Osborne v. State
| Citation | 54 N.E.3d 428 |
| Decision Date | 12 May 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 29A02–1511–CR–1931.,29A02–1511–CR–1931. |
| Parties | Mary OSBORNE, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Indiana |
Jennifer M. Lukemeyer, Voyles Zahn & Paul, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Angela N. Sanchez, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
, Judge.
[1] Appellant–Defendant, Mary Osborne (Osborne), appeals the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress
[2] We reverse and remand.
[3] Osborne raises one issue on interlocutory appeal, which we restate as follows: Whether the warrantless seizure of Osborne violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution
.
[4] On December 14, 2014, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Officer Jason Arnold (Officer Arnold) of the Fishers Police Department was assisting two other police officers with an operating while intoxicated investigation on 116th Street in Fishers, Hamilton County, Indiana. (Tr. p. 12). During the course of that investigation, dispatch advised that a clerk working at the Marathon gas station, located “near 116th Street and Brook[s] School Road[,]” had reported that “a female subject ... was stuck underneath her vehicle in the parking lot.” (Tr. p. 13). Officer Arnold responded to the call and drove to the gas station, which was approximately “a mile to a mile and a half” away. (Tr. p. 14). En route, dispatch apprised Officer Arnold of the vehicle's license plate number and that it “was a black passenger car, possibly a BMW.” (Tr. p. 14).
(Tr. p. 16). He added that he (Tr. p. 17).
[6] Officer Arnold approached the driver-side window, and although he did not observe any blood or other apparent injuries, he indicated that (Tr. p. 22). He asked, “Ma'am, are you okay; are you hurt?” (Tr. p. 21). Osborne informed Officer Arnold that “she was fine” and declined medical treatment. (Tr. p. 23). Nevertheless, Officer Arnold remained (Tr. p. 23). Osborne explained that her vehicle has a manual transmission, and “when she exited the vehicle at the gas station she must have forgotten to put the parking brake on and it rolled back on top of her.” (Tr. p. 23).
[7] Osborne's explanation convinced Officer Arnold that she was not in need of medical or other assistance. However, as he was questioning her, Officer Arnold noticed signs of possible impairment, including the odor of alcohol on her breath, red and watery eyes, and slurred speech. When Officer Arnold asked whether Osborne had consumed any alcohol, she stated that she had a beer about one hour earlier. According to the probable cause affidavit, Officer Arnold conducted several field sobriety tests, which Osborne failed. In addition, Officer Arnold administered a portable breathalyzer test, which indicated that Osborne's alcohol level was 0.12. After being transported to the Hamilton County Jail, Osborne submitted to another breath test, which revealed that her alcohol level was 0.10. On December 19, 2014, the State filed an Information, charging Osborne with Count I, operating a vehicle while intoxicated in a manner that endangers a person, a Class A misdemeanor, Ind.Code § 9–30–5–2(a)
–(b) ; and Count II, operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent to at least 0.08 gram of alcohol per 210 liters of the person's breath, a Class C misdemeanor, I.C. § 9–30–5–1(a)(2).
[8] On June 24, 2015, Osborne filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the course of the traffic stop. She argued that the warrantless seizure—i.e., the traffic stop—violated both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution
. On September 15, 2015, the trial court conducted a hearing, and on October 5, 2015, the trial court issued a Suppression Order, denying Osborne's motion. The trial court noted that “[o]ne exception [to the warrant requirement] is the noncriminal, noninvestigative community caretaking function, which is used with caution in order to ensure that it is not used as a pretext for a criminal investigation.” (Appellant's App. p. 29). The trial court concluded that “Officer Arnold stopped [Osborne's] vehicle as part of his ‘community caretaking’ function”; therefore, the warrantless seizure did not run afoul of either the federal Constitution or the Indiana Constitution. (Appellant's App. p. 28).
[9] On October 29, 2015, Osborne filed a motion to certify the Suppression Order for interlocutory appeal, which the trial court granted on November 2, 2015. On December 11, 2015, our court accepted jurisdiction over the case. Osborne now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
[10] Our standard for reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is well settled. Similar to sufficiency matters, we must “determine whether substantial evidence of probative value exists to support the trial court's ruling.” Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 358 (Ind.2005)
. We do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider any conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court's ruling. Id. Additionally, “[u]nlike typical sufficiency reviews, ... we will consider ... the uncontested evidence favorable to the defendant.” Gunn v. State, 956 N.E.2d 136, 138 (Ind.Ct.App.2011). We will uphold the trial court's ruling as long as it is sustainable on any legal theory apparent in the record. Allen v. State, 893 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (Ind.Ct.App.2008), trans. denied. “When the trial court's denial of a defendant's motion to suppress concerns the constitutionality of a search or seizure, ... it presents a question of law, and we address that question de novo.” Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 362, 365 (Ind.2014).
[11] Osborne claims that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the course of the traffic stop because the stop itself violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects[ ] against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV
. This protection is extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Woodford v. State, 752 N.E.2d 1278, 1280 (Ind.2001). A warrant supported by probable cause is typically required in order for a search or seizure to be reasonable. Breitweiser v. State, 704 N.E.2d 496, 498 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). Warrantless searches and seizures “are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Brown v. State, 653 N.E.2d 77, 80 (Ind.1995). The State bears the burden of proving that an exception to the warrant requirement applies. Trotter v. State, 933 N.E.2d 572, 579 (Ind.Ct.App.2010).
[12] “A traffic stop of an automobile and temporary detention of its occupants constitutes a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Bush v. State, 925 N.E.2d 787, 789 (Ind.Ct.App.2010)
(citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–10, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) ). However, it is well established that a traffic stop is akin to an investigative stop pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), whereby a police officer “may stop and briefly detain an individual for investigatory purposes if, based upon specific and articulable facts, the officer has a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity even if the officer lacks probable cause to make an arrest.” Graham v. State, 971 N.E.2d 713, 716 (Ind.Ct.App.2012)
, trans. denied;
Crabtree v. State, 762 N.E.2d 241, 245 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). Thus, while “[a] law enforcement officer must have probable cause to instigate a full-blown arrest or a detention that lasts for more than a short period[,] ... a traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if it is based on an observed traffic violation or if the officer has reasonable suspicion that the person detained is involved in criminal activity.” Killebrew v. State, 976 N.E.2d 775, 779 (Ind.Ct.App.2012), trans. denied. Reasonable suspicion must be based on “more than mere hunches or unparticularized suspicions.” Potter v. State, 912 N.E.2d 905, 907 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (citing Finger v. State, 799 N.E.2d 528, 533–34 (Ind.2003) ).
[13] In this case, there is no dispute that Officer Arnold's traffic stop was not based on his...
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