Osterberg v. Peca

CourtSupreme Court of Texas
Citation12 S.W.3d 31
Docket NumberNo. 97-1027,97-1027
Parties(Tex. 2000) Robert and Olga Osterberg, Petitioners v. Peter S. Peca, Jr., Respondent
Decision Date08 February 2000

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12 S.W.3d 31 (Tex. 2000)
Robert and Olga Osterberg, Petitioners
v.
Peter S. Peca, Jr., Respondent
No. 97-1027
SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS.
Argued Sept. 8, 1998.
Decided Feb. 3, 2000.
Concurring opinion by Justice Gonzales, Feb. 8, 2000.

On Petition for Review from the Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas

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Justice Abbott delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to parts I-IV and VI-XI, in which Justice Hecht, Justice Owen, Justice Baker and Justice Gonzales join, and a plurality opinion with respect to part V, in which Justice Hecht, Justice Owen, Justice Baker join.

We overrule the Osterbergs' motion for rehearing. We withdraw our opinion dated July 29, 1999, and substitute the following.

In this case we conclude that a candidate who seeks to enforce Texas Election Code reporting requirements is not required to prove that persons making unreported expenditures against the candidate knew they were breaking the law. Arriving at that conclusion requires us to decide the constitutionality of the Election Code sections imposing reporting requirements on direct campaign spenders and the Election Code sections providing private civil remedies for reporting violations. We conclude that, as applied to the Osterbergs, the reporting requirements and the private civil enforcement provisions pass constitutional muster, with one exception: We hold that the Election Code's requirement that husband and wife Robert and Olga Osterberg form a political committee before acting in concert to make a campaign expenditure unconstitutionally burdens their freedom of association. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the court of appeals' judgment and remand to the court of appeals.

I
FACTS

In 1991, Robert Osterberg and his wife Olga were involved in litigation in State District Judge Peter Peca's court. The Osterbergs were unhappy with the way Peca treated them during the litigation. When Peca ran for re-election in 1994, the Osterbergs opposed his candidacy. They contributed $34,200 to Albert Biel, Peca's opponent in the Democratic primary. The Osterbergs also created and funded their own television advertisements about the race.1 The advertisements consisted of the following text:

CONSIDER THIS:

* Judge Peca was chosen by his peers El Paso's outstanding jurist

* He graduated Summa Cum Laude

* He worked to reduce his docket for over seven years

IF THAT'S ENOUGH, VOTE FOR HIM

[next screen:]

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But, if you want ONE who understands:

* The Courthouse exists for the people, and not for judges, accidents of politics, and lawyers.

* The spirit of the law, not just the letter, must be employed for justice and the people.

* Efficiency at the expense of justice cannot be tolerated.

BRING THE COURTHOUSE BACK TO THE PEOPLE!

VOTE FOR HIS OPPONENT

And remove HIM in four years

If he fails the will of the people!

Ad paid for by Bob Osterberg

The Osterbergs spent $28,695 to produce and air the advertisement. The money was withdrawn from a bank account Robert and Olga shared, with checks that Olga had signed in her name. Robert testified that Olga knew nothing about his payment for the ads, and that he used checks she had signed for his use because he had suffered a stroke that impaired his right hand.

One month before the March 8, 1994 primary election, Peca spoke at an El Paso Bar Association candidate forum luncheon. Biel attended the luncheon and heard Peca speak. Biel understood some of Peca's remarks to be accusations that Osterberg was somehow violating the Texas Election Code. At trial, Biel testified that he told Osterberg about Peca's remarks, though he did not say when.

Peca won the March 8th primary election. Two days later, he filed suit against the Osterbergs seeking civil damages for violations of the Texas Election Code. An opposing candidate can bring a private cause of action against "[a] person who knowingly . . . makes a campaign expenditure in violation of" Chapter 253. Tex. Elec. Code 253.131. Peca claimed that the Osterbergs violated Chapter 253 of the Election Code by failing to report the direct campaign expenditures they made for the television advertisements. Chapter 253 prohibits direct campaign expenditures over $100 unless the spender reports the expenditures in compliance with Election Code Chapter 254.2 The Osterbergs had not reported the expenditures by the deadlines required by Election Code section 254.124. Under section 254.124, the Osterbergs were required to file a report no later than the eighth day before the election. Robert did not file a report until May 4, 1994 - nearly two months after the election and after Peca had filed suit. Following a jury trial, the trial court held Robert and Olga jointly and severally liable for Election Code violations and awarded Peca $57,390 plus interest.

