Ortiz v. the City of Chicago

Decision Date25 August 2011
Docket NumberNo. 10–1775.,10–1775.
Citation656 F.3d 523
PartiesApril ORTIZ, as administrator of the Estate of May Molina, Plaintiff–Appellant,v.The CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants–Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Jon C. Loevy (argued), Mark Reyes, Attorneys, Loevy & Loevy, Chicago, IL, for PlaintiffsAppellants.John F. Gibbons, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Kerrie Maloney Laytin (argued), Mara S. Georges, Attorneys, Office of the Corporation Counsel, Appeals Division, Chicago, IL, for DefendantsAppellees.Before ROVNER, WOOD, and EVANS *, Circuit Judges.WOOD, Circuit Judge.

May Molina, a prominent civil rights activist known for protesting police practices, died in custody over 24 hours after officers arrested her on drug charges at her home. Molina was disabled, obese, and in poor health. She took daily medications for several ailments, including diabetes, a thyroid condition, hypertension, and asthma. Pursuant to a Chicago Police Department (CPD) policy that prohibits arrestees from taking medications while in lockup unless they are taken to a hospital, Molina had no access to her medications while in custody. When she met with her lawyer about 16 hours into her detention, she could hardly speak, walk, or stand. He told the lockup keepers to get Molina to a hospital because she was clearly sick. None of the guards on duty responded. Instead, her health deteriorated and she died alone in her cell.

April Ortiz, who is Molina's daughter, is acting as the administrator of Molina's estate. (Appellant's opening brief represents that of the several plaintiffs who appeared in the district court, the only one remaining is the Estate. For convenience we refer to it as Ortiz.) First, Ortiz argues that the district court improperly granted summary judgment on her claim that the defendants, collectively the City of Chicago and the lockup officers, unreasonably denied Molina medical care by not taking her to the hospital so that she could resume her medications. Embedded in this claim is an evidentiary issue, because the court excluded Ortiz's expert witness. Second, Ortiz argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the defendants on her claim that they unconstitutionally held Molina in custody for 27 hours without taking her before a judge for a probable cause hearing. We reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment on the denial of medical care claim but affirm on the delayed hearing claim.

I

Because Ortiz appeals from a grant of summary judgment against her, we construe the evidence and reasonable inferences from it in her favor. CPD officers searched Molina's home at 3526 N. Halsted Street pursuant to an uncontested search warrant on May 24, 2004. Officers apparently received a tip from a confidential informant stating that he had purchased small amounts of drugs from Molina and from her son, Michael Ortiz, who lived upstairs. Based on this information, 17 officers raided the two-flat apartments where Molina and her son lived. There they recovered a number of tinfoil packets and some brown putty. Officers later arrested the two, but all charges against Michael Ortiz were eventually dropped.

Molina required constant access to an array of medications to survive. She had Type II diabetes mellitus that required medication (including Glipizide and Metformin) and monitoring to ensure that her blood sugar was controlled. Otherwise, she risked slipping into either a hyperglycemic or hypoglycemic state, which could lead to a fatal coma. She also suffered from life-threatening hypertensive and thyroid conditions, both of which required medication (including Furosemide, Enalapril, and Potassium Chloride) and monitoring. She used a wheelchair or walker to get around. At the time of her arrest (10:07 p.m. on May 24), Molina informed the officers that she took thyroid and diabetes medications and asked whether she could bring them along. The officers told her that medications were not permitted in lockup.

Initially, Molina was detained briefly at the 23rd District lockup, which does not have a women's unit. Ortiz brought Molina's medications to that facility, explaining to the officer on duty (who is not a defendant in this lawsuit) that her mother needed the medications “to save her life.” The officer refused to accept the medications, stating that Molina would soon be transferred to the 19th District lockup and then taken to Cermak Hospital where she would be provided with medical care.

