Ortiz v. Jordan, 09–737.
Decision Date | 24 January 2011 |
Docket Number | No. 09–737.,09–737. |
Citation | 131 S.Ct. 884,562 U.S. 180,178 L.Ed.2d 703 |
Parties | Michelle ORTIZ, Petitioner, v. Paula JORDAN et al. |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
David E. Mills, Cleveland, OH, for petitioner.
Benjamin C. Mizer, Columbus, OH, for respondents.
David E. Mills, Counsel of Record, The Mills Law Office LLC, Cleveland, Ohio, Andrew S. Pollis, Milton A. Kramer Law Clinic, Case Western Reserve, University School of Law, Cleveland, Ohio, Christian J. Grostic, Kushner & Hamed Co. LPA, Cleveland, Ohio, for petitioner.
Benjamin C. Mizer, Counsel of Record, Solicitor General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, Stephen P. Carney, Emily S. Schlesinger, Deputy Solicitors, Lori Weisman, Assistant Solicitor, Columbus, Ohio, for respondents.
We address in this case a procedural issue arising in a civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Michelle Ortiz, a former inmate at the Ohio Reformatory for Women. Plaintiff below, petitioner here, Ortiz filed a complaint in federal court stating key facts on which she based claims for damages against superintending prison officers. On two consecutive nights during her one-year incarceration, Ortiz stated, she was sexually assaulted by a corrections officer. Although she promptly reported the first incident, she further alleged, prison authorities took no measures to protect her against the second assault. After that assault, Ortiz charged, and in retaliation for accounts she gave of the two episodes, prison officials placed her, shackled and handcuffed, in solitary confinement in a cell without adequate heat, clothing, bedding, or blankets. The treatment to which she was exposed, Ortiz claimed, violated her right, safeguarded by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, to reasonable protection from violence while in custody.
Principal defendants in the suit, Paula Jordan, a case manager at Ortiz's living unit, and Rebecca Bright, a prison investigator, moved for summary judgment on their pleas of "qualified immunity," a defense that shields officials from suit if their conduct "d[id] not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Finding that the qualified immunity defense turned on material facts genuinely in dispute, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(a), the District Judge denied summary judgment. Ortiz v. Voinovich, 211 F.Supp.2d 917, 923–930 (S.D.Ohio 2002).
The case then proceeded to trial, and the jury returned verdicts for Ortiz against both Jordan and Bright. The two officers appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, targeting, inter alia, the denial of their pretrial motion for summary judgment. "[C]ourts normally do not review the denial of a summary judgment motion after a trial on the merits," the Court of Appeals recognized. 316 Fed.Appx. 449, 453 (2009). Nevertheless, the Court continued, "denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity is an exception to this rule." Ibid . Reversing the judgment entered on the jury's verdict, the appeals court held that both defendants were sheltered from Ortiz's suit by qualified immunity.
We granted review, 559 U.S. 1092, 130 S.Ct. 2371, 176 L.Ed.2d 767 (2010), to decide a threshold question on which the Circuits are split: May a party, as the Sixth Circuit believed, appeal an order denying summary judgment after a full trial on the merits?1 Our answer is no. The order retains its interlocutory character as simply a step along the route to final judgment. See Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). Once the case proceeds to trial, the full record developed in court supersedes the record existing at the time of the summary-judgment motion. A qualified immunity defense, of course, does not vanish when a district court declines to rule on the plea summarily. The plea remains available to the defending officials at trial; but at that stage, the defense must be evaluated in light of the character and quality of the evidence received in court.
When summary judgment is sought on a qualified immunity defense, the court inquires whether the party opposing the motion has raised any triable issue barring summary adjudication. "[O]nce trial has been had," however, "the availability of official immunity should be determined by the trial record, not the pleadings nor the summary judgment record." 15A C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3914.10, p. 684 (2d ed.1992 and Supp.2010). After trial, if defendants continue to urge qualified immunity, the decisive question, ordinarily, is whether the evidence favoring the party seeking relief is legally sufficient to overcome the defense. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 50(a), (b) ( ).
