Osier v. Consumers' Co.

• Decision Date: 28 July 1926
• Citation: 42 Idaho 789,248 P. 438
• Parties: DELVINA OSIER and JOHN OSIER, Her Husband, Respondents, v. CONSUMERS COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

248 P. 438

42 Idaho 789

DELVINA OSIER and JOHN OSIER, Her Husband, Respondents, v. CONSUMERS COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant

Supreme Court of Idaho

July 28, 1926

PERSONAL INJURY-MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-DEFECTIVE STREET-KNOWLEDGE OF DANGER-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-INSTRUCTIONS-DAMAGES-APPEAL AND ERROR.

1. Instruction, in action for personal injuries, as to person's right to presume that sidewalk or highway is safe, and as to effect of knowledge of defect, held not prejudicial, when considered with other instructions.

2. Weight of knowledge of unsafe condition of street by person injured at time of accident, and whether acts were those of reasonably prudent person, is for jury.

3. Knowledge of unsafe condition of street, to be complete defense to action for injuries, must be present knowledge.

4. Person although having previous knowledge of danger, but not having presently in mind existence of defect, is not guilty of contributory negligence.

5. Instruction in action for personal injuries, permitting recovery if plaintiff was acting as reasonably prudent person at time of accident, held not erroneous, in view of other instructions.

6. Contributory negligence is matter of defense, and burden of proving it rests on defendant.

7. Instruction requiring defendant to affirmatively show contributory negligence is not erroneous.

8. Instruction that, if injured person was guilty of negligence she would not be entitled to verdict, held properly refused as not requiring negligence to be proximate cause of injury.

9. Eight thousand dollars damages for injuries to woman, leaving her in nervous condition and unable to do work or use right arm, is not excessive.

10. Before verdict can be set aside because of excessive damages appearing to have been given under influence of passion or prejudice, such fact must clearly appear.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, for Kootenai County. Hon. W. F. McNaughton, Judge.

Action for damages for personal injuries. Judgment for respondents. Affirmed.

Judgment affirmed. Costs awarded to respondents.

Edward H. Berg and Williams & Cornelius, for Appellant.

What Mrs. Osier knew at the instant of the accident was not "the real gist of the matter," and under the conceded facts, she had no right to presume that the way was safe, or that the obstruction had been removed. (O'Neil v. City of St. Louis, 292 Mo. 656, 239 S.W. 94; Collins v. Janesville, 107 Wis. 436, 83 N.W. 695; City of Sumner v. Scaggs, 52 Ill.App. 551; Cowie v. Seattle, 22 Wash. 659, 62 P. 121; Rowell v. Stamford St. Ry. Co., 64 Conn. 376, 30 A 131; McGraw v. Friend & Terry Lumber Co., 120 Cal 574, 52 P. 104; Straight Creek Fuel Co. v. Mullins, 189 Ky. 661, 225 S.W. 726; Solomon v. Philadelphia B. & W. R. Co., 7 Penne. (Del.) 21, 77 A. 970; Garman v. City of Waverly, 166 Ill.App. 399; Howard v. City of New Madrid, 148 Mo.App. 57, 127 S.W. 630; Cole v. City of East St. Louis, 147 Ill.App. 234.)

The test was not what a reasonably prudent person would do under ordinary circumstances, but the question was the duty which the law imposed upon Mrs. Osier of exercising proper care for her own safety with the knowledge she had of the obstruction in the path. (City of Knoxville v. Cain, 128 Tenn. 250, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 762, 159 S.W. 1084, 48 L. R. A., N. S., 628; City of Birmingham v. Edwards, 201 Ala. 251, 77 So. 841; Wheat v. City of St. Louis, 179 Mo. 572, 78 S.W. 790, 64 L. R. A. 292; Lyon v. City of Grand Rapids, 121 Wis. 609, 99 N.W. 311; Robb v. Borough of Connellsville, 137 Pa. 42, 20 A. 564; Reynolds v. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co., 162 Cal. 327, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 34, 122 P. 962, 39 L. R. A., N. S., 896; O'Neil v. City of St. Louis, supra; Cowie v. Seattle, supra; McGraw v. F. & T. Lumber Co., supra; Straight Creek Fuel Co. v. Mullins, supra; Vergin v. City of Saginaw, 125 Mich. 499, 84 N.W. 1075.)

