Oser v. Commercial Union Ins. Companies
Decision Date | 22 September 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 3-180A18,3-180A18 |
Parties | Richard J. OSER, Appellant (Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Below), v. COMMERCIAL UNION INSURANCE COMPANIES and the Employer's Fire Insurance Company, Appellees (Third-Party Defendants Below). |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Carol A. Angel, Fort Wayne, for appellant.
Douglas E. Miller and James P. Fenton, Barrett, Barrett & McNagny, Fort Wayne, for appellees.
Richard J. Oser's 17 year old son, Dale E. Oser, was driving his 1968 Pontiac when it became involved in a personal injury and property damage accident. 1 At the time of the accident the son was not a resident of his father's household. The father, Richard J. Oser, brought an action against his insurance company, The Commercial Union Assurance Companies and its subsidiary, The Employer's Fire Insurance Company, alleging that his insurance policy provided coverage for his son's accident.
The insurance company filed its motion for summary judgment which was granted by the trial court. Richard J. Oser brings this appeal and presents this issue for our review:
When a father signs his son's driver application and agrees to be liable for any damages caused from his son's driving, does the father have a valid claim under his insurance policy which does not name the son as an insured or list the son's vehicle as an insured vehicle?
We affirm.
When Dale made an application to the Bureau of Motor Vehicles for a Probationary Operator's License, his father, Oser, signed a financial liability statement which was attached to the application. Pursuant to IC 1971, 9-1-4-32, 2 his father agreed "to be responsible, jointly and severally" with Dale for any injury or damage caused by him in the operation of a motor vehicle. At the time of the accident, Dale was living with his mother in Indiana. His father had moved to Kentucky and had never, at any time, sent a written revocation of this agreement to the Bureau of Motor Vehicles. See IC 1971, 9-1-4-32(e).
On the date of the accident, Richard Oser, Dale's father, was the "named insured" in an automobile liability policy issued by Commercial. In urging that his son was covered by this policy, he makes no attempt to argue that his son was a "named insured" or even a "relative." He recognizes that, according to the policy definitions, his son, Dale, was not a "relative" because he was not a resident of the household of the named insured at the time of the accident. In addition, Richard Oser acknowledges that the 1968 Pontiac was not listed in his policy as an "owned automobile." If it were covered, he agrees that it would be only as a "non-owned automobile."
Richard Oser argues, instead, that Commercial's duty to him arises by virtue of the following provisions:
We agree with him that his signature, pursuant to IC 1971, 9-1-4-32 operates to impose upon him an obligation to be "jointly and severally" responsible with Dale for any injury or damage caused by him. See Wenisch v. Hoffmeister (1976), 168 Ind.App. 247, 342 N.E.2d 665. In view of our reading of the contract as a whole, however, we are reluctant to broaden the coverage of the policy to the extent suggested by Richard Oser.
It is our duty to interpret a contract so as to ascertain the intent of the parties. In doing so, we must accept a construction of the contract which harmonizes its provisions as opposed to a construction which causes the provisions to be conflicting. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp. v. Moll (1976), 264 Ind. 356, 344 N.E.2d 831. The meaning of a contract is to be determined from an examination of all of its provisions, not from a consideration of individual words, phrases or even paragraphs read alone. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp., supra; Tastee-Freez Leasing Corp. v. Milwid (1977), Ind.App., 365 N.E.2d 1388.
The "persons insured" under this policy are as follows:
(2) any other person using such automobile with the permission of the named insured, provided his actual operation or (if he is not operating) his other actual use thereof is within the scope of such permission, and
(3) any other person or organization but only with respect to his or its liability because of acts or omissions of an insured under (a)(1) or (2) above;
provided his actual operation or (if he is not operating) the other actual use thereof is with the permission, or reasonably believed to be with the permission, of the owner and is within the scope of such permission, and
(3) any other person or organization not owning or hiring the automobile, but only with respect to his or its liability because of acts or...
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