Osborne v. Thompson

Decision Date29 March 1979
Docket NumberNo. 78-3337 NA-CV.,78-3337 NA-CV.
PartiesBilly E. OSBORNE v. Vinson F. THOMPSON, Warden, Tennessee State Penitentiary.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Robert L. Tucker, Asst. Federal Public Defender, Nashville, Tenn., for petitioner.

William P. Sizer, II, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, Tenn., for respondent.

MEMORANDUM

WISEMAN, District Judge.

Petitioner has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging that he is presently incarcerated in the Tennessee State Penitentiary in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because he was sentenced after entry of five guilty pleas that petitioner asserts were not voluntarily and intelligently made. Petitioner originally filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus pro se. This Court subsequently appointed an attorney to represent petitioner, and he filed an amended petition with accompanying memorandum. Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment in response to petitioner's original petition and a second motion for summary judgment in response to the amended petition, both of which were accompanied by briefs in support of respondent's motion.

On March 19, 1975, petitioner pleaded guilty in the Knox County, Tennessee, Criminal Court to the first count of five indictments that charged him with first degree burglary, second degree burglary, third degree burglary, attempt to commit a felony, and grand larceny. On February 24, 1975, the trial court granted petitioner's motion for a psychiatric examination to determine petitioner's competency to stand trial. On March 6, 1975, a psychiatrist reported in writing to the trial judge that petitioner had been evaluated and was "marginally competent, able to understand the charges and consequences thereof, to advise with his counsel, and to participate in his own defense."1 No competency hearing was held. The record indicates that the only relevant information regarding petitioner's competency before the court prior to the submission hearing was the psychiatrist's brief letter and a forensic summary upon which the letter was apparently based.2

After petitioner entered guilty pleas, the trial court reserved imposition of judgment for four (4) months to allow petitioner to remain in the area, either free on bond or in the county jail, pending the birth of his child. On May 22, 1975, however, petitioner again appeared before the trial judge. Based on the judge's observation of petitioner's actions, demeanor, language, and general behavior, the court opined that petitioner was mentally incompetent and ordered that he be committed to Central State Psychiatric Hospital for evaluation and treatment.

On July 29, 1975, Central State reported that petitioner had been evaluated and found to be competent.3 Petitioner appeared before the court on September 19, 1975, for pronouncement of judgment, but, at that time, he moved to withdraw his guilty pleas. The transcript of this hearing indicates that petitioner was emotional and talked indiscernibly. The court took his motion under advisement and, on September 24, 1975, denied the motion and pronounced judgment, sentencing petitioner to nine (9) to twenty (20) years, according to the recommendation of the state pursuant to a plea bargain agreement.

Petitioner subsequently filed three (3) post conviction relief petitions in state court, generally alleging the same ground of incompetency to enter guilty pleas.4 The petitions, filed on October 15, 1975, September 6, 1976, and January 6, 1977, respectively, were all denied without evidentiary hearings. Petitioner appealed the denial of the January 6, 1977, petition to the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the trial court. The Tennessee Supreme Court denied certiorari. Petitioner has clearly exhausted his available state remedies.

It is petitioner's contention that his guilty pleas were not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered, and that he did not have an understanding of the nature of the charges and consequences of his pleas. Respondent asserts that petitioner was found competent after a psychiatric examination only thirteen (13) days before entry of his guilty pleas, that his competency was reaffirmed by psychiatric examination after the pleas were entered and before imposition of judgment, and that the trial judge was scrupulous in his determination that petitioner understood the charges against him and the consequences of entering guilty pleas before he accepted the pleas.

Petitioner cites the transcript of the submission hearing to support his assertion that he was not competent to enter guilty pleas, that he did not have sufficient awareness of the proceedings, and that there were other factors operating to influence his pleading guilty other than the stated plea bargain. After the court refused to lower petitioner's bond, the court recessed so that petitioner's counsel could consult with petitioner. Thereafter, the state announced an agreement between petitioner and the state whereby the assistant district attorney would recommend a total sentence of nine (9) to twenty (20) years for the five (5) charges in exchange for petitioner's pleas of guilty.

The court then personally addressed petitioner and stated the charges against him and the rights he would waive by pleading guilty. Petitioner uniformly responded that he understood the charges and each right by saying, "Yes, sir," until the court asked him if anyone had put any pressure on him to enter his guilty pleas. To that question petitioner responded, "Well, I don't know." The court rephrased its initial question and asked, "Is anyone forcing you to do this? Is this your decision?" Petitioner responded in an ambiguous manner by saying, "Me (sic) have just got a wife and baby I want to come back to." The court reiterated its previous question, "Well, this is your decision, is that right?" Petitioner responded simply, "Yes."