Having knowledge of the dangerous condition, the real question was whether the evidence disclosed a satisfactory excuse for Mrs. Osier's failure to avoid the obstruction. (Zoellner v. City of Fond du Lac, 147 Wis. 300, 133 N.W. 35; Seaver v. Town of Union, 113 Wis. 322, 89 N.W. 163; Tasker v. Inhabitants of Farmingdale, 85 Me. 523, 27 A. 464; Tuffree v. Incorporated Town of State Center, 57 Iowa 538, 11 N.W. 1.)

In the instruction given, a most prejudicial error was committed when the court required the jury to find that plaintiff's negligence "was the proximate cause of the injuries complained of" in order for the defense of contributory negligence to be sustained. The instruction should have been that it was only necessary that the jury should find that Mrs. Osier's negligence proximately contributed. (Rippetoe v. Feely, 20 Idaho 619, 119 P. 465; Pilmer v. Boise Traction Co., 14 Idaho 327, 125 Am. St. 161, 94 P. 432, 15 L. R. A., N. S., 254; Wheeler v. Oregon Railway & Navigation Co., 16 Idaho 375, 102 P. 347; Anderson v. Metropolitan Street Ry. Co., 30 Misc. 104, 61 N.Y.S. 899; Payne v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 129 Mo. 405, 31 S.W. 885; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Clark's Admr., 105 Ky. 571, 49 S.W. 323; Fail v. Gulf States Steel Co., 205 Ala. 148, 87 So. 612; Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Jobe, 69 Miss. 452, 10 So. 672; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Scranton, 78 Ill.App. 230.)

Furthermore the instruction was erroneous in that it practically told the jury that the evidence to sustain contributory negligence must have been presented by appellant's evidence, and that respondents' evidence was not sufficient for that purpose. (Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Reed, 88 Tex. 439, 31 S.W. 1058; St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co. v. Martin, 26 Tex. Civ. App. 231, 63 S.W. 1089; Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Gentry (Tex. Civ. App.), 197 S.W. 482.)

The verdict of eight thousand dollars was so excessive as to evidence passion and prejudice. (McLean v. City of Lewiston, 8 Idaho 472, 69 P. 478; Maloney v. Winston Bros. Co., 18 Idaho 740, 111 P. 1080, 47 L. R. A., N. S., 637; Walsh v. Winston Bros. Co., 18 Idaho 768, 111 P. 1090; Maw v. Coast Lumber Co., 19 Idaho 396, 114 P. 9; Keim v. Gilmore & Pittsburg R. Co., 23 Ida 511, 131 P. 656; Denbeigh v. Oregon-Washington R. & Nav. Co., 23 Idaho 663, 132 P. 112; Barter v. Stewart Min. Co., 24 Idaho 540, 135 P. 68; Wilson v. St. Joe Boom Co., 34 Idaho 253, 200 P. 884; Shaw v. City of Nampa, 31 Idaho 347, 171 P. 1132; Staab v. Rocky Mountain Bell Tel. Co., 23 Idaho 314, 129 P. 1078; Kinzell v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 33 Idaho 1, 190 P. 255; Joly v. New York & E. R. Ferry Co., 48 A.D. 624, 62 N.Y.S. 576; Beeker v. Marshall Field & Co., 170 Ill.App. 237; Parks v. United Ry. Co. (Mo. ), 235 S.W. 1067; Hase v. City of Seattle, 57 Wash. 230, 107 P. 515.)

Ezra R. Whitla and Roger G. Wearne, for Respondents.

Previous knowledge is not a bar to recovery. (Carson v. Genessee, 9 Idaho 244, 108 Am. St. 127, 74 P. 862; Muir v. Pocatello, 36 Idaho 532, 212 P. 345; Osier v. Consumers Co., 41 Idaho 268, 239 P. 735.)

