Ostrander v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, Inc.

• Decision Date: 24 March 1993
• Docket Number: No. 19255,19255
• Citation: 123 Idaho 650,851 P.2d 946
• Parties: , 8 IER Cases 1063 Diane OSTRANDER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO, INC., an Idaho corporation; Western Community Insurance Company, an Idaho corporation; Western Farm Bureau Life Insurance, Inc., a Colorado corporation, authorized to do business and doing business in Idaho; Farm Insurance Brokerage Company, an Idaho corporation; and Dave Hart, both individually and in his representative capacity as District Manager with the Farm Bureau family of Insurance Companies, Defendants-Respondents. Lewiston, October 1992 Term
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 946

851 P.2d 946

123 Idaho 650, 8 IER Cases 1063

Diane OSTRANDER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO, INC., an Idaho corporation; Western Community Insurance Company, an Idaho corporation; Western Farm Bureau Life Insurance, Inc., a Colorado corporation, authorized to do business and doing business in Idaho; Farm Insurance Brokerage Company, an Idaho corporation; and Dave Hart, both individually and in his representative capacity as District Manager with the Farm Bureau family of Insurance Companies, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 19255.

Supreme Court of Idaho,

Lewiston, October 1992 Term.

March 24, 1993.

Rehearing Denied May 25, 1993.

Dissenting Opinion on Rehearing of Justice Bistline May 25, 1993.

Skinner, Fawcett & Mauk, Boise, for appellant. W. Craig James argued.

Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, Boise, for respondents. Candy Wagahoff Dale argued.

TROUT, Justice.

I. BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

Diane Ostrander (Ostrander) was an insurance agent for Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (Farm Bureau) for fourteen years before her agreement was terminated in March, 1990. Under the terms of her Special Agent's Agreement with Farm Bureau, Ostrander was an independent contractor. The agreement specified that either party could cancel the agreement at any time, with or without cause.

On August 28, 1990, Ostrander filed a complaint in district court against Farm Bureau and her supervisor, Dave Hart (Hart). Ostrander claimed that Farm Bureau terminated their agreement with her because of her gender and her age, but she did not challenge her status as an independent contractor. In her complaint, Ostrander alleged that Hart intentionally made inaccurate and negative evaluations of her performance in order to support his later termination of her contract.

In response to the complaint, Farm Bureau and Hart filed a motion to dismiss under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. The trial court dismissed Ostrander's claims but gave her leave to file an amended complaint to allege breach of contract. At the request of Ostrander, the trial court certified the dismissal as final and Ostrander appealed to this Court.

Ostrander alleged four different causes of action, each of which is an issue on appeal. She argues: (1) she was dismissed in violation of public policy; (2) Farm Bureau violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) her supervisor, Dave Hart, tortiously interfered with her contract; and (4) she is entitled to treble damages for unpaid commissions as a claim for wages under Title 45, Chapter 6 of the Idaho Code.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Our standard for reviewing a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is the same as our standard for summary judgment. Tomchak v. Walker, 108 Idaho 446, 447, 700 P.2d 68, 69 (1985). When the Court considers the question of whether a claim for relief has been stated, the record must be considered in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 637, 778 P.2d 757, 759 (1989). In the present case, we must consider Ostrander's allegations in her complaint to be true in determining whether Ostrander has stated a claim for which relief may be granted.

III. OSTRANDER DOES NOT HAVE A TORT CLAIM BASED ON A VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY

Ostrander states that she was terminated as an independent contractor for Farm Bureau based on her age and her gender. While Idaho courts have recognized claims based on an allegation that a specific provision of a contract is against public policy, ¹ Ostrander argues that her dismissal violated the public policies embodied in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Title VII), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (ADEA), and the Idaho Human Rights Act, I.C. §§ 67-5901 to -5912. Here she states that the Court should provide a remedy in tort to assure the effectiveness of these provisions. We have recognized that when a legislative provision protects a certain class of persons but does not provide a civil remedy, the court may accord an injured member of the class a right of action in tort. White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 101, 730 P.2d 1014, 1021 (1986) citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 847A (1965).

[123 Idaho 653] those cases are not applicable to Ostrander's claim. Ostrander does not claim that her independent contractor agreement, or any of its terms, were against public policy; rather, she argues that the reasons for her dismissal were against public policy. Accordingly, this case is distinguishable from cases where we recognized that particular terms of a contract may be unenforceable as against public policy.