Apparently satisfied, the court continued the questioning, receiving monosyllabic responses from petitioner, and then informed petitioner of the maximum sentence he could receive on each case and the sentence recommended by the state as a result of the plea bargain.5 Finally, the court asked if petitioner understood the maximum sentence and the state's recommendation. Petitioner responded affirmatively and, in answer to the court's question, stated that there was nothing that he did not understand. Thereafter, forms for his guilty pleas and waiver of jury were executed. The state then read the indictments, and petitioner entered guilty pleas in each case. After the state read the stipulated testimony that formed the basis of the charges against petitioner, the court found petitioner guilty of the charges and fixed punishment according to the state's recommendation, but reserved pronouncement of judgment.

It is the colloquy between petitioner and the court, as described above, regarding whether or not anyone had put pressure on petitioner to plead guilty that petitioner has focused on in his allegation that he was incompetent to enter guilty pleas. Additionally, petitioner has argued that the plea bargain whereby the state would recommend less than maximum sentences on the cases with which petitioner was charged may not have been petitioner's motivation for entering guilty pleas, but rather that he may have been motivated by a desire to remain in the area pending his child's birth and/or by what petitioner has termed an implied threat to prosecute petitioner's wife if petitioner did not plead guilty.

When the state announced to the court that a plea bargain had been reached, the assistant district attorney did not allude to any agreement that the court would reserve judgment pending the birth of petitioner's child or that the state would so recommend. The agreement, as stated, included only recommendations as to sentences to be imposed. The court, however, did reserve imposition of judgment so that petitioner could remain in the area. If this were part of the bargain, the court clearly intended to abide by it, although petitioner was later sent to Central State Psychiatric Hospital for evaluation before the date set for imposition of judgment.

Petitioner argues that the court could have reserved imposition of judgment until after his child was born even if petitioner had gone to trial and that he need not have pleaded guilty for the court to have reserved judgment. As respondent points out, although the court might have reserved imposition of judgment, there was no guarantee that it would have done so.

It is not clear whether or not part of the bargain included retirement of petitioner's wife's case in exchange for petitioner's guilty pleas. At the submission hearing, the assistant district attorney stated that there had been some discussion about retiring petitioner's wife's case, but such a plan was not included in the agreement announced nor did the state expressly indicate that this would be done. In respondent's motion for summary judgment, however, the state said that charges were dropped against petitioner's wife in consideration of petitioner's pleas.

If petitioner's allegations of incompetency were related solely to implicit bargains between petitioner and the state to which the state apparently adhered, this Court would be more reluctant to disturb petitioner's guilty pleas. Together with petitioner's other allegations of incompetency as evidenced by the colloquy referred to above and the psychiatric evaluation submitted prior to the submission hearing, however, they may tend to suggest that petitioner was not fully aware of the proceedings.

Just as a defendant may not be forced to stand trial if he is not mentally competent, Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72, 95 S.Ct. 896, 904, 43 L.Ed.2d 103, 113 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378, 86...

To continue reading

Request your trial
8 cases
  • Evans v. Raines, Civ 80-522 PHX VAC.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Arizona
    • March 26, 1982
    ...faith doubt as to petitioner's competence to waive counsel, and sua sponte should have held a competency hearing. See Osborne v. Thompson, 481 F.Supp. 162, 171 (M.D.Tenn.), aff'd, 610 F.2d 461 (6th Cir. 1979). The failure to hold such a hearing denied petitioner due Knowing and Intelligent ......
  • State v. Cleary, 01-289.
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • February 7, 2003
    ...prove an inadequate measure of the validity of a plea proffered by a defendant of questionable mental competence"); Osborne v. Thompson, 481 F.Supp. 162, 169 (M.D.Tenn.1979) (routine questioning in Rule 11 colloquy "is particularly questionable when the defendant is of limited intelligence,......
  • Warren v. Lewis
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee
    • June 21, 2002
    ...the court has [an affirmative duty to] ... delve further to determine the defendant's comprehension." Osborne v. Thompson, 481 F.Supp. 162, 169 (M.D.Tenn.1979)(Wiseman, J.), aff'd 610 F.2d 461 (6th Cir.1979). The Supreme Court has held that when evidence of a defendant's mental deficiencies......
  • U.S. v. Johns, 83-1595
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • March 1, 1984
    ...about whether she wanted to read the presentence report, the defendant replied, "I believe in Jesus Christ." See Osborne v. Thompson, 481 F.Supp. 162 (M.D.Tenn.1979), aff'd, 610 F.2d 461 (6th Cir.1979). When asked at least three times if she would say anything to the court before sentencing......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT