Orr v. Yates

• Decision Date: 20 April 1904
• Parties: ORR et al. v. YATES et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

209 Ill. 222

70 N.E. 731

ORR et al.

v.YATES et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 20, 1904.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Pike County; Harry Higbee, Judge.

Suit by Mary Maria Yates and another against Jefferson Orr and others. From a decree, defendants appeal. Reversed.

William Mumford and L. T. Graham, for appellants.

Vandeventer & Woods, A. G. Crawford, and Matthews & Anderson, for appellees.

WILKIN, J.

Mary Maria Yates and Lydia Yates, her mother, the daughter and widow of William H. Yates, who died testate on September 16, 1902, filed their bill in chancery in the circuit court of Pike county against Jefferson Orr, as trustee and executor, and certain devisees in the last will of William H. Yates, to construe his will and grant certain relief therein prayed. The bill alleges that said will, by its first clause, gave the lot and residence where the family resided at the date of testator's death to his wife, Lydia Yates; that by the second clause she was given one-half of the personal property, and by the third, all of the real estate for life, except the Putz farm. The fourth clause, the construction of which is involved in this litigation, is as follows:

‘I devise to my daughter, Mary Maria Yates, one-half of all my personal property, including choses in action, and in fee simple all the real estate that I may die seized of, except the farm known as the Putz farm, which is herein otherwise disposed of. That is to say, that if, at the death of my wife, Lydia Yates, my daughter, Mary Maria Yates, shall then be living, the fee to said real estate shall vest in her, and in the event the said Mary Maria Yates shall not be living but shall leave a living child or children, then the said fee shall vest in said child or children. But in the event that at the death of Lydia Yates, my wife, said Mary Maria Yates shall not be living, and no child or children or descendants of child of said Mary Maria Yates shall be living, then, in such case, said fee, if not disposed of by Mary Maria Yates, shall vest in my brothers and sisters, Catherine Rush, Emma Fisher, Monroe Yates, Edward Yates, Ella M. Orr and Mattie McMahon, in equal parts, and their heirs and assigns, and in the event of the death of either of said brothers or sisters such share shall descend to the heirs of such deceased brother and sister.

‘I being desirous of providing a competency for my daughter, Mary Maria Yates, and to create a fund that will not be liable for her debts in any manner whatever, and that will secure to her a living, I devise to Jefferson Orr, trustee [describing the land], said above described tract of land constituting what is commonly known and called the Putz farm, to have and to hold in trust for the sole use and benefit of Mary Maria Yates for and during her natural life; and in the event of the death of the said Mary Maria Yates without child or children or descendants of child, then to have and to hold for the sole use and benefit of Lydia Yates, my wife, if she shall be living, during her natural life, and at the death of Lydia Yates, my wife, and Mary Maria Yates, my daughter (if said Mary Maria Yates dies without child or descendants of child), the fee to the said last described tract of land known as the Putz place shall be equally divided between my brothers and sisters and their heirs and assigns, as herein provided for the division of my other real estate herein devised, that is to say, in equal parts.

‘I hereby authorize said trustee to turn the management of said estate over to Mary Maria Yates, and Lydia Yates, for any period of time that he may deem best. It is a part and condition of this devise to said trustee that no part of the rents or profits or use of said lands shall be applied to the payment of any judgments against the said Mary Maria Yates or on any debt contracted by her, but the sole object and purpose of said devise is to create a fund that shall be kept free from the said Mary Maria Yates' contracts and judgments against her; that if said trustee shall turn the management of said Putz farm herein devised to the said Mary Maria Yates and Lydia Yates, then said trustee shall not be accountable for the rents and profits in any manner while the same shall be under the management of said Lydia Yates and Mary Maria Yates. I hereby authorize and empower Jefferson Orr, my said trustee, in the event of sickness, failing health, old age, or any other good cause appearing to him, he may appoint some suitable person to execute said trust.’

It concludes by nominating Jefferson Orr sole executor of the will and guardian of the daughter, Mary Maria Yates; giving him, as such guardian, full power and authority to manage whatever property she shall be the owner of, or to which she is entitled.