However, Ostrander has not shown that she is in the class of persons protected by any legislative provision. The statutes on which Ostrander bases her public policy claim were not intended to protect independent contractors. Title VII and the ADEA apply exclusively to employees, and not to independent contractors. Knight v. United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 377, 380 (7th Cir.1991) (independent contractors are not protected by Title VII); Falls v. Sporting News Pub. Co., 834 F.2d 611, 613 (6th Cir.1987) (independent contractors are excluded from the protection of Title VII and the ADEA). The Idaho Human Rights Act embodies the policies of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the ADEA. I.C. § 67-5901(1). In interpreting the Idaho Human Rights Act we are guided by federal law. O'Dell v. Basabe, 119 Idaho 796, 811, 810 P.2d 1082, 1097 (1991). It follows that the protections of the Idaho Human Rights Act are also limited to employees.

As an independent contractor, Ostrander is not protected by the provisions of Title VII, the ADEA or the Idaho Human Rights Act. These statutes do provide civil remedies, they are just not available to independent contractors. Thus, Ostrander has no cause of action for a violation of public policy under these statutes.

We note that the Court has previously enunciated an exception to employment-at-will contracts where a discharge is for a reason contravening public policy. See, e.g., Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977); MacNeil v. Minidoka Memorial Hosp., 108 Idaho 588, 701 P.2d 208 (1985); Clement v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 115 Idaho 298, 766 P.2d 768 (1988), citing Anderson v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 112 Idaho 461, 732 P.2d 699 (Ct.App.1987). This exception, however, has been applied only in employee-employer relationships and not to independent contractors. We decline the opportunity to expand this exception to include independent contractors.

IV. OSTRANDER DOES NOT HAVE A CLAIM FOR VIOLATION OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING

Ostrander asks this Court to apply the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to her as an independent contractor. Until now, the Court has not directly decided the issue of whether the covenant applies to independent contractors. We now hold that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not apply to independent contractors.

In Clement v. Farmers Ins. Exch., a 3-2 majority of the Court held that the implied covenant of good faith did not apply to the appellant, who by his own admission was Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 116 Idaho 622, 778 P.2d 744 (1989), presented the Court with the opportunity to decide that issue as it applied to an employee. The Court held that employees may have a cause of action under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in certain circumstances. In adopting the covenant, though, the Court specifically applied it to employees rather than independent contractors.

                [123 Idaho 654] an independent contractor.  115 Idaho 298, 766 P.2d 768.   Two members of the majority stated that the covenant would not invalidate an express contractual provision which provides for termination.  In a special concurrence, the third member of the majority specifically declined to extend the application of that covenant to independent contractors, opting to wait until the issue was properly presented to determine if it should even apply to employees.  Id. at 302, 766 P.2d at 772
                

Nevertheless, it is the opinion of this Court today that in employer-employee relationships (as distinguished from principal-agent (independent contractor) relationships, Clement v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, supra) we should adopt an implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing (the covenant) as hereinafter outlined.

Id. at 626, 778 P.2d at 748.

We recognize that due to bargaining position and other circumstances surrounding a working relationship some nominal independent contractors may be de facto employees. However, in cases such as this one, where the plaintiff does not challenge her status as an independent contractor, there is no cause of action under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

V. OSTRANDER DOES NOT HAVE A CLAIM FOR TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT AGAINST HER SUPERVISOR

Ostrander claims that her supervisor, Dave Hart, tortiously interfered with her contract with Farm Bureau. In Barlow v. International Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881, 522 P.2d 1102 (1974), we listed the elements of tortious interference with contract by a third party as: (a) the existence of a contract; (b) knowledge of the contract on the part of the defendant; (c) intentional interference causing a breach of contract; (d) injury to the plaintiff resulting from the breach.

The general rule is that a party cannot tortiously interfere with its own contract. See Houser v. City of Redmond, 91 Wash.2d 36, 586 P.2d 482, 484 (1978); Payne v. Pennzoil Corp., 138 Ariz. 52, 57, 672 P.2d 1322, 1327 (1983); Nordling v. Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 505 (Minn.1991); Bolz v. Myers, 200 Mont. 286, 651 P.2d 606, 609 (1982); Michelson v. Exxon Research and Eng'g Co., 808 F.2d 1005, 1007-1008 (3rd. Cir.1987) citin...