Ospina v. Department of Corrections, State of Del.
| Citation | 749 F. Supp. 572 |
| Decision Date | 31 October 1990 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 89-585-JRR. |
| Parties | Ramon Elias OSPINA, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, STATE OF DELAWARE; Department of Public Safety, State of Delaware; Robert Durnan; Clifford M. Graviet; Howard Young; and Robert J. Watson, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Delaware |
Carolyn M. McNeice of Warren B. Burt and Associates, Wilmington, Del., for plaintiff.
Diane J. Bartels and Stuart B. Drowos, Deputy Attys. Gen., State of Del., Dept. of Justice, Wilmington, Del., for defendants.
This action arises out of the arrest and detention of plaintiff Ramon Ospina. In his complaint Ospina asserts a number of claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under Delaware law. The defendants in this suit include Robert Durnan, the Delaware State Policeman who made the arrest; Clifford Graviet, the Superintendent of the Delaware State Police; and the Delaware Department of Public Safety. Also named as defendants are Howard Young, the Warden of the prison where Ospina was detained after arrest; Robert Watson, the Commissioner of the Delaware Department of Corrections; and the Delaware Department of Corrections itself. All defendants are sued in their official capacities. As we discuss below, only Trooper Durnan is sued in his personal, or individual,1 capacity.
In response to Ospina's complaint, the defendants have filed the motion to dismiss that is presently before the Court.
At the outset it must be noted that the parties have filed affidavits with their briefs on the motion to dismiss. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recognize that this has the effect of converting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim into one for summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). The same Rules, however, specifically state that in these circumstances "all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion." Id. (emphasis added). In the present case no discovery has taken place. At this stage of litigation, then, the parties are in no position to present all material pertinent to a motion for summary judgment. See Melo v. Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 634 (3d Cir.1990) (). For this reason, we exclude the affidavits from consideration and treat the defendants' motion as one to dismiss the complaint.
In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, this Court will accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them. Ransom v. Marrazzo, 848 F.2d 398, 401 (3d Cir.1988). The Court will not grant dismissal unless it is certain that no relief could be granted under any set of facts which could be proved. Id. The relevant facts, as described in Ospina's complaint, are as follows.
On October 21, 1987, State Trooper Robert Durnan stopped a car being driven by Ramon Ospina on Interstate 95 in the State of Delaware. Durnan made a legal search of the car, discovering a quantity of illegal drugs. Durnan then arrested Ospina and placed him in handcuffs. According to Ospina, Durnan applied the cuffs with such force that Ospina's right wrist was seriously injured. Durnan proceeded to transport Ospina to a police station for interrogation. There the handcuffs were removed for the time being. Although the complaint is not clear about what happened next, it seems that Ospina was again handcuffed (by whom is not stated) for his arraignment and transportation to the Gander Hill prison.
Ospina alleges that, upon arriving at the prison, he requested immediate medical treatment for his wrist injury but was told that he would have to fill out a written request for an appointment. Ospina claims that the pain in his wrist persisted and an "unsightly growth" appeared in the injured area. No medical treatment was provided for eight days. The doctor who finally examined Ospina's wrist concluded, after reviewing x-rays, that nothing was wrong with the wrist. Ospina was given pain medication and was told that the pain would subside. For the next two months Ospina complained of further pain, loss of movement, and enlargement of the growth, but he received no medical care. He was then examined by another medical care provider who "determined that there was an injury to his wrist and more investigation was needed." Before any additional treatment or examination could occur, Ospina was transferred from the Gander Hill prison to the Federal Corrections Institution in Tallahassee, Florida. Ospina states in the complaint that the injury now prevents him from performing routine tasks and from participating in sporting events. He asserts that his wrist is severely damaged and extensive orthopedic surgery is required to repair it.
The complaint, while not drafted with great precision, asserts both state and federal claims against the defendants. Each of the six defendants is charged with violating Ospina's civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 19832 and with violating duties imposed by Delaware law.3 Ospina seeks retrospective relief in the form of damages, Complaint ¶ 1, and requests no prospective relief.
The defendants' motion to dismiss asserts that Ospina has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and has failed to join an indispensable party.
For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that all federal and state claims against all defendants sued in their official capacities must be dismissed. Federal and state claims against Trooper Durnan in his individual capacity cannot be dismissed at this point.
Before analyzing the merits of the motion to dismiss, it is worth pausing to examine the capacities in which the defendants are sued. The Third Circuit has recently instructed that District Courts must, in determining whether a defendant is sued in his or her personal capacity, official capacity, or both, "look to the complaint and `the course of the proceedings.'" Melo v. Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 635 (3d Cir.1990) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3106 n. 14, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985)). Having engaged in this analysis, we conclude that Ospina intended to sue all six defendants in their official capacities, but intended to sue only defendant Durnan in his personal capacity.
