Osgood v. Artt

• Decision Date: 17 January 1882
• Citation: 10 F. 365
• Parties: OSGOOD v. ARTT.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

10 F. 365

OSGOOD v. ARTT.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois.

January 17, 1882

Grant &amp Swift, for plaintiff.

Edsall & Hawley, for defendant.

BLODGETT D.J.

This is a suit upon a promissory note made by defendant, dated May 14, 1856, by which he agreed to pay the Racine & Mississippi Railroad Company, or order, $2,500, with interest at the rate of 10 per cent. per annum, at the office of the company in the city of Racine, Wisconsin, in five years from date.

The fourth, seventh, and ninth pleas allege, in substance, under different forms of statement, that at the time of making the note, and until long after its maturity, defendant was a resident of the state of Illinois; that on the ninth of January, 1870, he removed from the state of Illinois to the state of Missouri, from which time he has continually resided in the latter state, and been at all times liable to a suit on said note in the courts of said state; that by the laws of the state of Missouri the plaintiff's right of action on this note is barred in 10 years from the time the cause of action accrued thereon; and that at the time the suit was commenced defendant had been for more than 10 years a resident in Missouri and liable to suit on said notes in such state; wherefore he insists that plaintiff's right of action is barred. The demurrers filed to the seventh and ninth pleas, and to the replications to the fourth plea raise the single question whether the facts set up in these pleas are a good bar to this action under the limitation laws of this state.

Section 20 of chapter 83, Rev. St. Ill., tit. 'Limitations,' reads as follows:

'When a cause of action has arisen in a state or territory out of this state, or in a foreign country, and by the laws thereof an action cannot be maintained by reason of the lapse of time, an action thereon shall not be maintained in this state.'

This section was first introduced into the limitation laws of this state in the act of April 4, 1872. Before that time the legislature had somewhat approached the principle embodied in this section by enacting in the act of April 13, 1849, that all actions founded on any promissory note executed, entered into, or accrued beyond the limits of this state, should be commenced within five years next after such cause of action should have accrued. And by the act of February 19, 1859, the words 'cause of action accrued' were defined to mean the time when an action might have been commenced, 'whether in this state or elsewhere. ' But, saving this exceptional legislation, the rule laid down in Chenot v. Lefevre, 3 Gil. 637, that the bar of the statute can arise only by a continuous residence within this state from the time the right of action accrued until the bar of the statute is complete, had been the settled law of this state up to the act of April 4, 1872; but by the section now under consideration the legislature evidently intended that when a debt had become barred by the operation of the laws of another state or country, the debtor, if sued in this state, could successfully plead such bar.

The plaintiff, however, insists that this case does not come within the scope of the twentieth section because the cause of action accrued upon the note in this state; that the defendant resided in this state when the note fell due, and that statute of this state had commenced to run; that the bar had not become complete when defendant removed to...