Ortiz v. Cybex Int'l, Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 September 2018
• Docket Number: CIVIL NO. 15-2989 (PAD)
• Citation: 345 F.Supp.3d 107
• Parties: Neslie I. BERNARDI ORTIZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CYBEX INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

345 F.Supp.3d 107

Neslie I. BERNARDI ORTIZ, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.CYBEX INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al., Defendants.

CIVIL NO. 15-2989 (PAD)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed September 30, 2018

Alicia Margarita Santos-Irizarry, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Antonio Gnocchi-Franco, Gnocchi-Franco Law Office, San Juan, PR, Michelle Gilboe, Carli D. Pearson, Pro Hac Vice, Bowman and Brooke LLP, Minneapolis, MN, Carlos J. Chardon-Kierce, Hamilton Miller & Birthisel, LLP, Miami, FL, Jolieann Brooks-Guzman, Hamilton, Miller & Birthisel, Tampa, FL, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Delgado-Hernández, District Judge.

This is an action for damages under Puerto Rico law predicated on diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (Docket Nos. 1 and 28). Before the court are two motions for summary judgment, one seeking dismissal of third-party claims as a result of a settlement agreement reached between plaintiffs and some of the third-party defendants (Docket No. 236), the other, filed by non-settling third-party defendants, requesting dismissal on timeliness, improper impleader, jurisdictional, and what may be characterized as "indirect settlement beneficiary" grounds (Docket No. 279). The motions generated oppositions, replies and sur-replies. See, Docket Nos. 277, 300, 323, 333, 334, 339, 352, 357, and 358. For the reasons explained below, the motion for summary judgment at Docket No. 236 is GRANTED and the motion at Docket No. 279 is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Working out at a gym, Neslie I. Bernardi-Ortiz suffered severe injuries, leading her and her parents and siblings to initiate this action for recovery of damages against Cybex International, Inc., the manufacturer of the exercise machine that broke on Ms. Bernardi, and Cybex's insurer, Navigators Specialty Insurance Company Code (Docket Nos. 1 and 28).¹ Cybex filed a third-party complaint against: (1) the gym's owner and/or operator HCOA Mayagüez, LLC, HCOA PR Management Services LLC, HCOA PR Franchise Holding, TS Fitness PR HoldCo, LLC, Total Body Fitness PR, LLC and their insurer, MAPFRE-PRAICO Insurance Company; and (2) Fitness and Spa Solutions, Inc., Fitness Services, Inc., Zayra Sánchez, Milton Esteva, Irwin Rodríguez and their insurer, Universal Insurance Company (Docket Nos. 14, 48, 140, 142, 263, 264).

During discovery, plaintiffs settled with MAPFRE, the HCOA entities and TS Fitness PR HoldCo, as a result of which, the settling defendants moved for summary judgment (Docket No. 236). The remaining third-party defendants (the "Universal defendants") followed suit, moving for summary judgment as well (Docket No. 279). Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate when the record shows no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See, Fed R. Civ. 56 (a)(setting forth standard). The issues sub judice consist of legal disputes properly raised by way of Rule 56 for evaluation and decision.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Bar Order

In August 2017, as part of case management and ordering of proceedings, the court prohibited filing of motions for summary judgment except motions related to State Insurance Fund (i.e. workers' compensation) immunity (Docket No. 215, pp. 1-2). Subsequently, the parties moved for summary judgment as indicated above. The settling defendants' motion is predicated on a settlement agreement entered into after the bar order, and thus, is based on a ground that did not exist at the time the order was docketed. As such, it falls beyond the scope of the order.

In contrast, the Universal defendants' motion for summary judgment was partly filed in violation of the order, for it is predicated on: (1) the argument that the action is time-barred; (2) allegedly improper impleader and related jurisdictional grounds; and (3) the theory that the actions against the Universal defendants cannot subsist in light of the settlement agreement reached between the plaintiffs by the settling defendants. The court will not consider the timeliness issue given that, contrary to the other grounds proffered in support of the motion, it is not related to the court's jurisdiction or the settlement agreement. In the interest of judicial economy, however, the motion will not be ordered stricken only to be refiled without reference to arguments regarding the alleged untimeliness.

