Osguthorpe v. Resorts

• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: PARRISH
• Citation: Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., 232 P.3d 999, 2010 UT 29 (Utah 2010)
• Decision Date: 07 May 2010
• Docket Number: No. 20080770,20090042,20090043.,20080770
• Parties: D.A. OSGUTHORPE, in his capacity as Trustee of the Dr. D.A. Osguthorpe Trust; and D.A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership, Petitioners and Appellants,v.WOLF MOUNTAIN RESORTS, L.C.; Petitioner and Appellant,v.ASC Utah, Inc., in its own stead; ASC Utah, Inc., as the representative of a defendant class consisting of ASC Utah, Inc., skiers, contractors, all other invitees and successors trespassing on plaintiffs' real property under color of both ASC Utah, Inc.'s claim of right as a lessee from Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., and ASC Utah, Inc.'s claim of right as a lessee directly from plaintiffs, Respondents and Appellees.

232 P.3d 999

2010 UT 29

D.A. OSGUTHORPE, in his capacity as Trustee of the Dr. D.A. Osguthorpe Trust; and D.A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership, Petitioners and Appellants,

v.WOLF MOUNTAIN RESORTS, L.C.; Petitioner and Appellant,

v.ASC Utah, Inc., in its own stead; ASC Utah, Inc., as the representative of a defendant class consisting of ASC Utah, Inc., skiers, contractors, all other invitees and successors trespassing on plaintiffs' real property under color of both ASC Utah, Inc.'s claim of right as a lessee from Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., and ASC Utah, Inc.'s claim of right as a lessee directly from plaintiffs, Respondents and Appellees.

Nos. 20080770, 20090042, 20090043.

Supreme Court of Utah.

May 7, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

David W. Scofield, R. Reed Pruyn Goldstein, Thomas W. Peters, Salt Lake City, for petitioners D.A. Osguthorpe and D.A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership.

Victoria C. Fitlow, Park City, for petitioner Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C.

John R. Lund, Kara L. Pettit, Julianne P. Blanch, Rodney R. Parker, Michael M. Homer, Brian D. Bolinder, Jesse C. Trentadue, Salt Lake City, for respondents.

PARRISH, Justice:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 This case presents questions regarding the purpose and applicability of Utah's unlawful detainer statute. Appellants D.A. Osguthorpe and the D.A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership (collectively the “Osguthorpes”) appeal the district court's dismissal of their unlawful detainer claims against American Skiing Company (“American Skiing”) and Wolf Mountain Resorts (“Wolf Mountain”). Wolf Mountain cross-appeals the district court's dismissal of its cross-claims against American Skiing for indemnification, breach of contract, and breach of implied covenant of good faith. The district court dismissed the unlawful detainer claims and cross-claims. In so doing, it found that there was a dispute as to whether American Skiing and Wolf Mountain were tenants in possession of the Osguthorpes' land in Summit County, Utah (the “Property”) and concluded that this uncertainty precluded an unlawful detainer action. We affirm the district court's dismissal of the unlawful detainer action and cross-claims because we hold as a matter of law that American Skiing and Wolf Mountain were not tenants in possession of the Property as required by Utah's unlawful detainer statute.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 The controversies between these parties stem from a series of agreements dictating each party's right to use the Property. The Osguthorpes are the fee owners of the Property, where they operate a sheep and cattle ranching operation in the summer months. On August 14, 1996, the Osguthorpes entered into an agreement (the “Lease Agreement”) with Wolf Mountain allowing it to utilize the Property for its ski operation in the winter months. The Lease Agreement allowed “the installation, maintenance and operation of two ski lifts, snow making and clearing of ski trails and other related facilities, structures and roads as may be required.” The Osguthorpes retained the right “to improve and use the Property provided that such improvement or use not interfere with ski lifts and similar structures and runs.” The Lease Agreement refers to the Osguthorpes as “lessors” and Wolf Mountain as “lessees.”

¶ 3 In 1997, Wolf Mountain and American Skiing entered into a Ground Lease Guaranty (the “Guaranty”) that transferred Wolf Mountain's rights in the Property to American Skiing.¹ In 2001, American Skiing renegotiated the terms of the 1996 Lease Agreement with the Osguthorpes. The results of the renegotiation are reflected in a “Restatement of Agreement” between American Skiing and the Osguthorpes. This Restatement of Agreement indicates that it supersedes and restates the original Lease Agreement. It describes American Skiing's interest in the Property as an “Easement” ² rather than a “Lease” and gives both parties rights to use the Property, but limits interference with the other's uses. The Restatement of Agreement provides:

[American Skiing] acknowledges that under the documents Osguthorpe and Partnership have retained the right to use all of the Property as part of their ranch operation, including, without limitation, grazing and other activities in connection with their sheep and cattle operation, and to otherwise use and improve the Property, so long as such ranch operations and other use and improvements do not damage the towers or other facilities lawfully constructed on the Property by [American Skiing] ... and does not unreasonably interfere with the use of the Property by [American Skiing] in the winter as part of [American Skiing's] winter skiing operation. [American Skiing] agrees that the use of the Property during the spring, summer and fall months will not interfere with the ranch operations of Osguthorpe and Partnership.

