Orr v. United States
| Decision Date | 02 April 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 18999.,18999. |
| Citation | 408 F.2d 1011 |
| Parties | Curtis ORR, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America et al., Respondents-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Curtis Orr, Jr., in pro. per.
Bernard J. Stuplinski, U. S. Atty., Cleveland, Ohio, on brief, for appellees.
Before PECK and McCREE, Circuit Judges, and CECIL, Senior Circuit Judge.
Curtis Orr, Jr., petitioner-appellant, appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, denying his motion for relief under Section 2255, Title 28, U.S.C. Orr was sentenced on July 6, 1962 to three two year sentences on three counts of a nine count indictment, the sentences to run consecutively. The other six counts of the indictment were dismissed.
The appellant sets forth only one ground in his motion as a basis for vacating the judgment of the District Court:
"* * * the trial court failed to advise him that his plea of guilty would expose him to cumulative punishment, and that under Rule 11, Fed.R.Cr. Proc., a plea of guilty shall not be accepted without first determining `that the plea is made voluntarily with the understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.\'"
At the time the appellant pleaded guilty in 1962 Rule 11 did not contain the phrase "and the consequences of the plea." That was added by amendment in 1966. There was no specific violation of Rule 11 at the time the appellant was sentenced. A plea of guilty to three counts of a nine count indictment with six counts dismissed is open to the inference that the appellant knew that he could be sentenced on each count.
The appellant cannot complain about the severity of the sentence. Sweeden v. United States, 209 F.2d 524 (C.A. 8). The sentences were within the limits fixed by statute and whether they be made to run concurrently or consecutively was within the discretion of the trial judge. Clearly, there was no abuse of discretion here. See Livers v. United States, 185 F.2d 807, 809 (C.A. 6). It is not customary to advise a defendant of the sentence he will receive on a plea of guilty unless it is by agreement and pre-arrangement. He knows that he is subject to a sentence within the full range of the penalty provided by statute.
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Marcusse v. United States
...attack its severity." United States v. Burns, F. Supp. 1988 WL 122735, at *6 (E.D. Ky. October 14, 1988) (citing Orr v. United States, 408 F.2d 1011 (6th Cir. 1969)). Thus, because Marcusse does not have a constitutional right to the same sentence as other defendants, and because her senten......
-
Besser v. United States
...its severity." United States v. Burns, Nos. 86-10, 86-26, 1988 WL 122735, at *6 (E.D. Ky. October 14, 1988) (citing Orr v. United States, 408 F.2d 1011 (6th Cir. 1969)). Thus, because Movant does not have a constitutional right to the same sentence as other defendants, and because his sente......
-
Flynn v. United States
...its severity." United Statesv. Burns,Nos. 86-10, 86-26, 1988 WL 122735, at *6 (E.D. Ky. October 14, 1988) (citing Orr v. United States, 408 F.2d 1011 (6th Cir. 1969)). Moreover, Movant's reliance on United States v. Wallace, 597 F.3d 794 (6th Cir. 2010), is misplaced. (Dkt. No. 21, at 20.) ......
-
United States v. Myers
...his possible sentence. At least, he would put on inquiry concerning the possibility of consecutive sentences. (See Orr v. United States (6th Cir. 1969) 408 F.2d 1011, 1012.) Myers, however, had no reason to know that the sentencing judge did not have discretion to determine when the federal......