The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. 952 S.W.2d 121. It held that Peca was required to prove that

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the Osterbergs knew their expenditures violated the Election Code. Id. at 126. Applying that standard, it affirmed the trial court's judgment against Robert, finding evidence that Robert knew he was violating the Election Code. Id. at 128. The court of appeals reversed as to Olga because it found there was no evidence that she knowingly violated the Election Code. Id. Because of this reversal, the court did not address the Osterbergs' argument that there was no evidence or insufficient evidence that Olga made a direct campaign expenditure. Id. at 129. The court of appeals also held that the Osterbergs had waived their constitutional objections to Chapter 253's reporting requirement and civil enforcement provision. Id. at 124-25. The court of appeals further held that the Osterbergs waived their constitutional argument that the trial court should have limited its definition of "campaign expenditure" to expenditures for communications that "expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate." Id. at 129-31. And the court of appeals held that the Osterbergs waived their contention that they "substantially complied" with the Election Code's reporting requirements by filing a report on May 4, 1994 - almost two months after the election. Id. at 129. Finally, the court of appeals held that Peca waived recovery of attorney's fees by failing to object or make a new request when the jury did not return a finding on the attorney's fees issue. Id. at 132.

Both the Osterbergs and Peca petitioned this Court for review. The Osterbergs renew their argument that Peca produced no evidence that Robert Osterberg knowingly violated Chapter 253 and contend that they did not waive their constitutional and substantial compliance arguments. In response, Peca argues that the Election Code does not require him to prove the Osterbergs knew that their expenditure violated the Election Code, and alternatively that if the Election Code does require knowledge of the law, the evidence supports such a finding. Peca also argues that he is entitled to attorney's fees.

We hold that: (1) Peca need not prove the Osterbergs' subjective knowledge of election laws; (2) the Osterbergs preserved their constitutional objections to Chapter 253; (3) the statute's de facto requirement that the Osterbergs form a political committee and designate a treasurer before making expenditures "in concert" unconstitutionally burdens their associational rights; (4) the application of Chapter 253's other provisions to the Osterbergs does not violate the free speech or association provisions of the Texas or United States Constitutions; (5) the Osterbergs did not waive their constitutional objection to the trial court's definition of campaign expenditure, but any error by the trial court in its instruction was harmless because the Osterbergs' advertisement was express advocacy as a matter of law; (6) the Osterbergs waived their defense that they substantially complied with the statute; and (7) Peca waived his claim for attorney's fees. Our holding renders irrelevant Peca's alternative argument that the evidence supports a finding that the Osterbergs knowingly violated the statute.

II

WHAT MUST A VIOLATOR KNOW?

Texas Election Code section 253.131(a) provides:

A person who knowingly makes or accepts a campaign contribution or makes a campaign expenditure in violation of this chapter is liable for damages as provided by this section.

Tex. Elec. Code 253.131(a) (emphasis added). The initial question in this case is whether this section requires Peca to prove that the Osterbergs actually knew that their conduct violated Chapter 253. The trial court and court of appeals held that the word "knowingly" applies not only to the act of making a campaign expenditure, but also to the fact that the expenditure violates the Election Code. Peca

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assails this construction of the statute, arguing that it violates the "deeply rooted" rule that ignorance or mistake of law is not a defense to prosecution. Peca contends that allowing ignorance or mistake of law as a defense would vitiate enforcement of the Election Code's campaign finance provisions.

In construing a statute, our primary aim is to give effect to the Legislature's intent. Texas Water Comm'n v. Brushy Creek Mun. Util. Dist., 917 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1996). We endeavor to discern the Legislature's intent from the actual language it used. Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Ashworth, 943 S.W.2d 436, 438 (Tex. 1997). In so doing, we consider the object to be attained, the circumstances surrounding the statute's enactment, legislative history, former statutory and common law, and the consequences of a particular construction. Tex. Gov't Code 311.023; Mitchell Energy, 943 S.W.2d at 438; Union Bankers Ins. Co. v. Shelton, 889 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Tex. 1994).

The language of section 253.131(a),...

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