Orraca Figueroa v. Torres Torres, CIV. 02-2225(JP).

• Decision Date: 14 October 2003
• Docket Number: No. CIV. 02-2225(JP).,CIV. 02-2225(JP).
• Citation: 288 F.Supp.2d 176
• Parties: Pedro ORRACA FIGUEROA, Plaintiff v. Anibal Jose TORRES TORRES, et al., Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

288 F.Supp.2d 176

Pedro ORRACA FIGUEROA, Plaintiff v. Anibal Jose TORRES TORRES, et al., Defendants

No. CIV. 02-2225(JP).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

October 14, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John F. Nevares, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Mariana Negrón Vargas, Commonwealth Department of Justice, Federal Litigation Division, San Juan, PR, Eileen Landrón Guardiola, Landrón & Vera, Centro Internacional de Mercadeo, Guaynabo, PR, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

PIERAS, Senior District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Pedro Orraca Figueroa brings this case against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his rights under the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Plaintiff began working in a transitory position, "Employment Program Specialist", for the Youth Affairs Office of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (referred to herein by its Spanish acronym, "OAJ") in December 1999. He was promoted to the career position of "Juvenile Coordinator" on August 30, 2000, after a competitive selection process. Plaintiff is affiliated with the New Progressive Party ("NPP"). Defendants in this case are Aníbal Torres Torres, in his official capacity as OAJ Executive Director, and in his personal capacity and José Otero, Special Aide to the Executive Director, in his personal capacity.

In November 2000, the Popular Democratic Party won the general elections in Puerto Rico ("PDP"). Defendants are affiliated with the PDP. On July 6, 2001, after the change in administration, Co-Defendant Aníbal Torres Torres notified Plaintiff that he was going to annul his appointment as Youth Coordinator because the appointment was not properly carried out, which was discovered by Co-Defendant after an audit of employee personnel files. After an administrative hearing, the hearing officer determined that Plaintiff's appointment was illegal. According to the hearing officer, Plaintiff lacked the necessary experience for the position. On August 24, 2001, Plaintiff was dismissed from his position.

Plaintiff states that Defendants then opened competition for two positions titled "Youth Coordinator", which was Plaintiff's previous position. On September 7, 2001, Plaintiff applied for the position. On October 8, 2001, the Youth Affairs Office notified Plaintiff that he had been certified as an eligible candidate for the position. However, Defendant Torres Torres filled both open positions with members of the PDP.

Plaintiff states that, after the change in administration, his duties were systematically removed by Defendants, to the point where he was deprived of all of the duties and responsibilities set forth in his job description, despite Plaintiff's request for work assignments. Plaintiff was left isolated in a hall with no office equipment, no personal telephone, and no access to the files or documents he needed to perform his duties. He was told not to talk or leave his work area.

Defendants now move for summary judgment, alleging that Plaintiff has failed to state a case for political discrimination because he did not have the required interview experience for the position of "Youth Coordinator" and was appointed illegally in violation of the Personnel Law of Puerto Rico. Second, Defendants state that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for a violation of his Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment because, as his appointment was illegal, he did not possess a property interest in his employment. Finally, Defendants allege that they are immune from suit under the doctrine of qualified immunity (docket No. 31).

Plaintiff opposes Defendants' motion (docket No. 38), stating that Defendants' decision to investigate and terminate Plaintiff was motivated by discriminatory animus.

II. UNCONTESTED FACTS

The following are the uncontested facts, agreed to by the parties, as they appear in the ISC Order in this case:

1. In September 1999, Plaintiff applied for a position at the Youth Affairs Office ("OAJ").

2. The parties stipulate as true the contents of Plaintiff's employment application with the OAJ, dated October 1, 1999.

3. The parties stipulate as true the contents of Plaintiff's resume, submitted as part of his employment application in 1999.

4. The parties stipulate as true the contents of a document titled "Plan de Acción a Realizarse en la Comisión de Comercio e Industria" dated February 16, 1999.

5. Plaintiff was appointed to the position of "Employment Program Specialist" at OAJ, as a transitory employee, from October 1, 1999 to June 30, 2000, with a salary of $1,139.00 per month.

6. By December 20, 1999, Plaintiff was working in the Covenant with the Youth Program, with a salary of $1,239.00 per month.

