Orthodox Jewish Coal. of Chestnut Ridge v. Vill. of Chestnut Ridge, N.Y.

• Decision Date: 13 August 2021
• Docket Number: 19-CV-443 (KMK)
• Parties: ORTHODOX JEWISH COALITION OF CHESTNUT RIDGE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. VILLAGE OF CHESTNUT RIDGE, NEW YORK, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

ORTHODOX JEWISH COALITION OF CHESTNUT RIDGE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. VILLAGE OF CHESTNUT RIDGE, NEW YORK, Defendant.

No. 19-CV-443 (KMK)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

August 13, 2021

ORDER

KENNETH M. KARAS, United States District Judge.

Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration (the “Motion”). (See Pls.' Not. of Mot for Recons. (“Not. of Mot.”) (Dkt. No. 81).) Plaintiffs seek reconsideration of the Court's March 31 2021 Opinion & Order (the “March Opinion”) insofar as it dismissed Count III and Count VIII of Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint. (Id.; see also Op. & Order (“Op.”) (Dkt No. 80); First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) ¶¶ 158-60, 169-71 (Dkt. No. 29).) For the following reasons, the Motion is granted.

I. Background

The Court assumes familiarity with the facts alleged in the First Amended Complaint as discussed in the March Opinion. (See generally Op.) In the March Opinion, the Court dismissed as moot Plaintiffs' claims for prospective relief. (Id. at 11-19.) This left only Plaintiffs' claims for damages. Regarding those claims, the Court dismissed as unripe Plaintiffs' as-applied challenges and Plaintiffs' facial challenges that it referred to as Category Two claims-that is, claims regarding “free exercise, free speech, and free association . . . . and RLUIPA substantial burden and exclusion and limits claims.” (Id. at 30 (alterations omitted); see id. at 20-34.) However, it found ripe Plaintiffs' facial Category One challenges-including “equal protection claims under the federal and New York constitutions and nondiscrimination and equal terms claims under RLUIPA.” (Id. at 30 (ellipses omitted).) The Court found that Plaintiffs had adequately alleged injury in fact to establish standing, (id. 34-37), but that the Orthodox Jewish Coalition of Chestnut Ridge (“OJCCR”) lacked standing, (id. 37-39). Finally, the Court found that RLUIPA's safe harbor provision barred Plaintiffs' nondiscrimination and equal terms claims under RLUIPA. (Id. at 39-41.)

These holdings-which the Motion does not challenge-left three congregations (Congregation Birchas Yitzchok, Congregation Dexter Park, and Congregation Torah U'tfilla; the “Congregations”) and two individuals (Abraham Willner and Tzvi Miller; the “Individuals”), each with a claim for damages based on (1) a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution (Count III; the “Equal Protection” claim), (FAC ¶¶ 158-60), and (2) a violation of Article I § 3 of the New York Constitution (Count VIII; the “State Law” claim), (id. ¶¶ 169-71). The Court dismissed Plaintiffs' Equal Protection claim because “Plaintiffs [did] not allege . . . a discriminatory purpose.” (Op. 42-43.) And having dismissed all of Plaintiffs' federal claims, the Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the State Law claim. (Id. at 43.)

In the Motion, Plaintiffs make two arguments. First, Plaintiffs argue that the Court committed clear error in requiring “additional proof of discriminatory intent” when the First Amended Complaint alleged that Defendant's ordinance was “facially discriminatory.” (Pls.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. (“Pls.' Mem.”) 2 (Dkt. No. 82).) Defendant contests this argument. (See generally Def.'s Mem. in Opp'n to Pls.' Mot. (“Def.'s Mem.”) (Dkt. No. 84).) Second, Plaintiffs argue that “the Court should treat [the State Law claim] as a ‘Category One' claim with respect to any ripeness challenges, ” and exercise supplemental jurisdiction over it. (Pls.' Mem. 9.) Defendant does not contest this argument. (See generally Def.'s Mem.) As a result, the Motion hinges on Plaintiffs' argument that they adequately alleged an Equal Protection claim.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