The bill further alleges that said pretended last will is ambiguous and uncertain, and that the legal effect of said fourth clause is to vest the life estate in the widow, Lydia Yates, of the lands mentioned in said clause, except the Putz farm, and the remainder in fee absolute in the daughter, and that the limitation over to the brothers and sisters of testator is null and void, as tending to limit the estate in fee given to said daughter; that the remaining portion of the fourth clause, devising the Putz farm in trust, is ambiguous and uncertain, and does not provide what shall become of said trust fund in the event of the death of said appellees without leaving descendants; that the same is in violation of the rule against perpetuities; that no provision is made for the accounting by said trustee or cestui que trust; and that for these reasons that portion of said pretended will should be set aside and declared null and void. The prayer is that the will may be construed by the court, and that portion of it which creates a trust set aside upon the ground of uncertainty and remoteness; that Mary Maria Yates be declared to be the owner in fee simple of all of the lands mentioned in said pretended will; and that the management and control of said Putz farm may be turned over to her upon her reaching her majority.

To the bill the defendants filed a general and special demurrer, which was overruled, and they elected to stand by the same. The cause was submitted for hearing upon the issue so formed, and a final decree rendered adjudging that all of the real estate, except the home place and Putz farm, was vested by the will in fee simple absolute in the said Mary Maria Yates, subject to the life estate of said Lydia Yates; that the limitation over to the brothers and sisters of the testator is void, because it attempts to limit the fee already given to the daughter after giving her a general power of disposition in fee; and that the trust attempted to be created by the fourth clause in Jefferson Orr of the Putz farm is void for uncertainty, incompleteness, and ambiguity, and declaring the same null and void. The decree then adjudges that said Mary Maria Yates is seised of a life estate, by said will, in the Putz farm, and that upon her death the said Lydia Yates, if Mary Maria Yates shall die without child or children or descendants thereof, will be seised of a life estate therein, and in the event that said Mary Maria dies leaving child or children, or descendants thereof, the fee simplein the premises, after the death of both Mary Maria and Lydia Yates, will vest in said child or children or descendants thereof, but in the event of the death of said Mary Maria without child or children, or descendants thereof, then, upon her death and the death of said Lydia, the fee simple in said farm will vest in said brothers and sisters. From that decree the defendants prosecute this appeal.

The first assigned error relied upon is that the circuit court had no jurisdiction to entertain the bill, for the reason that it attempts to settle purely legal titles, and not to enforce the alleged trust, or to construe and determine the complainants' rights thereunder, but denies the existence of any trust; setting up the legal title of the complainants, and asking the court to adjudge the same in them. It is admitted by all parties that courts of equity are wanting in jurisdiction in such cases where purely legal titles are involved. Harrison v. Owsley, 172 Ill. 629, 50 N. E. 227, and cases cited. It is, however, equally well settled that, upon bills by executors or trustees, courts of chancery have power to construe wills creating trusts, in order to enable executors or trustees to perform the duties imposed upon them in the administration of the trust, and that, having acquired jurisdiction for that purpose, they will retain it for the purpose of construing other provisions of the same will. Nor do we understand this latter rule to be confined to cases in which the bill is filed by a party charged with the execution of the trust, but may be invoked by a cestui que trust or other party interested. Longwith v. Riggs, 123 Ill. 258, 14 N. E. 840, and authorities there cited; Minkler v. Simons, 172 Ill. 323, 50 N. E. 176. The bill in this case sets out the will of the testator, and alleges that it is ambiguous and uncertain, and that the trust attempted to be created contravenes well-established principles of law, and is therefore void, but it also avers that the defendants deny such illegality, and insist that it is legal and valid. This presented an issue to be determinedby the court-whether, upon the face of the will, a trust was created-and we are unable to see why a trust was not directly involved in that issue. It is true, the chancellor held that there was no valid trust contained in the will, but his jurisdiction could not be made to depend upon that conclusion. If he had held there was a trust, and construed the same, there would seem to be no reasonable ground for the contention that his decree was invalid for want of jurisdiction. It is also insisted on this branch of the case that the bill seeks the judgment of the court...