Ortiz v. De San Juan

Decision Date29 March 2021
Docket NumberCIVIL NO. 19-1671 (DRD)
PartiesLUIS CAMACHO ORTIZ, Plaintiff, v. MUNICIPIO DE SAN JUAN, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
OMNIBUS OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the Court are the following motions: Codefendant, Guillermo Calixto-Rodríguez's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and Memorandum in Support Thereof (Docket No. 63); Codefendant, Municipio de San Juan's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint Against the Municipality of San Juan Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and Memorandum in Support Thereof (Docket No. 64); Codefendant, former Mayor of the Autonomous Municipality of San Juan, Carmen Yulín Cruz Soto's Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint Against the Mayor of the Municipality of San Juan and Memorandum in Support Thereof (Docket No. 65)1; and Codefendants, Carmen Serrano Cruz and Marta Vera Ramírez's Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6) and Memorandum in Support Thereof (Docket No. 67)2, collectively (the "Motions to Dismiss"). Plaintiff, Luis Camacho Ortiz timely filed his Opposition to Motions to Dismiss. See Docket No. 72. Codefendants,Guillermo Calixto-Rodríguez and Carmen Yulín Cruz Soto replied shortly thereafter. See Docket Nos. 79 and 80, respectively. Plaintiff filed a Surreply. See Docket No. 85.

For the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. See Docket Nos. 63, 64, 65 and 67.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The instant suit raises causes of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution; Puerto Rico's Act 100; Puerto Rico's Act 115 as to the Municipality of San Juan; and damages as a result thereof, pursuant to Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code. See Docket No. 58; see also PR Laws Ann. Tit. 31, §§ 5141 and 5142. Mr. Camacho essentially seeks to enjoin the Municipality of San Juan "from discriminating against its employees based on their exercise of their First Amendment rights"; reinstating him to his position in the Municipality of San Juan (hereinafter, "MSJ"); damages; and attorney's fees and costs and other applicable relief. See Docket No. 58.

According to the Amended Complaint3, "[t]his is a 1983 action based on Defendants' retaliation against Plaintiff exercising his First Amendment rights by writing and publishing articles critical of specific defendants and of the Municipality of San Juan itself." Docket No. 58, ¶ 1. Mr. Camacho worked for the Police Force of the Municipality of San Juan from 1998 until his resignation on June 25, 2017. Id., ¶¶ 12, 57. In 2012, he was promoted to Sergeant. Id., ¶ 13. However, Plaintiff argues that the San Juan Municipal Police rejected [his] resignation and firedhim in retaliation for his writing and publishing articles about matters of public concern that were critical of co-Defendants." Id., ¶ 61.

In his spare time, Mr. Camacho "published a webpage called tunoticiapr.com. Id., ¶ 14. As stated in the Amended Complaint, "there were a number or articles that criticized the official conduct of co-Defendants Cruz and Calixto, including one . . . that criticized Mayor Cruz for lying about the official policy of the Municipality of San Juan as to the presence of swimming pools at the municipal facility Casa Cuna." Id., ¶ 16. Mr. Camacho alleges that "[n]o article tunoticiapr.com4 published contained information that [plaintiff] learned from his work as a sergeant in the San Juan Municipal Police." Id., ¶ 23.

Plaintiff argues that he worked for the MSJ Police Department "and, in his free time, ran a website that reported on matters of public concern. His efforts ignited Defendants' ire and caused them to fire him when Mayor Cruz lied to reporters after a baby drowned in a pool at Casa Cuna." Docket No. 72 at 2. According to Mr. Camacho, "[t]he mayor told journalists that the municipality prohibited such pools; Sgt. Camacho posted pictures of a receipt for a tank of water the municipality bought for the pool; and the Defendants fired him without a hearing for a 'conflict of interest' for reporting the truth."5 Id. Finally, according to Mr. Camacho, theinformation that was published was received from sources unrelated to his job on the MSJ. See Id.

Whereas, Codefendant Calixto Rodríguez, Police Commissioner of the Municipality of San Juan at the time of the events, seeks dismissal as "[t]he Amended Complaint does not state valid claims for relief against him in his personal capacity and must be dismissed on its face. As will be shown, there are no well-pleaded allegations in the Amended Complaint that impute individual liability on Co-Defendant Calixto-Rodríguez who acted within the purview and legal mandate of Municipal laws and regulations and pursuant to the duties of his former position as Commissioner of the San Juan Municipal Police." Docket No. 63 at 2. In turn, the MSJ argues that "[t]o support his claims, Camacho refers to several events in a vague and generic manner. He also fails, on occasions and to his convenience, to provide a date when the events occurred, like for example when claim letters were sent to the MSJ." Docket No. 64 at 2.

Meanwhile, the former Mayor of the MSJ, Codefendant Cruz Soto joins the arguments set forth by the Defendants and raises the defense of qualified immunity. See Docket No. 65. Finally, Codefendants, Carmen Serrano Cruz and Marta Vera Ramírez argue that the Amended Complaint fails to provide additional allegations to avoid a dismissal, and should run the same faith as the original Complaint as it "fail[s] to claim that the codefendants were involved in any event that cause[d] or contributed to the deprivation of the employment of the plaintiff without due process of the law or without any infringed of his constitutional rights." Docket No. 67 at 2. Furthermore,Carmen Serrano Cruz and Marta Vera Ramírez are raising protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Id. In any event, Codefendants Serrano Cruz and Vera Ramírez argue that claims pursuant to § 1983 are time barred.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires plaintiffs to provide "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Under Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), a plaintiff must "provide the grounds of his entitlement [with] more than labels and conclusions." See Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) ("in order to 'show' an entitlement of relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).') (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (citation omitted). Thus, a plaintiff must, and is now required to, present allegations that "nudge [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible" in order to comply with the requirements of Rule 8(a). Id. at 570; see e.g. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).

When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court's inquiry occurs in a two-step process under the current context-based "plausibility" standard established by Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, and Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662. "Context based" means that a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts that comply with the basic elements of the cause of action. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-679 (concluding that plaintiff's complaint was factually insufficient to substantiate the required elements of a Bivens claim, leaving the complaint with only conclusory statements). First, the Court must "accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint[,]" discarding legal conclusions, conclusory statements and factually threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action.Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "Yet we need not accept as true legal conclusions from the complaint or 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 268 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. 678) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Under the second step of the inquiry, the Court must determine whether, based upon all assertions that were not discarded under the first step of the inquiry, the complaint "states a plausible claim for relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. 679. This second step is "context-specific" and requires that the Court draw from its own "judicial experience and common sense" to decide whether a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted, or, conversely, whether dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate. Id.

Thus "[i]n order to survive a motion to dismiss, [a] plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show that he has a plausible entitlement to relief." Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 41 (1st Cir. 2009). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged —but has not 'show[n]' 'that the pleader is entitled to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Furthermore, such inferences must be at least as plausible as any "obvious alternative explanation." Id. at 679-80 (citing Twombly 550 U.S. at 567). "A plaintiff is not entitled to 'proceed perforce' by virtue of allegations that merely parrot the elements of the cause of action." Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 12, (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679); Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 45 (1st Cir. 2009). The First Circuit has cautioned against equating plausibility with an analysis of the likely success on the merits, affirming that the plausibility standard assumes "pleaded facts to be true and read in a plaintiff's favor" even if seemingly incredible. Sepúlveda-Villarini v. Dep't of Educ. of P.R., 628 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 12(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556) ("[T]he court may not disregard properly pled factual...

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