Osuagwu v. Gila Reg'l Med. Ctr.

• Decision Date: 21 December 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11cv001 MV/SMV.,11cv001 MV/SMV.
• Citation: 938 F.Supp.2d 1142
• Parties: Chinonyerem OSUAGWU, Plaintiff, v. GILA REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER; Jean Remillard, M.D.; Gregory Koury, M.D.; Michael Sergeant, M.D.; Mark Donnell, M.D.; Ronald Deyhle, M.D.; Don White, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico

938 F.Supp.2d 1142

Chinonyerem OSUAGWU, Plaintiff,

v.GILA REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER; Jean Remillard, M.D.; Gregory Koury, M.D.; Michael Sergeant, M.D.; Mark Donnell, M.D.; Ronald Deyhle, M.D.; Don White, Defendants.

No. 11cv001 MV/SMV.

United States District Court,

D. New Mexico.

Dec. 21, 2012.

Dr. Chinonyerem Osuagwu, Albuquerque, NM, pro se.

Candace J. Cavanaugh, Butt Thornton & Baehr PC, Albuquerque, NM, for Defendant Gila Regional.

Kevin J. Banville, Seth Sparks, Shannon Sherrell, Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A., Albuquerque, NM, for the Individual Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MARTHA VÁZQUEZ, District Judge.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on pro-se Plaintiff/Physician Chinonyerem Osuagwu's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed August 23, 2012 [Doc. 135] and on Defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment, filed in response [Doc. 160]. Plaintiff contends that the undisputed record, as set forth in part in my March 27, 2012 Memorandum Opinion and Order (“MOO”) denying summary judgment to Gila Regional Medical Center, demonstrates that he is entitled to summary judgment on his § 1983 claims. Defendants assert qualified immunity on the contention that it is not clearly established Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit law that Plaintiff had a constitutionally-protected property interest in his medical privileges granted by Gila Regional Hospital, and they alternatively contend that they did not violate Plaintiff's right to due process. Having considered the parties' submissions, the record, and the applicable law, I have decided to temporarily bifurcate Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against Gila Regional from his § 1983 claims against the individual Defendants and his state-law claims, and will address in this memorandum opinion and order only Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against Gila Regional Medical Center. I will grant Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on his § 1983claims as to Gila Regional Medical Center and his request for injunctive relief, and will enter an order requiring Gila Regional to reinstate Plaintiff's medical privileges and to withdraw the reports that it sent to the New Mexico Medical Board and the National Practitioner Data Bank so that Plaintiff's record may be cleared and he may apply for privileges at other hospitals and mitigate his damages. I will resolve the remaining pending matters and motions at a later date, and a jury may decide the issue of monetary damages on the § 1983 claims against Gila Regional. I will adopt and incorporate into this MOO some of the findings and conclusions set forth in my March 27, 2012 MOO for the purpose of analyzing the due-process issues in this case, and, therefore, I quote liberally from that opinion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff:

sued Gila Regional and several individuals under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages and injunctive relief, alleging violation of his due-process rights, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. He alleges that Gila Regional, through the actions and conduct of Don White (the Chairman of its Board of Trustees); Dr. Jean Remillard (its Chief Medical Officer); the individual members of its internal Peer Review Committee (“PRC”); the members of its Medical Executive Committee (“MEC”); the members of its Fair Hearing Committee (“FHC” or “panel”); and Ronald Dehyle, an Outside Peer Reviewer, violated his civil rights when, without a reasonable belief that their actions were warranted by known facts, without a reasonable effort to obtain facts, and without following the process due to Plaintiff, the MEC and Board of Trustees temporarily and then indefinitely suspended his medical privileges and imposed harsh requirements for regaining those privileges, and Dr. Remillard filed notice of that adverse action with the National Practitioner Databank and the New Mexico Medical Board. Plaintiff also contends that the Defendants have tortiously damaged his reputation and intentionally inflicted emotional distress.

Osuagwu v. Gila Reg'l Med. Ctr., 850 F.Supp.2d 1216, 1219 (D.N.M.2012) (footnote omitted.). The parties have engaged in discovery, which ended on November 19, 2012.

