Orr v. Clark
| Decision Date | 22 April 1890 |
| Citation | 19 A. 929,62 Vt. 136 |
| Parties | HELEN M. ORR v. HORACE CLARKE ET AL |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
JANUARY TERM, 1890.
Bill in chancery, brought by the oratrix to establish her title to a certain parcel of land. Heard on bill, answer and master's report at the September Term, 1889. POWERS Chancellor, dismissed the bill with costs. The oratrix appeals.
The pro forma decree is reversed and cause remanded under a mandate that the temporary injunction be made perpetual, and that the defendants make such conveyance of the premises in question to the oratrix as the Court of Chancery may adjudge necessary to carry out the terms and conditions of the written agreement.
H A. Harman, for the oratrix.
Present TAFT, ROWELL, TYLER and MUNSON, JJ.ROWELL, J., being indisposed, did not sit.
The case is this: The land in controversy was owned in fee by Alzina J. Whitcomb, who died intestate, December 15, 1874. Her husband, Austin S. Whitcomb, died May 14, 1887. Their only children and heirs were Alta J. Clark and Ella T Orr, who, soon after their mother's decease, executed between themselves a written instrument by which they agreed that their father, the said Whitcomb, should have the occupation and use of said land during his life and at his decease the survivor of the sisters should take the fee. Alta J. was the wife of defendant Clark and Ella T. was the wife of Horace J. Orr and the mother of the oratrix. The husbands joined in the execution of the agreement, which was signed sealed, witnessed, acknowledged and left for safe keeping with one Randall, a justice of the peace, who drew it up. Subsequently Mrs. Clark, with her sister's knowledge and consent, took the instrument from Randall's possession and kept it herself until her death in December, 1883. Her sister died in February, 1886. After the death of his wife, defendant Clark admitted to Whitcomb that he had the written instrument and promised to deliver it to him, but he never did deliver it, and in his answer in this suit and at the trial before the master he denied all knowledge of its execution and existence. No one but the defendant has seen the instrument since the death of Mrs. Clark. Whitcomb occupied the land until his death, and since that time it has been occupied by the oratrix, who is the sole heir of Mrs. Orr. The oratrix now claims title in fee to the land in the right of her mother, while defendant Hulet claims title to an undivided half thereof by virtue of a deed from defendant Clark, who claimed title in the right of his wife. The master reports that he is unable to find what the language of the instrument was and whether or not it was sufficient in law, upon Alta's decease, to convey her interest in the land to her sister; but he does find that the instrument was made with that intent and purpose on the part of both sister, in the even that Ella survived Alta. It also appears that defendant Clark, if he has not destroyed the writing, now withholds it, having repeatedly admitted, since his wife's decease, that it was in his possession.
The oratrix now invokes the application of the maxim, Omnia praesumuntur contra spoliatorem and cites, among other cases, Armory v. DeLamirie, 1 Strange 505. In that case a person in a humble station in life, having found a jewel, took it to the shop of a goldsmith to inquire its value, who, having got the jewel into his possession under pretense of weighing it, took out the stone, and on the finder refusing to accept a small sum for it, returned him the empty socket. An action of trover having been brought to recover damages for the detention of the stone, the jury were directed that, unless the defendant produced the jewel and thereby showed it not to be of the finest water, they should presume the strongest against him and make the value of the best jewel that would fit the socket the measure of their damages.
This maxim has often been applied in cases where written instruments of evidence have been destroyed or suppressed. This not only raises a presumption that the evidence suppressed would, if produced, militate against the party suppressing it, but procures more ready admission to the evidence of the opposite side. 2 Best Ev. 412. "If," says Ld. Ch. Justice Holt, in 1 Ld. Raym. 731, "a man destroys a thing that is designed to be evidence against himself, a small matter will supply."
In Hunt v. Matthews, 1 Vern. 408, a widow, before her marriage with her second husband, assigned over the greater part of her estate to trustees, in trust for her children by her first husband. The husband suppressing the deed, was decreed to pay $ 800, the sum proved to have been mentioned in the deed as the value of the goods. See also, Wardour v. Berisford, 1 Vern. 452, and Dalston v. Coatsworth, 1 P. Wms. 731. In Rex v. the Countess of Arundell , Hob. 109, the king claimed title to land by an attainder of high treason. On its being shown that the deeds whereby the estate came to the party attained were not extant, but were very strongly suspected to have been suppressed by some one under whom the defendant claimed, a decree was made that the crown should hold and enjoy the land until the defendant should produce the deeds and the court thereupon take further consideration and order.
Mr Best seriously questions whether this maxim has not been carried too far and quotes Lord Eldon in Barker v. Ray, 2 Russ. 72,...
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