Turning first to the complaint, we note that, despite a defendant's need for "adequate notice that his or her assets are at stake," § 1983 complaints need not specifically identify the capacity in which a defendant is being sued. Melo, supra, at 636 n. 7. Rather, we must adopt a "flexible approach" and interpret the pleading. Id. A number of the complaint's features argue for the conclusion that Ospina intended to sue only defendant Durnan in his personal capacity. For example, a preliminary paragraph of the complaint explicitly notes that Trooper Durnan "is sued individually and in his official capacity." Complaint ¶ 8. By contrast, the five preliminary paragraphs that correspond to the other defendants do not mention suing "individually". Nor do these five paragraphs mention suing anyone in an official capacity. Rather, each states the name and position of the defendant, as well as the defendant's relationship to the State of Delaware. The paragraph naming and describing defendant Young, the warden of Gander Hill prison, is a good example of the language employed:
At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Howard Young was serving as warden of Gander Hill, a prison facility under the direction of the Department of Corrections, State of Delaware and was, at all times relevant hereto, an employee, servant and agent of the State of Delaware and may be served through the office of the Attorney General, State of Delaware.
Complaint ¶ 9. In identical fashion, the paragraphs describing Commissioner Watson and Superintendent Graviet omit any mention of individual or personal capacity.4 Indeed, only Trooper Durnan is singled out by being sued "individually," at least in the body of the complaint.5
The caption of the complaint provides further evidence that Ospina intended to sue only Trooper Durnan in a personal capacity. The caption lists the defendants as:
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, STATE OF DELAWARE; DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, STATE OF DELAWARE; ROBERT DURNAN, Individually, and as an employee of the Delaware State Police, an agency of the Department of Public Safety; CLIFFORD M. GRAVIET, Superintendent, Delaware State Police, an agency of the Department of Public Safety, State of Delaware; HOWARD YOUNG, Warden, Multipurpose Criminal Justice Facility, a Correctional Institution under the direction of the Department of Corrections, State of Delaware and ROBERT J. WATSON, Commissioner, Department of Corrections, a Department of the State of Delaware,
Complaint at 1 (emphasis added). Once again, Trooper Durnan receives unique treatment from the plaintiff.6 These two features of the complaint, even when interpreted flexibly, lead to the conclusion that Ospina intended to sue Durnan in his personal capacity, but not the other defendants.
Our determination of the defendants' capacities in this matter is incomplete, however, until we look at the course of the proceedings. In this task we are again guided by the recent decision in Melo v. Hafer, supra, in which the Third Circuit reversed the District Court's conclusion that Barbara Hafer, the Auditor General of Pennsylvania, had been sued only in her official capacity. The panel first reviewed the complaint, noting that the caption listed only the defendant's name, not her job title. The complaint also requested damages from Hafer only and not from Pennsylvania. The Court went on, however, to look at the course of proceedings:
It appears that Hafer understood that plaintiffs sought to sue her...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Schwab v. Wood, Civ. A. No. 88-657 MMS.
...mode of analysis that courts should use with respect to the existing right of freedom from excessive force. See Ospina v. Dept. of Corrections, 749 F.Supp. 572 (D.Del.1990). Therefore, a Connor analysis was employed in Section III. B. to ascertain whether there was use of excessive force. H......
-
Brennan v. National Telephone Directory Corp.
...or no discovery conducted by the parties. Brug v. The Enstar Group, Inc., 755 F.Supp. 1247, 1251 (D.Del.1991); Ospina v. Dept. of Corrections, 749 F.Supp. 572, 574 (D.Del.1990); Kelley, 721 F.Supp. at 877-78. Considering the motion as a motion for summary judgment would be improper in those......
-
Tonka Corp. v. Rose Art Industries, Inc.
...F.2d 1528, 1532 (11th Cir.1990); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Hertz Corp., 776 F.Supp. 1235, 1238 (S.D.Ohio 1991); Ospina v. Department of Corrections, 749 F.Supp. 572, 574 (D.Del.1990). Because, however, Rose Art has been on notice since its inception that the motion, with regard to the Counterc......
-
Robinson v. Comm'r Carl Danberg
...federal court.). The State of Delaware has not waived its sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. See Ospina v. Department of Corr., 749 F.Supp. 572, 579 (D.Del.1990). Hence, as an agency of the State of Delaware, the DOC is entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. See e.......