Question of contributory negligence including knowledge of plaintiff is for the jury. (Virgin v. Saginaw, 125 Mich. 449, 84 N.W. 1075; Zoollner v. City of Fond du Lac, 147 Wis. 300, 133 N.W. 35; Barnes v. Marcus, 96 Iowa 675, 65 N.W. 984; O'Hara v. City of Buffalo, 39 A.D. 443, 57 N.Y.S. 367; Rusch v. Dubuque, 116 Iowa 402, 90 N.W. 80; Graney v. City of St. Louis, 141 Mo. 180, 42 S.W. 941; Scott v. City of New Orleans, 75 F. 373, 5th Circuit, 21 C. C. A. 402; City of Dallas v. Muncton, 37 Tex. Civ. App. 112, 83 S.W. 431; McQuillan v. City of Seattle, 10 Wash. 464, 45 Am. St. 799, 38 P. 1119; Grattan v. Village of Williamston, 116 Mich. 462, 74 N.W. 668; Palestine v. Hassell, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 519, 40 S.W. 147; City of Ft. Scott v. Peck, 5 Kan. App. 593, 49 P. 111; Trophy v. City of Fall River, 188 Mass. 310, 74 N.E. 465; Osier v. Consumers Co. , supra; Carson v. Genessee, supra; Muir v. Pocatello, supra; Maloy v. St. Paul, 54 Minn. 398, 56 N.W. 94.)

It is present knowledge that is material--not former knowledge. (McLeod v. Spokane, 26 Wash. 346, 67 P. 74; City of Bluffton v. McAfee, 23 Ind.App. 112, 53 N.E. 1058; Simonds v. City of Baraboo, 93 Wis. 40, 57 Am. St. 895, 67 N.W. 40; Powers v. Boston, 154 Mass. 60, 27 N.E. 995; Atchison v. Plunkett, 8 Kan. App. 308, 55 P. 677; City of Dallas v. Muncton, supra; Whoram v. Argentine Tp., 112 Mich. 20, 70 N.W. 341; City of Horton v. Trompeter, 53 Kan. 150, 35 P. 1106; Finn v. City of Adrian, 93 Mich. 504, 53 N.W. 614; Muir v. Pocatello, supra; Perrigo v. City of St. Louis, 185 Mo. 274, 84 S.W. 30.)

Instruction requested by the plaintiff and refused at defendant's request was correct. (Donovan v. City of Boise, 31 Idaho 324, 171 P. 670; Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Mares, 123 U.S. 710, 31 L.Ed. 296, 8 S.Ct. 321; Prior v. Eggert, 39 Wash. 481, 81 P. 929; Murray v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 101 Mo. 236, 20 Am. St. 601, 13 S.W. 817; Crites v. City of New Richmond, 95 Wis. 55, 73 N.W. 322.)

Acting as a reasonably prudent person would act is the criterion. (Cowie v. Seattle, 22 Wash. 659, 62 P. 121; Jewell City v. Van Meter, 70 Kan. 887, 79 P. 149; McQuillan v. Seattle, supra; Rusch v. Dubuque, 116 Iowa 402, 90 N.W. 80.)

To bar plaintiff's action her negligence must be proximate cause of injury and rule that any negligence bars right, does not apply in this state. (Osier v. Consumers Co., supra; Carson v. Genessee, supra; Muir v. Pocatello, supra; Cowie v. Seattle, supra; 1 Thompson on Negligence, par. 170, p. 167.)

The court's instructions were correct. (Osier v. Consumers Co., supra; Carson v. Genessee, supra; Muir v. Pocatello supra; Cowie v. Seattle, supra; Pilmer v. Boise Traction Co., 14 Idaho 327, 125 Am. St. 161, 94 P. 432, 15 L. R. A., N. S., 254; Stephenson v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 102 Cal. 143, 34 P. 618, 36 P. 407; Kinzell v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 33...