Oro Water, Light & Power Co. v. City of Oroville

• Decision Date: 14 April 1908
• Docket Number: 14,459.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
• Parties: ORO WATER, LIGHT & POWER CO. v. CITY OF OROVILLE et al.

162 F. 975

ORO WATER, LIGHT & POWER CO. v. CITY OF OROVILLE et al.

No. 14,459.

United States Circuit Court, N.D. California.

April 14, 1908

George W. Lane and Curtis H. Lindley, for complainant.

W. E Duncan, Jr., for defendants.

FARRINGTON District Judge.

This suit was brought to obtain a decree restraining defendants and all consumers of electric light or current in the city of Oroville, Cal., from enforcing or attempting to enforce an ordinance of said city fixing the maximum rates to be charged for electricity. The defendants have filed their answer, and now move the court for an order allowing them, their agents or attorneys, 'the right to inspect or make copies of any part of any and all books, records, vouchers, papers, bills receipts, deeds, agreements, time books, check books, stubs day books, cash books, journals, ledgers, blotters or other books or papers,' relating to some 23 different subjects which are enumerated in the motion, such as matters of purchasing, constructing, maintaining, and operating complainant's electric plant, the amount of merchandise purchased by complainant to be sold to other persons, amounts received from the sales of electricity, etc.

This being a suit in equity, there is no warrant in section 724 of the Revised Statutes (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 583) of the United States for such an order. That section applies to actions at law, and in no wise changes the procedure in equitable cases. This has been so held repeatedly by the federal courts, and is apparent from the language of the statute itself, which reads as follows:

'In the trial of actions at law, the courts of the United States may, on motion and due notice thereof, require the parties to produce books or writings in their possession or power, which contain evidence pertinent to the issue, in cases and under circumstances where they might be compelled to produce the same by the ordinary rules of proceeding in chancery. ' Ryder v. Bateman (C.C.) 93 F. 31; West Publishing Co. v. Edward Thompson Co. (C.C.) 151 F. 138, 140; 2 Rose's Code of Federal Proc. Sec. 1763.

Although this statute has changed the procedure, it has not increased or diminished the rights of the parties. True, it is no longer necessary for a litigant at law in the federal courts to file a bill of discovery in equity in order to obtain inspection of documents necessary to the proper presentation of his case.

But nevertheless this statute requires him to make just as full a showing of facts and circumstances justifying the order as under the old chancery practice which was superseded by this statute. I call attention to this in order to emphasize the fact that the federal courts have no power to grant, and the litigant in the federal court has no right to expect, an order which will compel his adversary to exhibit for inspection anything and everything in writing under the latter's control which may assist the party who makes the demand. The theory upon which this court and courts of equity have always proceeded is that the party against whom discovery is sought has rights which must be protected. The court cannot lend itself to any scheme to conceal evidence, neither can it compel a party to disclose evidence which, for instance, would subject him to criminal prosecution. Neither party has a legal right to examine all records and documents in his adversary's possession simply for the purpose of discovering whether they contain something which might benefit him, or to see in advance of the trial what evidence will be produced on the other side. Again, a court of equity should make no order blindly. It should command of no man anything which he has a legal right to refuse, and, when issued, its order should be specific and certain, leaving as little as possible to the discretion of the person or persons against whom it is directed. In cases of this kind, there should be no uncertainty as to what documents are in the possession of the party against whom discovery is sought, and just what portion of them he should exhibit. The court should require the production of no evidence which is not competent and material, and within the legitimate issues of the case and in aid of the action or defense of him who seeks it. Victor G. Bloede Co. v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co. (C.C.) 98 F. 175. Obviously, then, there ought to be a hearing in advance of the order at which each party shall be given adequate opportunity to state and establish his contentions. These reasons indicate somewhat of the nature, character, and purpose of the chancery practice. If the statute, a portion of which is recited above, indicates anything as to the practice, it indicates that courts of equity are to compel the production of documentary evidence by their old methods, and 'not upon motion and due notice'; for, as Judge Hammond says in Ryder v. Bateman (C.C.) 93 F. 31, 34:

'Congress has not yet chosen to change the method of procedure in the federal courts of equity, and the very fact that Rev. St. Sec. 724, is confined to courts of law, is conclusive that courts of equity must proceed as they did and do without the aid of that statute.'

The equity rules prescribed by the Supreme Court of the United States to regulate the practice in Circuit Courts do not formulate any method for compelling the production of documents prior to trial, but they do provide, in rule 90, that:

'In all cases where the rules prescribed by this court do not apply, the practice of the Circuit Court shall be regulated by the present practice of the High Court of Chancery in England, so far as the same may reasonably be applied consistently with the local circumstances and local conveniences of the district where the court is held, not as positive rules, but as furnishing just analogies to regulate the practice.'

It has been held that by 'present practice of the High Court of Chancery in England' is to be understood the practice which prevailed in that court in 1842, when the equity rules were ordained. In Bate v. Bate, 7...