It is this Restatement of Agreement that the Osguthorpes attached to their initial unlawful detainer complaint as evidence of a lease.

¶ 4 The Osguthorpes' complaint contained three separate causes of action seeking: (1) eviction of Wolf Mountain, allegedly in unlawful detainer, (2) eviction of American Skiing, allegedly in unlawful detainer, and (3) eviction of a defendant class. In support of their eviction action against American Skiing, the Osguthorpes asserted that American Skiing committed waste by destroying crops on the Property meant to feed the Osguthorpes' sheep and by leaving snowmaking equipment on the Property that allegedly killed at least seven sheep. American Skiing countered with a motion to dismiss pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), claiming that eviction under the unlawful detainer statute was not available because it was not a tenant in possession of the Property.

¶ 5 The district court entered an order on September 2, 2008, dismissing counts two and three of the Osguthorpes' complaint stating, “[t]he court does not believe that an action for unlawful detainer is appropriate where the parties dispute whether the tenant is in fact a tenant of real property and the nature of their agreement under which the premises are held.” The Osguthorpes moved for permission to seek an interlocutory appeal of that order, which the court granted.

¶ 6 Meanwhile, Wolf Mountain answered count one of the Osguthorpes' complaint, admitting it was a tenant in unlawful detainer, and asserting cross-claims against American Skiing for indemnification, breach of contract, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. American Skiing, troubled by the implications of Wolf Mountain's admission that Wolf Mountain was in unlawful detainer of the Property, filed a motion to dismiss both the eviction action against Wolf Mountain and Wolf Mountain's cross-claims. In December 2008, the district court dismissed count one of the Osguthorpes' complaint, as well as all of Wolf Mountain's cross-claims. The Osguthorpes and Wolf Mountain appeal this final order. Their appeal has been consolidated with the Osguthorpes' previously filed interlocutory appeal.

¶ 7 The Osguthorpes argue that the district court erred in dismissing their claims. Specifically, they argue that the district court erred in concluding that unlawful detainer actions could not lie when the parties disputed whether the interest at issue was a lease interest or an easement. The Osguthorpes also argue that the district court erred when it considered American Skiing's motion to dismiss the unlawful detainer action against Wolf Mountain because American Skiing, having been dismissed from the action, lacked standing to file the motion. Wolf Mountain argues that the district court erred in dismissing its cross-claims against American Skiing because it sufficiently pled facts on which relief could be granted and the district court's ruling “eviscerates” its original Lease Agreement with the Osguthorpes.

¶ 8 American Skiing counters that the dismissal of the unlawful detainer action was proper because neither Wolf Mountain nor American Skiing is a tenant in possession of the Property. It further argues that the district court was not bound by any prior judicial determination that the Restatement of Agreement constituted a lease and American Skiing could properly move to dismiss the Osguthorpes' eviction action against Wolf Mountain because an eviction of Wolf Mountain would constitute an eviction of American Skiing.

¶ 9 We hold that the district court properly dismissed the unlawful detainer claims because, as a matter of law, American Skiing does not qualify as a tenant in possession under the Utah unlawful detainer statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-802 (2008). We also hold that American Skiing continued to retain party status in the action even after the entry of the district court's interlocutory order dismissing the Osguthorpes' claims against it and therefore was entitled to seek dismissal of the Osguthorpes' unlawful detainer claim against Wolf Mountain. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(j).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 10 “A district court's grant of a motion to dismiss based upon the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint[ ] presents a question of law that we review for correctness.” Walker v. Stowell, 2009 UT 82, ¶ 7, 227 P.3d 242 (internal quotation marks omitted). In reviewing a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, we “accept the plaintiff's description of facts alleged in the complaint to be true, but we need not accept extrinsic facts not pleaded nor need we accept legal conclusions in contradiction of the pleaded facts.” Allred v. Cook, 590 P.2d 318, 319 (Utah 1979). Furthermore, “it is well established that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record,” even if it “differs from that stated by the trial court.” First Equity Fed., Inc. v. Phillips Dev., LC, 2002 UT 56, ¶ 11, 52 P.3d 1137.

¶ 11 The Osguthorpes alleged in their complaint that the Restatement of Agreement with...