APPLICABLE STANDARDS

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” ¹Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (noting that a summary judgment movant need not negate all the nonmovant's claims, but need only point to an “absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case”). The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden to show that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Once [the movant] meets this burden, the burden shifts to [the non-moving party] to identify specific facts that show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. The party opposing the motion must present sufficient evidence in specific, factual form for a jury to return a verdict in that party's favor. Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, summary judgment in favor of the moving party is proper.

Thomas v. Int'l Bus. Machs., 48 F.3d 478, 484 (10th Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The ultimate inquiry in a summary judgment disposition is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “When applying th[e summary judgment] standard, [the court] view[s] the evidence and draw[s] reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Garrison v. Gambro, Inc., 428 F.3d 933, 935 (10th Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Cross motions for summary judgment are to be treated separately; the denial of one does not require the grant of another.” Buell Cabinet Co. v. Sudduth, 608 F.2d 431, 433 (10th Cir.1979). Even where the parties file cross motions pursuant to Rule 56, summary judgment is inappropriate if disputes remain as to material facts. Atl. Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita, 226 F.3d 1138, 1148 (10th Cir.2000). Where the facts are not in dispute and the parties only disagree about whether the actions were constitutional, summary disposition is appropriate. SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

Christian Heritage Acad. v. Okla. Secondary Sch. Activities Ass'n, 483 F.3d 1025, 1030 (10th Cir.2007).

“The law of the case doctrine posits that when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.” Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., 647 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court may, of course, revisit rulings made before a final judgment is entered. See id.

A governmental entity, like the public hospital in this case, “can be sued for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief for depriving someone of constitutional or civil rights. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Qualified immunity is not available as a defense to [such] liability.” Seamons v. Snow, 206 F.3d 1021, 1029 (10th Cir.2000).

Property interests “are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.” Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). Thus, constitutionally protected property interests are created and defined by statute, ordinance, contract, implied contract and rules and understandings developed by state officials.

Hulen v. Yates, 322 F.3d 1229, 1240 (10th Cir.2003). “A successful procedural due process claim requires a plaintiff to show (1) the deprivation of a liberty or property interest and (2) the absence of due process. Stears v. Sheridan County Mem'l Hosp. Bd. of Trs., 491 F.3d 1160, 1162 (10th Cir.2007).” Mecca v. United States, 389 Fed.Appx. 775, 781 (10th Cir.2010).

To show a deprivation of one's liberty interest in professional reputation, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) “statements [that] impugn the good name, reputation, honor, or integrity of the employee”; (2) “the statements [were] false”; (3) the “statements ... occur[red] in the course of terminating the employee or must foreclose other employment opportunities”; and (4) “the statements [were] published.” Watson v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 75 F.3d 569, 579 (10th Cir.1996) (quotation omitted).

Id. at 782.

When a public employer takes action to terminate an employee based upon a public statement of unfounded charges of dishonesty or immorality that might seriously damage the employee's standing or associations in the community and foreclose the employee's freedom to take advantage of future employment opportunities, a claim for relief is created.

Melton v. City of Okla. City, 928 F.2d 920, 927 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,502 U.S. 906[, 112 S.Ct. 296, 116 L.Ed.2d 241] (1991). A plaintiff must show that his dismissal resulted in “the publication of information which was false and stigmatizing-information which had the general effect of curtailing her future freedom of choice or action.” Asbill v. Housing Auth. of the Choctaw Nation, 726 F.2d 1499, 1503 (10th Cir.1984) (footnotes omitted). The public statements “ ‘must rise to such a serious level as to place the employee's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity at stake.’ ” Six v. Henry, 42 F.3d 582, 585 (10th Cir.1994) ( quoting Asbill, 726 F.2d at 1503).

Custodio v. Parker, No. 94–1587, 65 F.3d 178, 1995 WL 523123, *4 (10th Cir. Sept. 6, 1995) (unpublished).

“While it is true that procedural protections alone do not create a property interest,” when the governmental entity publishes rules, like an employee...