Ortega v. Chi. Pub. Sch. of the Bd. of Educ. of Chi. & Adelfio Garcia

• Decision Date: 30 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. 11 C 8477,11 C 8477
• Parties: Linda Ortega Plaintiff, v. Chicago Public School of the Board of Education of the City of Chicago and Adelfio Garcia. Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

Linda Ortega Plaintiff, v. Chicago Public School of the Board of Education of the City of Chicago and Adelfio Garcia. Defendants.

No. 11 C 8477

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

June 30, 2015

Judge Thomas M. Durkin

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Linda Ortega filed this lawsuit against her former employer, the Chicago Board of Education¹ (the "Board"), and the principal of the school where she was a teacher, Adelfio Garcia ("Principal Garcia"), in his individual capacity, alleging discrimination and retaliation claims against both defendants in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. ("Count IV"). R. 37. Defendants ask the Court to grant summary judgment in their favor. R. 74. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part.

Background

I. Local Rule 56.1

Before discussing the underlying facts, the Court must first address the parties' numerous failures to comply with Local Rule 56.1.

A. Ortega's Response to Defendant's² Local Rule 56.1 Statement

Local Rule 56.1 requires a party seeking summary judgment to file a statement of material facts, submitted as short numbered paragraphs containing citations to admissible evidence. L. R. 56.1(a); see also Ace Hardware Corp. v. Landen Hardware, LLC, 883 F. Supp. 2d 739, 741 (N.D. Ill. 2012). Local Rule 56.1 also requires the opposing party to either admit or deny each paragraph and cite to its own supporting evidence. L. R. 56.1(b)(3)(A). As a result, any facts that a party improperly purports to controvert in its Local Rule 56.1 response are deemed admitted. Hinton v. USA Funds, No. 03 C 2311, 2005 WL 730963, at *1 n. 2 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 30, 2005) (citing Wilkins v. Riveredge Hosp., No 02 C 9232, 2004 WL 906010, at *2 n. 3) (N.D. Ill. Apr. 26, 2004)).

Many of Ortega's responses to Defendant's Rule 56.1 statement contain allegations that are unsupported by citations to the record. While the Court draws all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, an adequate rebuttal of a supported assertion of fact requires a citation to specific support in the record; an unsubstantiated denial is not adequate. Groshon v. Trans Union, LLC, No. 12 C 7591, 2014 WL 683747, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2014). The consequence of Ortega's failure to comply with Local Rule 56.1 is that her responses without citation to the record are disregarded by the Court, and the Defendant's factual allegations to which they are directed are deemed admitted.³ De v. City of Chicago, 912 F. Supp. 2d 709, 712-13 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (citing L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(C) ("All material facts set forth in the statement required of the moving party will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement of the opposing party.")).

Pursuant to Rule 56.1, the party opposing summary judgment must also give "a concise response" to each of the movant's statements. L. R. 56.1(b). Bennett v. Unitek Global Servs., LLC, No. 10 C 4968, 2013 WL 4804841, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2013). Lengthy recitations of additional facts in Ortega's responses are not proper. For example, Ortega's response to Paragraph 13 of Defendant's statement of facts is nearly three full pages composed of four paragraphs. Such a response isimproper and will not be considered.⁴ Certain of Ortega's Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) statements also assert facts that are not fairly responsive to the corresponding paragraphs of Defendant's Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement. As such, the Court disregards the additional facts contained therein and deems the Defendant's facts admitted.⁵ See id. at *4; Flores v. Giuliano, No. 12 C 162, 2014 WL 3360504, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2014).

Relatedly, "[f]acts presented only in response to a defendant's statement of facts, but not in the plaintiff's own statement of additional facts are improper because the defendant has no mechanism to reply or otherwise dispute them." Wilcox v. Allstate Corp., No. 11 C 814, 2012 WL 6569729, at *5-7 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 2012) (citing Woods v. Von Maur, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 2d 857, 863 (N.D. Ill. 2011)). Therefore, any additional factual assertions contained within the paragraphs of Ortega's response to Defendant's 56.1 statement will not be considered as facts "affirmatively demonstrating why summary judgment should be denied." Wilcox, 2012 WL 6569729, at *6 (quoting Woods, 837 F. Supp. 2d at 863). However, they are properly before the Court for the limited purpose of determining the basis for Ortega's denial of Defendant's factual assertions. Id. ("[u]sing such evidence to directly dispute [the defendant's] fact is fine . . . ." (citing Woods, 837 F. Supp. 2d at 873)).