B. Impleader/Jurisdiction

The Universal defendants allege that the third-party actions which Cybex filed against them are improper and suggest that if not dismissed, could result in lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to absence of complete diversity of citizenship between the parties (Docket No. 279, p. 11; Docket No. 352, p. 2). Pursuant to Rule 14(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, at any time after the commencement of the action, a defending party, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons to be served upon a person not a party to the action "who is or may be liable to the third-party plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff." Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a). Third-party practice under Rule 14 is usually referred to as impleader. See, 3 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 14.02, p. 14-9 (so noting). It basically permits a defending party to join an absentee for the purpose of deflecting to that absentee all or part of its potential liability to the plaintiff on the underlying claim. Id. at § 14.03 [1], p. 14-10. Almost always, this deflection will be based on an assertion that the absentee owes the defending party a duty of contribution or indemnity. Id.

The right of contribution does not arise until one of the tortfeasors pays more than its share of liability. Nevertheless, a contingent claim may be filed against any of the other alleged tortfeasors. Therefore, a tortfeasor may use a third-party action to accumulate a claim against any potential joint tortfeasor contingent to the result of the principal action. See, MOORE'S, supra, at § 14.05 [2], pp. 14-28-14-29 (Rule 14(a) permits impleader of joint tortfeasors for contribution before the claim accrues; the fact that defendant's right has not yet accrued by virtue of paying a judgment does not affect the sufficiency of its third-party complaint to state a claim for relief).

Third-party practice fosters efficient litigation by packaging the underlying claim for liability and any contribution or indemnity claims in a single case, sparing the judicial system and at least some of the parties the waste and expense of multiple lawsuits. Id. It does not, however, operate in a vacuum. It is only available when the applicable substantive law provides the right to pursue the claim against the third-party defendant. See, United Nat. Ins. Co. v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., 306 F.R.D. 153, 154 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (liability of third-party defendant depends on relevant substantive law); Connors v. Suburban Propane Co., 916 F.Supp. 73, 76 (D.N.H. 1996) ( Rule 14 is available to bring causes of action recognized under statutory or common law).

From these parameters, plaintiffs allege that Bernardi was injured while performing squat exercises using a Cybex Smith Press machine at a gym owned by HCOA Mayaguez LLC (Docket No. 28, ¶¶ 17, 18). They assert the machine suddenly broke, and a weight of approximately 270 pounds hit Bernardi's cervical area, causing paraplegia

. Id. at ¶¶ 18, 20. They claim Cybex is strictly liable to them for having designed, manufactured and marketed a defective machine, and for negligence, as it failed to take appropriate measures to avoid accidents such as the one that occurred here, and to provide adequate instructions and warnings of the risks involved in using the equipment (Docket No. 1, ¶¶ 26, 28, 32, 33, 34, 37, 38, 39).

Cybex filed third-party claims for contribution and indemnification against the Universal defendants, alleging that those defendants were responsible for maintaining and servicing the machine and that plaintiffs' injuries, if any, were caused by the Universal defendants' negligent conduct in failing to observe necessary and routine maintenance of the machine and/or modified or altered the machine from its original manufactured condition (Docket No. 263, ¶¶ 8, 9, 10,16, 17, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26, 29, 32, 33). Thus, it brought forth allegations upon which the Universal defendants may be liable to it for all or part of plaintiffs' claims, by pointing to a direct line of liability between itself and those defendants, a legitimate line to establish and pursue, given that Puerto Rico permits tortfeasor contribution. See, Fernández v. Corporación Insular de Seguros, 79 F.3d 207, 210 (1st Cir. 1996) (so recognizing in context of Rule 14(a) ).

Impleader is proper if there is a question as to whether the parties are in fact joint tortfeasors. See, Arroyo López v. Hospital Dr. Domínguez, Inc., 262 F.R.D. 93, 96 (D.P.R. 2009) (so noting). Requiring a district court "to determine the merit of all defenses potentially available to the original defendant as a precondition to allowing that defendant to file a third-party complaint would frustrate [the core purpose of Rule 14(a) ] and countervail the efficient allocation of judicial resources." Lehman v. Revolution Portfolio L.L.C., 166 F.3d 389, 395 (1st Cir. 1999). Consequently, the impleader here does not violate Rule 14(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, Corning Glass Works v. Puerto Rico Water Resources Authority, Inc., 396 F.2d 421, 423 (1st Cir. 1968) (alleged joint tortfeasor defendant may implead all who by their concurrent negligence might be liable to him for contribution).

The Universal defendants take issue with this conclusion, alleging they are not liable to Cybex for product liability (Docket No. 279, pp. 13-17; Docket No. 352, pp. 13-15). Admittedly, what the defendant, third-party plaintiff asserts in its own right must be derivative of some claim set forth in the plaintiff's complaint. See, Metropolitan Life...