Orr v. Kneip
| Citation | 287 N.W.2d 480 |
| Decision Date | 28 December 1979 |
| Docket Number | 12629,Nos. 12596,s. 12596 |
| Parties | Robert D. ORR, Frank Dixon, C. H. Peterson, Keith Kettering, Carol Reed and Phyllis Huss, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Richard F. KNEIP, Governor of the State of South Dakota; Vern Butler, Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources of the State of South Dakota; The Department of Natural Resources of the State of South Dakota; The South Dakota Conservancy District; The Board of Natural Resource Development of the Department of Natural Resources, Wesley Beaman, Neil Evans, Larry Green, Jake Muehl, James Schulbach, Dr. James Sturdevant, and J. Harvey Glover, Members of the Board of Natural Resource Development; Michael Madden, Director of the Oahe Conservancy Subdistrict; John Sieh, Director of the Oahe Conservancy Subdistrict; Leonard W. Naessig, Director of the Oahe Conservancy Subdistrict; Arnold Schurr, Director of the Oahe Conservancy Subdistrict; Siegfried Swanhorst, Director of the Oahe Conservancy Subdistrict; Glenn Overby, Director of the Oahe Conservancy Subdistrict; Douglas Beckett, Director of the Oahe Conservancy Subdistrict; and William Piper, Director of the Oahe Conservancy Subdistrict; Kenneth Marsh, Stephen Thorson and R. B. Hipple, Defendants, and Oahe Conservancy Subdistrict, Defendant and Appellant, and Edmunds County, a political subdivision of the State of South Dakota, Intervenor and Defendant, and Day County, a political subdivision of the State of South Dakota, Amicus Curiae, and Clark County, a political subdivision of the State of South Dakota, Amicus Curiae, and City of Huron, a municipal corporation of the State of South Dakota, Amicus Curiae. |
| Court | Supreme Court of South Dakota |
William J. Srstka, Jr. of Duncan, Olinger, Srstka, Lovald & Robbennolt, Pierre, for plaintiffs and respondents.
Judith A. Atkinson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for all other defendants; Mark V. Meierhenry, Atty. Gen., Pierre, on the brief.
Lawrence L. Piersol of Davenport, Evans, Hurwitz & Smith, Sioux Falls, for appellant, Oahe Conservancy Subdistrict.
Michael T. Hogan, Ipswich, for intervenor and defendant, Edmunds County.
Leon Vander Linden, Webster, for amicus curiae, Day County.
D. G. Syvertson, Clark, for amicus curiae, Clark County.
Glen A. Severson, Huron, for amicus curiae, City of Huron, South Dakota.
This consolidated appeal is taken by the Oahe Conservancy Subdistrict (subdistrict) from two judgments of the Circuit Court, Sixth Judicial Circuit. Appeal # 12596 challenges the trial court's decision in a declaratory judgment action that the apportionment of the Oahe Conservancy Subdistrict Board of Directors is unconstitutional. The subdistrict appeals on the issue of adequacy of the instructions. In Appeal # 12629, the subdistrict challenges the trial court's refusal to award it costs and damages allegedly incurred as a result of the temporary injunction which this court later vacated. We reverse and remand.
This controversy was previously before us in Orr v. Kneip, 260 N.W.2d 638 (S.D.1977), hereinafter referred to as Orr I. 1 The facts are set forth fully in that opinion and will not be repeated here at length. In summary, plaintiffs, respondents herein, brought this action against the subdistrict challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of the subdistrict's board of directors. Plaintiffs contend that the current apportionment system violates their rights under the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution and appropriate sections of the South Dakota Constitution. Plaintiffs' claim is based primarily on the disparity between municipal and non-municipal or rural representation since nine directors on the board, who are elected from rural areas and represent only 35.18% Of the subdistrict's population, have 81.81% Of the vote on the board while the municipal residents, who comprise 64.8% Of the total population, elect two directors who have only 18.18% Of the vote on the board.
In Orr I, the trial court originally concluded that the subdistrict is a governmental entity and subject to the one-man, one-vote rule. Consequently, the court issued a temporary injunction that temporarily weighted the votes of the directors in a manner which comported with the one-man, one-vote principle. Upon appeal of that action, this court vacated the injunction solely on the issue of the propriety of the injunction without reaching the merits of the case as to the constitutional question and remanded the case for trial.