In the case before us, the Court of Appeals, although purporting to review the District Court's denial of the prison officials' pretrial summary-judgment motion, 316 Fed.Appx., at 453, several times pointed to evidence presented only at the trial stage of the proceedings, see id ., at 453–454. The appeals court erred, but not fatally, by incorrectly placing its ruling under a summary-judgment headline. Its judgment was infirm, however, because Jordan's and Bright's failure to renew their motion for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) left the appellate forum with no warrant to reject the appraisal of the evidence by "the judge who saw and heard the witnesses and ha[d] the feel of the case which no appellate printed transcript can impart." Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 216, 67 S.Ct. 752, 91 L.Ed. 849 (1947).
Michelle Ortiz, serving a sentence for aggravated assault against her husband,2 maintained that she was sexually assaulted on consecutive days by Corrections Officer Douglas Schultz. On Friday, November 8, 1996, Ortiz recounted, Schultz walked up behind her in the washroom of her living quarters and grabbed one of her breasts.3 Ortiz fended off the assault, but Schultz returned later that day and threatened to "see [her] tomorrow," Tr. 36.
The next day, Ortiz described the incident to Jordan. After assuring Ortiz that "no one has the right to touch you," 316 Fed.Appx., at 451 (internal quotation marks omitted), Jordan told Ortiz that Schultz had been reassigned to another correctional facility and was serving his last day at the reformatory. Ortiz could file a written complaint, Jordan noted. She suggested, however, that Ortiz not do so, in view of Schultz's imminent departure. Jordan advised Ortiz that she "always ha[d] the right to defend [her]self," Tr. 43, and counseled her to " 'hang out with [her] friends' for the rest of the day so that Schultz would not have the chance to be alone with her," 316 Fed.Appx., at 451 (alteration in original).
The day of her conversation with Ortiz, Jordan wrote an incident report describing her version of the encounter. In that account, Jordan stated that Ortiz had refused to name her assailant or provide any other information about the assault. Jordan did not immediately notify her superiors of the assault Ortiz reported and Ortiz's consequent fears about her safety. Taking the incident report home in her workbag, Jordan submitted it upon her return to work two days later.
Ortiz endeavored to follow Jordan's advice about staying in the company of friends. But later in the day, feeling ill, she returned to her room and fell asleep. Three other inmates were in the room when Ortiz went to sleep. They were gone when she awoke to find Schultz standing over her, one hand fondling her left breast, the fingers of the other hand inside her underwear penetrating her vagina.
Bright's investigation began two days after the second assault. During its course, Bright placed Ortiz in solitary confinement. Ortiz maintained that Bright isolated her in retaliation for her accusations against Schultz. Bright, however, testified that she segregated Ortiz because Ortiz continued to discuss the investigation with other inmates, disobeying Bright's repeated instructions to refrain from speaking about it.
In her § 1983 action, Ortiz claimed that Jordan did nothing to ward off Schultz's second sexual assault, despite Jordan's awareness of the substantial risk of that occurrence. Bright, Ortiz charged, retaliated against her because she resisted Bright's efforts to induce her to retract her accounts of Schultz's assaults. (Schultz, having resigned from state employment, could not be found and served with process.) The District Court, noting multiple factual disputes material to Ortiz's claims and the officers' defense of qualified immunity, denied summary judgment to Jordan and Bright, 211 F.Supp.2d, at 923–930 ;4 neither defendant appealed the District Court's denial of summary judgment.
The case proceeded to trial, and a jury returned a verdict of $350,000 in compensatory and punitive damages against Jordan and $275,000 against Bright. Jordan and Bright sought judgment as a matter of law, pursuant to Rule 50(a), both at the close of Ortiz's evidence and at the close of their own presentation. But they did not contest the jury's liability finding by renewing, under Rule 50(b), their request for judgment as a matter of law. Nor did they request a new trial under Rule 59(a). The District Court entered judgment for Ortiz in accordance with the jury's verdict.
On appeal, Jordan and Bright urged both that the District Court should have granted them summary judgment on their defense of qualified immunity and that the verdict was "against the weight of the evidence." Final Brief for Defendants–Appellants in No. 06–3627(CA6), pp. 21, 26. Appraising the parties' evidence under a de novo standard of review, the Court of Appeals "reverse[d]...
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