chicago. In it he had a stock of seeds, the insured property. Next west of the warehouse was a frame blacksmith shop, 20 feet wide. Next was the New England Mill, the front of which on Lake street was a two-story frame joined to a four-story brick structure in the rear.
The policy provided indemnity for 'all direct loss or damage by fire,' except (so far as concerns this case) in two instances: (1) 'The company shall not be liable for loss caused directly or indirectly by invasion, * * * or (unless fire ensues, and, in that event, for the damage by fire only) by explosion of any kind.' (2) 'If a building, or any part thereof, fall, except as the result of fire, all insurance by this policy on such building or its contents shall immediately cease.'
Mr. Leonard's theory was that an explosion of mill dust in the frame part of the New England Mill broke down the front part of the west wall of his building, and that a fire, immediately ensuing upon and connected with the explosion, entered through the opening, and consumed his property. At the first trial he introduced evidence sufficient to go to the jury if his theory was good in law. But the court directed a verdict for the company on the ground that when the wall fell not by fire, but by explosion, the insurance was at an end. That ruling was held to be error. Leonard v. Orient Ins. Co., 48 C.C.A. 369, 109 F. 286, 54 L.R.A. 706.
On the present writ the company assigns that the court erred in refusing to take the case from the jury, in giving and refusing instructions, and in admitting evidence.
Other facts are stated in the opinion.
Before JENKINS, GROSSCUP, and BAKER, Circuit Judges.
BAKER Circuit Judge, having made this statement, .
A consideration of what was decided on the former writ will greatly simplify the solution of the principal questions now presented. Mr. Leonard's own case showed that an explosion, and not a fire, caused the fall. It was, therefore, necessary to decide whether, when the ensuing fire reached Mr. Leonard's property, the insurance had not already ceased by virtue of the second condition quoted in the statement. In determinging this, the court had regard, also, for the first condition, namely, that the company would not be liable for loss caused directly or indirectly by explosions of any kind, and for the exception to that condition, namely, that the company would be liable for damage by fire ensuing upon an explosion. The court found that the wording of the second condition was 'unqualified and universal, admitting of neither interpretation nor construction,' but that an application of it to the case in hand would utterly destroy the liability 'carefully and precisely defined' in the exception to the first condition. The court thought such a result was not intended, and therefore held the second condition inapplicable. 'In this way,' the court concluded, 'the two clauses may well stand together, neither interfering with the legitimate office of the other.'
Now when Mr. Leonard, on the second trial, again produced evidence that an explosion in the neighboring mill made a hole in the wall, through which the fire ensuing upon and connected with the explosion entered, and destroyed his stock, the court was not a liberty to follow its own or counsel's view of the law in ruling on the company's motion for a directed verdict in its favor. The law of the case, determined by the former decision, required the denial of the motion, and the submission of the evidence to the jury. And, since its motion for a new trial was overruled, it is futile for the company...
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