Ortega further responds to certain statements of fact by claiming that she can "neither admit nor deny" them or "has insufficient knowledge" to admit or deny. This type of response is inappropriate at the summary judgment stage as it neither admits nor denies Defendant's facts and is unsupported by citations to the record. See Ace Hardware, 883 F. Supp. 2d at 742-43; Pl. 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 13, 29 (R. 92-2). To the extent that Ortega so responds in paragraphs 13 and 29, Defendant's corresponding facts are deemed admitted insofar as they are supported by the record. Ace Hardware, 883 F. Supp. 2d at 742-43 (citing Marchman v. Advocate Bethany Hosp., No 04 C 6051, 2006 WL 1987815, at *6 (N.D. Ill. July 12, 2006)).

Additionally, Ortega's responses objecting to the relevance of the stated facts do not constitute denials. Wilcox, 2012 WL 6569729, at *5-7 (citing Ammons v. Aramark Uniform Servs., Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 818 (7th Cir. 2004) (non-moving party's assertion that allegations in movant's 56.1 statement were "irrelevant" does not excuse the nonmoving party from "at least indicating that it agrees with or denies the allegation")). Those facts will be deemed admitted.⁶

B. Ortega's Statement of Additional Facts

Defendant objects to several of Ortega's statements of additional facts for failure to comply with Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 56.1 of the Local Rules. R. 104. Specifically, Defendant argues that certain facts are not supported by admissible record evidence. See id. ¶¶ 4, 7, 22, 29, 38. Moreover, Defendant claims Ortega improperly cites to material not provided to the Court insupport of certain facts. "[T]he nonmovant's statement of additional facts, must 'be supported by specific references to the record.'" De, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 712-13 (quoting Malec v. Sanford, 191 F.R.D. 581, 584 (N.D. Ill. 2000)). The Court does not accept Ortega's factual assertions as being supported when the record lacks the cited material.⁷ Facts citing material not provided to the Court, along with those unsupported by any reference to the record, will be disregarded.

Ortega's statement of additional facts also includes improper argumentative characterizations of facts. For example, Ortega states that Principal Garcia asked Ortega to complete assignments that were "not even possible" and that Principal Garcia made an "impossible" request of Ortega. See Pl. Addt'l. 56.1 ¶ 6 (R. 92-2)⁸. The Court will disregard this type of argumentative language as it is improper. Ace Hardware, 883 F. Supp. 2d at 743.

C. Defendant's Response to Ortega's Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts

In several of Defendant's responses to Ortega's Rule 56.1 statement of additional facts, Defendant states that it "do[es] not dispute that [the witness] testified as stated." See Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 14, 16, 17, 21, 23_(R. 104). However, "[i]f a party disputes a statement, it must point to specific evidencein the record to support its contention. Otherwise, that statement is deemed admitted. Gross v. Radioshack Corp., No. 04 C 4297, 2007 WL 917387, at *6 n.11 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2007) (citing L. R. 56.1(b)(3)). Thus, the facts to which Defendant so replies will be admitted.⁹ Id. (admitting facts where, defendant, in its local rule response, did not specifically deny that statements were made and instead responded, "[the witness] so testified.").

In sum, based on the Court's findings, the Court disregards Ortega's responses (or the portions described herein) to Paragraphs 6, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 36, 40, 41, 42, 44, 47, 48, 53 of Defendant's statement of facts and deems the facts admitted. Similarly, the Court disregards Defendant's responses to Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 14, 16, 17, 21, 23 of Ortega's statement of additional facts and deems the facts admitted.

II. Background Facts

Ortega began working for the Board in 1998. Def. 56.1 ¶ 1. In February 2001, she started working full time at Hedges Elementary School ("Hedges") in Chicago. Id. Principal Garcia was employed by the Board for 18 years. Id. ¶ 2. He became Principal of Hedges in July 2006. Id. For purposes of this motion, Defendant does not dispute that Ortega had a left-arm paralysis disability at the time of the events in this case. R. 75 at 4. Pl. Addt'l. 56.1 ¶¶ 7.

For the 2008-09 school year, Hedges had "departmentalized" classes for students in the middle school grades (grades six through eight). Def. 56.1 ¶ 9. Theclasses are "departmentalized" in that teachers teach specific subjects, such as language arts, mathematics, science, and social studies,¹⁰ instead of teaching all subjects to a particular class of students. Id. ¶ 10. Principal Garcia assigned four teachers to teach sixth graders for the 2008-09 school year. Id. ¶ 11. Ortega taught language arts; Brian Cerda taught social studies, Alejandro Perez taught math; and Linda Smith taught science. Id. Ortega taught all of the language arts classes that year. Pl. Addt'l. 56.1 ¶ 8. For the subject of language arts, teachers were to grade students in five areas: (1) Reading in the English Language Standards ("ESL")or Reading in the non-English Language Standards (for example Spanish); (2) Writing Standards; (3) Listening Standards; (4)...