“Motions for reconsideration are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and Local Civil Rule 6.3, which are meant to ensure the finality of decisions and to prevent the practice of a losing party examining a decision and then plugging the gaps of a lost motion with additional matters.” Arthur Glick Truck Sales, Inc. v. Stuphen E. Corp, 965 F.Supp.2d 402, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citation omitted), aff'd, 577 Fed.Appx. 11 (2d Cir. 2014). The standard for such motions is “strict” and “should not be granted where the moving party seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995); see also In re Gen. Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig., No. 14-MC-2543, 2017 WL 3443623, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2017) (“It is well established that the rules permitting motions for reconsideration must be narrowly construed and strictly applied so as to avoid repetitive arguments on issues that have been considered fully by the [c]ourt.” (citation omitted)). A movant may not “rely upon facts, issues, or arguments that were previously available but not presented to the court.” Indergit v. Rite Aid Corp., 52 F.Supp.3d 522, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). Nor is a motion for reconsideration “the proper avenue for the submission of new material.” Sys. Mgmt. Arts Inc. v. Avesta Techs., Inc., 106 F.Supp.2d 519, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). “Rather, to be entitled to reconsideration, a movant must demonstrate that the [c]ourt overlooked controlling decisions or factual matters that were put before it on the underlying motion, which, had they been considered might reasonably have altered the result reached by the court.” Arthur Glick Truck Sales, 965 F.Supp.2d at 405 (citation omitted); Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257 (same). In other words, “[a] motion for reconsideration should be granted only when the [movant] identifies an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Alvarez v. City of New York, No. 11-CV-5464, 2017 WL 6033425, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2017) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, Inc. v. YLL Irrevocable Tr., 729 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2013)); see also Indergit, 52 F.Supp.3d at 523 (same).

B. Analysis

Plaintiffs argue that “the Court erred in holding that [Plaintiffs] were required to allege that . . . facially discriminatory laws were enacted with a discriminatory purpose.” (Pls.' Mem. 1.) They are correct. The Second Circuit has “recognized three types of equal protection violations: (1) a facially discriminatory law; (2) a facially neutral statute that was adopted with a discriminatory intent and applied with a discriminatory effect; and (3) a facially neutral law that is enforced in a discriminatory manner.” Congregation Rabbinical Coll. of Tartikov, Inc. v. Village of Pomona, 945 F.3d 83, 110-11 (2d Cir. 2019) (ellipses omitted), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 885 (2020); see also Chabad Lubavitch of Litchfield Cnty., Inc. v. Litchfield Historic Dist. Comm'n, 768 F.3d 183, 199 (2d Cir. 2014) (same); Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1999) (same). As a result, “a plaintiff who alleges a policy that is discriminatory on its face is not required to make any further allegations of discriminatory intent or animus.” Juarez v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 69 F.Supp.3d 364, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), amended, No. 14-CV-5107, 2014 WL 12772237 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2014); see also Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agr. Implement Workers of Am., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199 (1991) (“[T]he absence of a malevolent motive does not convert a facially discriminatory policy into a neutral policy with a discriminatory effect.”).^[1] Defendant argues that Plaintiffs are required to allege intentional discrimination. (Def.'s Mem. 6-10.) This is right, but it does not help Defendant because “[s]uch intentional discrimination can be demonstrated . . . [by] a law or policy [that] is discriminatory on its face.” Hayden, 180 F.3d at 48; see also Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 337 (2d Cir. 2000) (same). The March Opinion's holding to the contrary was clear error.

Defendant's arguments regarding the standard of review are unpersuasive. Defendant claims that Plaintiffs should have answered its argument while opposing its motion to dismiss. (Def.'s Mem. 3.) Plaintiffs respond that Defendant's statement regarding their Equal Protection claim was “not an argument, ” because it appeared in the “Summary of Motion” section and not the “Argument” section, and it merely noted as “relevant” the lack of an alleged discriminatory purpose. (Pls.' Reply Mem. in Supp. of Mot. (“Pls.' Reply”) 1 (Dkt. No. 87).) The Court agrees with Plaintiffs' characterization of the briefing. Of course, Plaintiffs could have responded, but Defendant's claim was stray and disconnected from the remainder of its argument and did not provide sufficient notice that Plaintiffs' claim could be dismissed on this basis. (See Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. To Dismiss Pls.' First Am. Compl. (“Def.'s MTD Mem.”) 3 (Dkt. No. 62).)

Defendant's other arguments are equally unavailing. Plaintiffs are entitled to reconsideration of clearly erroneous decisions, even where they have the option to amend. (See Def.'s Mem. 3.) Indeed, the case Defendant cites notes that the plaintiff's failure to “take advantage of the opportunity to replead” was “not dispositive.” Murray v. Dutcavich, No. 17-CV-9121, 2020 WL 3318212, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2020). Finally, as discussed, Plaintiffs identify ample controlling authority showing that the March Opinion's ruling as to Plaintiffs' Equal Protection claim was clearly erroneous. (See Def.'s Mem. 4.)

Defendant raises a number of substantive arguments. It argues that Plaintiffs fail to identify similarly situated comparators. (Id. at 4-6, 8.) It argues that the challenged ordinance was facially neutral. (Id. at 14-22.) And it interposes challenges based on the statute of limitations the fact that the challenged law...