Orlando v. Robinson, 12341.

• Citation: 262 F.2d 850
• Decision Date: 10 February 1959
• Docket Number: No. 12341.,12341.
• Parties: Agostino Eddie ORLANDO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert H. ROBINSON, District Director of Immigration and Naturalization Service, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)

262 F.2d 850 (1959)

Agostino Eddie ORLANDO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert H. ROBINSON, District Director of Immigration and Naturalization Service, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 12341.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

January 5, 1959.

Rehearing Denied February 10, 1959.

Anna R. Lavin, Chicago, Ill., for appellant.

Robert Tieken, U. S. Atty., Donald S. Manion, Asst. U. S. Atty., Chicago, Ill. (John Peter Lulinski, Asst. U. S. Atty., Chicago, Ill., of counsel), for appellee.

Before DUFFY, Chief Judge, MAJOR and PARKINSON, Circuit Judges.

PARKINSON, Circuit Judge.

This appeal is from a judgment of the District Court affirming on review a final order of the Immigration and Naturalization Service directing the deportation of plaintiff-appellant Orlando as one twice convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude subsequent to his entry into this country and to review the finding that Orlando had failed to establish his good moral character for the ten-year period from May 24, 1945 to May 24, 1955 making him, therefore, ineligible for suspension of deportation, for which suspension he had made application on May 24, 1955.

Orlando does not contend that he has been convicted of less than two crimes since his entry into this country. He admits to a conviction, inter alia, of contributing to the delinquency of a female child in Chicago, Illinois on May 28, 1943 and to a conviction for larceny in Pasadena, California on January 18, 1929. In his brief Orlando makes no issue or argument "addressed to the finding that the 1943 conviction was for a crime involving moral turpitude." This we can readily understand after reading the sordid details of the immoral act to which he pleaded guilty. However, he does contend that his 1929 conviction for larceny was for a crime not involving moral turpitude. He would have us believe that because he was guilty of stealing Christmas packages valued at only $5 from an automobile and did not know he was arrested for and convicted of larceny but thought he was "accused of trying to break into the car", moral turpitude was not involved.

Larceny or theft is a crime malum in se. All crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude. Orlando was convicted of unlawfully stealing Christmas packages. There is nothing in this record to show that he knew what the packages contained when he stole them. The fact that the stolen packages contained merchandise of the value of $5 instead of $500 was for him a mere fortuity. It might have been a disappointment to the thief but it would not extirpate the element of moral turpitude. Orlando's quoted testimony contains absolutely nothing in mitigation. He did not plead guilty and "pay the judge", as he suggests by innuendo. He pleaded not guilty and was convicted after a trial. We are not here presented with a case of a father stealing a loaf of bread for his starving children or any facts of an extenuating nature whatsoever. Unmitigated...