Osborne v. Osborne
Decision Date | 13 November 1981 |
Citation | 428 N.E.2d 810,384 Mass. 591 |
Parties | David P. OSBORNE, Jr. v. Barbara M. OSBORNE. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
John P. Birmingham, Jr., Boston (Alice D. Alexander, Newton, with him), for David P. Osborne, Jr.
David M. Wright, Boston (Jacob M. Atwood, Boston, with him), for Barbara M. Osborne.
Before HENNESSEY, C. J., and WILKINS, LIACOS, ABRAMS and LYNCH, JJ.
This is an appeal from Probate Court judgments entered in connection with reciprocal divorce actions by husband and wife, and in connection with an equity action brought by the husband to establish an ownership interest in certain real estate and personal property. The husband also seeks an award of alimony and a division of property pursuant to G.L. c. 208, § 34. 1 The alimony and property claims were referred to a master, who, after a hearing, filed a report concluding that the husband should receive neither alimony nor an equitable division of property, and that ownership of the property claimed in the equity complaint belonged solely to the wife. 2 Subsequently, upon motion of the husband, the probate judge submitted the case to a second master for additional subsidiary findings of fact on the needs of the parties and the contribution of the parties as homemakers. After the second master's report was filed, the probate judge struck the second master's report in its entirety, and adopted the first master's report, with the exception of the first master's findings relating to the husband's claim of joint ownership in three parcels of real property, which the court found to be jointly held. 3 Both parties appealed, and we granted the wife's application for direct appellate review. 4 The evidence has been reported.
The husband claims that the probate judge erred in adopting the first master's report because (1) the master failed to apply properly the factors enumerated in G.L. c. 208, § 34, relating to the needs of the parties and their station in life, (2) the master's findings relating to the husband's ownership interest in the personal property were against the weight of the evidence and (3) the master improperly admitted certain prejudicial evidence relating to the postseparation conduct of the husband. On cross-appeal, the wife contends that the probate judge erred in (1) failing to give full effect to an antenuptial contract entered into by the parties in which both parties waived their rights to alimony or to any portion of the other's estate, and (2) striking so much of the first master's report that found the wife to be the sole owner of the three parcels of real estate.
We think that the judge erred in striking the master's findings regarding ownership of the real property. We also conclude that the judge was correct in denying the husband's claim for alimony or for assignment of any portion of his wife's estate; however, we do so on reasoning substantially different from that of the probate judge. It is apparent that neither the first master nor the probate judge was clear on what effect should be given the antenuptial contract. The court found that the husband was not in need of any alimony or assignment of property from the wife's estate, see G.L. c. 208, § 34, and thereby avoided the issue whether the antenuptial contract was effective to preclude the husband's claim. We conclude that the antenuptial contract is controlling on all claims of the husband, and, therefore, we do not reach the questions relating to the proper application of G.L. c. 208, § 34.
The relevant facts as found by the master are summarized. The parties, Barbara E. Mallinckrodt (Barbara) and David P. Osborne, Jr. (David), met and became engaged while they were both attending medical school. They were married on August 19, 1967. Barbara is an heiress to a large family fortune amounting to nearly $17,000,000, most of which is held in trust. Barbara's income from these funds was approximately $540,000 in 1976. At the time of their engagement, David had no assets of significant value. A few hours before their wedding they executed an antenuptial agreement containing, among others, the following pertinent provisions: "Barbara now has sufficient property to provide adequate means for her own support and David, by reason of his becoming a member of the medical profession, contemplates that he will have adequate earning power for his own support"; "Barbara and David intend this agreement to be in full discharge of all ... statutory marital property rights under the statutes or law of any state in which they are now or may hereafter be domiciled"; "neither, upon or subsequent to said marriage, shall acquire any interest, right or claim in or to the property, real and personal, of whatever kind or wherever situated, which the other now owns, possesses or is entitled to, or which the other may own, possess or become entitled to hereafter"; that if their Attached to the agreement was a schedule accurately showing Barbara's wealth and expectation of inheritance. David read the agreement before he signed it.
Two children were born of the marriage. During the marriage the parties maintained a high standard of living which was financed completely by the income from Barbara's trust accounts. Barbara maintained joint checking accounts upon which either party could draw funds. These accounts were funded with monies from her separate trust accounts. During the marriage the parties acquired furniture and fixtures worth approximately $15,000, jewelry valued at approximately $225,000, art valued at approximately $428,545, a wine collection worth $60,000, and three parcels of real estate valued at $100,000, $60,000, and $40,000. 5 The husband claims an ownership interest in all these items of property. Both parties are now practicing physicians and earn respectable salaries. Further facts are set forth in the opinion.
Validity of the Antenuptial Agreement.
We must first determine the validity of the antenuptial agreement. This court has not previously passed on the validity of an antenuptial agreement that attempts to regulate the rights of the parties in the event of their subsequent divorce. The majority of Massachusetts cases dealing with the validity of antenuptial contracts concern the rights of the parties to modify those property rights that would otherwise arise during the marriage or upon the death of one of the parties. See, e. g., Rosenberg v. Lipnick, 377 Mass. 666, 389 N.E.2d 385 (1979) ( ); French v. McAnarney, 290 Mass. 544, 195 N.E. 714 (1935). These contracts have generally been upheld where there has been no fraudulent conduct on the part of either party, or, more recently, where the parties have acted honestly and fairly and have fully disclosed their assets one to the other. Rosenberg v. Lipnick, supra. Antenuptial contracts are recognized by statute and at common law. G. L. c. 209, §§ 25, 26. Freeland v. Freeland, 128 Mass. 509 (1880). Jenkins v. Holt, 109 Mass. 261 (1872).
In many jurisdictions it has been held that an antenuptial contract made in contemplation of divorce is void as against public policy. See generally 2 A. Lindey, Separation Agreements and Ante-Nuptial Contracts § 90, at 90-33 (1979 & Supp.1981). The reasons most frequently given for invalidating such contracts are (1) they are not compatible with and denigrate the status of marriage, (2) they tend to facilitate divorce by providing inducements to end the marriage, and (3) a contract waiving or minimizing alimony may turn a spouse into a ward of the State. See Ferry v. Ferry, 586 S.W.2d 782, 785-786 (Mo.App.1979), for a discussion of the trend in the cases. Examples of cases adopting these views are Norris v. Norris, 174 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa, 1970); Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn.App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288 (1964); Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 42 N.W.2d 500 (1950). See also Klarman, Marital Agreements in Contemplation of Divorce, 10 U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 397, 398 (1977); Annot. 57 A.L.R.2d 942 (1958).
In Fox v. Davis, 113 Mass. 255, 257-258 (1873), this court stated: Had the issue come before this court several decades ago, the law as stated in Fox might well have been held to be controlling. In French v. McAnarney, 290 Mass. 544 (1935), it was held that an antenuptial contract wherein the wife agreed not to make any claim for support against the husband was void as against public policy. The facts of the case are distinguishable in that there the parties were not divorced; yet the rationale is applicable. The court in French concluded that certain rights and duties incident to the marital relation, including the duty of the husband to support his wife, could not be avoided by an antenuptial contract. Under the case law of the time, this same reasoning would have applied to the rights of the parties upon divorce, since the obligation of the husband to pay alimony was also based on the husband's legal duty to support his wife. England v. England, 329 Mass. 763, 764, 107 N.E.2d 30 (1952). See Coe v. Coe, 313 Mass. 232, 46 N.E.2d 1017 (1943); H. Clark, Law of Domestic...
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