7. An opening for three positions as "Employment Program Specialist," named and numbered "Convocatoria: 2000-10" dated January 3, 2000, was issued by OAJ. Participants had until January 21, 2000, to apply for the position openings.

8. Plaintiff applied for one of the positions of "Employment Program Specialist" for OAJ on January 11, 2000, for which he submitted an employment application.

9. Plaintiff's personnel file contains a Certification dated January 13, 2000, issued by Antonio Silva Delgado, Representative for the Eighth District of the House of Representatives, and President of the Commerce and Industries Commission.

10. On April 6, 2000, Mrs. Gladys G. Meléndez, Human Resources Director at OAJ, wrote Plaintiff a letter stating that his exam for Opening 2000-10 had been evaluated and his name included in the List of Eligibles. Also, Mrs. Meléndez requested his attendance at an interview on April 13, 2000, at OAJ.

11. OAJ's List of Eligibles for Opening 2000-10 reflects that, from ten applicants, four had Bachelor's Degrees and that they were included as eligible. The name and score given to these four applicants is as follows: Ivette M. Montañez: 75%; María L. Vázquez Guzmán: 72%; Pedro Orraca Figueroa: 71%; Dalisa Marrero Ríos: 70%.

12. By letter dated June 2, 2000, Arturo Deliz Vélez, OAJ's Executive Director, informed Plaintiff that he had been appointed to an Employment Program Specialist Position, as a regular career employee, effective June 16, 2000.

13. Through letter dated June 7, 2000, Mrs. Gladys G. Meléndez, Director of Human Resources at OAJ, informed Plaintiff that he had been selected for the Employment Program Specialist Position for Opening 2000-10, effective June 16, 2000. She also requested that he meet with her on June 12, 2000, to coordinate matters related to his employment.

14. Two documents titled "Notification for Appointment and Change Report" were issued on behalf of Plaintiff on June 2, 2000, to wit: (1) ending his transitory appointment as Employment Program Specialist, in the Services Sub Area, under the Covenant with Youth Program, effective June 15, 2000, (2) appointing him as Employment Program Specialist, in the Assistant Services Area, under the Covenant with the Youth Program. This second change reflects that, in his recently appointed position, Plaintiff's status was changed from career-probatory to regular-career, effective June 16, 2000, with a salary of $1,244.00 per month.

15. A "Notification for Appointment and Change Report" was issued on behalf of Plaintiff on August 30, 2000, stating that, as a result of the introduction of OAJ's new Classification Plan for the career service, Plaintiff's position was now one of "Youth Coordinator" in the Assistant Service Area, under the Covenant with the Youth Program, a regular position, with a salary of $1,437.00 per month, effective August 15, 2000.

16. Plaintiff's position as Youth Coordinator is not one in which political affiliation is an appropriate requirement nor does it have anything whatsoever to do with the effective performance of his position.

17. In January of 2001, Governor Sila M. Calderón appointed Co-Defendant Aníbal J. Torres Torres as Executive Director of the Youth Affairs Office.

18. Co-Defendant Torres Torres is a political activist of the Popular Democratic Party ("PDP"), who ran for mayor of the Municipality of Orocovis but was defeated by the candidate for the New Progressive Party ("NPP").

19. On August 20, 2001, an Administrative Hearing was held regarding the annulment of Plaintiff's position before Iris Gautier Rodríguez.

20. On September 5, 2001, the Youth Affairs Office published a Job Opening Announcement ("Convocatoria") to fill two positions titled "Youth Coordinator", including the position previously occupied by Plaintiff.

21. On September 7, 2001, Plaintiff applied for the position of "Youth Coordinator".

22. On October 8, 2001, the Youth Affairs Office notified Plaintiff that he had been certified as an eligible candidate for the position of "Youth Coordinator".

23. Co-Defendant Torres Torres filled both available positions for Youth Coordinator with two persons identified with and/or members of the PDP.

III. STANDARD FOR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the entry of summary judgment where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Pagano v. Frank, 983 F.2d 343, 347 (1st Cir.1993); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 894 (1st Cir. 1988). Summary judgment is appropriate where, after drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is material if, based on the substantive law at issue, it might affect the outcome of the case. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st...