The complaint originally consisted of some six causes of action seeking injunctive relief, writs of prohibition, mandamus, certiorari, and quo warranto, and a declaratory judgment declaring the present apportionment illegal and unconstitutional. At an omnibus hearing in advance of trial, the trial court dismissed all but the declaratory judgment action.
Although the principal issue in the case originally was whether the subdistrict is a governmental purpose unit or a special purpose unit, that issue is not before us on this appeal. Although the record is unclear, it appears that the trial court on the remand decided at another pretrial conference to treat the subdistrict as a special purpose unit rather than a governmental purpose unit. 2 Therefore, the parties were advised to try the case with the understanding that the rational basis test rather than the strict scrutiny test was applicable.
Trial to a jury was held in June of 1978. Prior to the trial, the parties entered into a "Stipulation of Facts" which was read to the jury. This stipulation details the history of the subdistrict, the manner in which the board is elected, the statutory authority for elections, the powers of the subdistrict, and the projects of the subdistrict and their benefits. The bulk of the testimony adduced at trial addressed the question of whether the activities of the subdistrict had a greater impact on the rural residents than on the municipal residents. Conflicting testimony was given on this point with plaintiffs' witnesses testifying that municipal residents were significantly affected by the subdistrict's activities and the subdistrict's witnesses testifying that rural residents felt the more substantial impact.
The trial court submitted the case to the jury on a special verdict form inquiring:
To the first question, the jury answered yes, and to the second, no. As a result, the trial court entered a final judgment which declared the "apportionment of the Oahe Conservancy Subdistrict Board of Directors . . . to be unconstitutional as violation (sic) of the constitution of the United States and the State of South Dakota." The subdistrict appeals from this judgment.
As previously stated, the trial court first treated the subdistrict as a governmental unit but subsequently reversed itself and decided to treat it as a special purpose unit. Generally, a governmental entity is termed a "governmental purpose unit" if it exercises general governmental powers as opposed to a "special purpose unit" which disproportionately affects a definable class, and has a special limited purpose. Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action, 430 U.S. 259, 97 S.Ct. 1047, 51 L.Ed.2d 313 (1977); Salyer Land Company v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District, 410 U.S. 719, 93 S.Ct. 1224, 35 L.Ed.2d 659 (1973); Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement District, 410 U.S. 743, 93 S.Ct. 1237, 35 L.Ed.2d 675 (1973). A governmental purpose unit is subject to the "strict scrutiny" test which requires the use of a mathematical calculation to determine whether the apportionment meets the one-man, one-vote criterion with reasonable precision. A special purpose unit, on the other hand, is subject to the "rational basis" test which is whether there is a state of facts which may reasonably be conceived to justify the apportionment (a rational relationship) and whether the classification is reasonably precise, i. e., no persons are being included in or excluded from the class when they should not be under the apportionment. 3 Although both tests contain a requirement of reasonable precision, the meaning of the phrase is substantially different when placed in the context of the respective tests. In the "strict scrutiny" test, the precision is a mathematical variation within reasonable limits whereas, in the "rational basis" test, the precision is in selectivity within reasonable limits.
Plaintiffs urge this court to decide the issue of whether the subdistrict is a special purpose unit or a governmental purpose unit, the determination of which will be conclusive of whether the trial court erred in applying the rational basis test. The court's instructions became the law of the case subject to reversal on appeal only if the record of objection, exception and the proposal of correct instructions is preserved. While counsel for plaintiffs assiduously made his record to preserve the issue, we must decline to address it since it has not been properly presented to us due to plaintiffs' failure to cross-appeal.
The first question we must deal with is the status of the special jury verdicts rendered herein; that is, whether they were binding on the trial court or merely advisory. In its answer, the subdistrict demanded a jury trial. When plaintiffs moved to strike the demand, the trial court denied the motion "on the basis of (SDCL) 21-24-9, among other things." 4
Article VI, § 6 of the South Dakota Constitution mandates that a party be given a jury trial as a matter of right if the action is...
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