Molina arrived at the 19th District lockup at 4:25 a.m. on May 25. At that time, Officers Avis Jamison and Authurine Pryor were staffing the 9:30 p.m. to 5:30 a.m. overnight shift. Officer Jamison, in Pryor's presence, interviewed Molina upon arrival to create what the parties call the screening record. She asked if Molina had any “serious medical problems,” and Molina responded that she did. Molina described her medical problems to Jamison, who noted on the screening record that Molina was taking medicine for diabetes, thyroid-related issues, and other conditions. Jamison did not inquire further about the type or frequency of Molina's medications. After completing the screening record, Jamison took it to the front desk, where it remained accessible to all front desk personnel. Officer Pryor photographed and fingerprinted Molina, and also asked her routine questions about whether she was sick, injured, or in need of medical assistance. Pryor says that Molina responded that she was fine and did not want to go to the hospital.

During this time, another arrestee, Diane Rice, was detained at the 19th District lockup. She heard Molina yell several times for a doctor and a wheelchair, though exactly when is unclear. Rice recounted that after Molina yelled for a doctor, someone yelled back: “Ma'am, we asked you when you came in if you needed a doctor, and you said no.” Rice also asserts that the officers did not conduct the requisite 15–minute cell checks.

After Molina was photographed and fingerprinted, CPD personnel transmitted her prints to the “10–print” unit for verification. Around 5:30 a.m., Officer Pryor observed Molina walk back to her cell after making a phone call. Pryor estimated that it took Molina five to seven minutes to walk a distance of about 30 feet. The next shift began at 5:30 a.m. on May 25, at which point Officers Catherine Ziemba and Tamara Lemon–Richmond took over. During the shift change, Pryor informed Ziemba that Molina had trouble walking and would need a “special needs” car to go to court because she was obese and moving slowly. By about 7:00 a.m., Molina's identity was manually verified and confirmed. CPD personnel then transmitted Molina's information to the “Instant Update Unit,” which transferred her arrest history from a typewritten form to a computer database and checked for outstanding warrants. At 12:12 p.m. all administrative tasks that were needed before Molina could be taken to bond court were completed. Neither Ziemba nor Lemon–Richmond tried to send her to bond court before their shift ended at 1:30 p.m.

Another shift change took place at 1:30 p.m., at which point Officers Diane Yost and Beverly Gilchrist took charge of the lockup until 9:30 p.m. Around 4:00 p.m., Molina's long-time attorney, Jerry Bischoff, arrived to speak with his client. Yost and Gilchrist escorted Molina to meet with Bischoff. According to Yost, it took Molina several minutes to walk a few feet, and she had to hold on to the wall to make any progress. Bischoff's testimony provides the clearest insight into Molina's health during this time. He said that Molina, whom he had never seen out of a wheelchair, was “having difficulty breathing” and “was breathing like someone who had just ... run up a flight of stairs.” Bischoff further noted that Molina was groggy, exhausted, and could not stand up on her own. Upon making these observations, Bischoff concluded that it would be unproductive to discuss Molina's case with her at that time and instead he inquired about her health. He asked if she was diabetic, and Molina, unable to speak, nodded her head yes. Bischoff then asked how she took her medication, and she gestured that she did so orally. When Bischoff inquired whether she had been able to take her medications while in lockup, Molina gestured to indicate that she had not. Bischoff thought that Molina belonged in the hospital and terminated the meeting. He then told Yost and Gilchrist that Molina needed to go to Cermak Hospital because she was “clearly sick.” According to Bischoff, the officers responded, we are working on it, counsel.” Yost denies being present at that time, and Gilchrist contends that this exchange never occurred.

Officer Maja Ramirez was working at the front desk, where Officer Jamison had previously deposited Molina's screening record, on May 25. During her shift, Ramirez received five to ten calls from a number of different people informing her that Molina needed to take her medications or go see a doctor. Ramirez says she did not recall whether the callers told her about specific medications, nor did she ask any follow-up questions. Instead she told each caller that a request for medication must come from the detainee, not a third party. Ramirez also says that she informed one of her supervisors about the phone calls after receiving the first few. Ramirez did not take any further action, such as walking to the lockup to see if Molina was all right, because that was not her job. The plaintiffs say that the supervisors on duty at the time were Sergeant Debra Holmes and Lieutenant William Wallace. Neither of the supervisors took any responsive action.

Officer Jamison returned to work the 9:30 p.m. to 5:30 a.m. overnight shift on May 25 with Officer Martha Gomez. Jamison is the only officer who had direct contact with Molina on two different shifts. At 11:00 that night, another arrestee, Jasmine Vaccarello, arrived in lockup....

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