Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp.

• Decision Date: 20 June 1995
• Docket Number: No. 1:94CV91-B-D.,1:94CV91-B-D.
• Citation: 889 F. Supp. 253
• Parties: Kevin OSWALT, Plaintiff, v. SARA LEE CORPORATION d/b/a Bryan Foods, Inc., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi

889 F. Supp. 253

Kevin OSWALT, Plaintiff, v. SARA LEE CORPORATION d/b/a Bryan Foods, Inc., Defendant.

No. 1:94CV91-B-D.

United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Eastern Division.

June 20, 1995.

Jim D. Waide, III, Waide Law Office, Tupelo, MS, for plaintiff.

James C. Helveston, Edwards, Storey, Marshall & Helveston, West Point, MS, R. Carl Cannon, Constangy, Brooks & Smith, Atlanta, GA, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BIGGERS, District Judge.

This cause comes before the court upon the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court has duly considered the parties' memoranda and exhibits and is ready to rule.

INTRODUCTION

The plaintiff, an employee of Bryan Foods in West Point, Mississippi, brought this action against the defendant alleging claims of wrongful discharge in violation of his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The plaintiff seeks actual and punitive damages.

FACTS

The plaintiff was hired by Bryan Foods in 1982 and was promoted to the position of assistant supervisor in 1992. All indications were that he was a model employee until 1993.

In his spare time, the plaintiff enjoyed painting and fixing automobiles, which he and his friends would do after work in the plaintiff's backyard. In the spring of 1993, the plaintiff rented a shop so as to have a convenient location to perform the auto body work. There is some dispute as to whether he was attempting to turn his auto work into a side business; however, resolution of that issue is immaterial to the outcome of this case.

In July of 1993, the plaintiff was diagnosed as having high blood pressure. His treating physician, Dr. Edmund Miller, stated that he authorized the plaintiff to remain out of work for nearly the entire month of July while his body adjusted to his blood pressure medication. During this time, the plaintiff failed to report directly to his supervisor regarding his condition. The plaintiff would call in to work and leave word about his progress with whoever answered the telephone, but never talked directly with any of his supervisors. Also during this period, many of the plaintiff's co-workers reported to Bryan Foods' management that they had seen the plaintiff at his shop and around town. After one of the supervisors reported seeing the plaintiff's car parked at his shop during the lunch hour, two members of management drove to the plaintiff's shop whereupon they found the plaintiff standing in the hot sun, appearing to supervise work on automobiles.

When the plaintiff returned to work on July 27th, he was placed on 90 days probation for failing to properly communicate with his supervisor as to his medical condition, and for working at his shop when he was supposedly unable to work at Bryan Foods.

On August 4th, approximately one week after returning to work, the plaintiff called in sick due to food poisoning. He went to the doctor, who gave him a work excuse for one day. The plaintiff called his supervisor at work to explain the situation, and notified his supervisor that he would be in to work on August 5th. On August 5th, the plaintiff did not report to work, and did not directly notify his supervisor of his continued need to remain at home. However, the plaintiff did call and leave a message on his supervisor's home answering machine, stating that he was still sick and would be going back to the doctor on August 6th. The plaintiff did not go to the doctor on August 6th, nor did he call or come in to work. On Sunday, August 8th, the plaintiff called his supervisor at home to notify his supervisor that he was still weak and that he would be returning to the doctor on August 10th. The plaintiff did not report to work on either August 9th or 10th. The plaintiff did go to the doctor's office on August 10th, but only in an attempt to obtain a work excuse for the entire length of his absence. When the doctor refused to give him an additional work excuse without a reexamination, the plaintiff left.

The plaintiff returned to work on August 11th, after an absence of five working days, with a medical excuse for only one day. The defendant fired the plaintiff, effective August 12, 1993. The stated reason for the plaintiff's discharge was his failure to provide a doctor's excuse for the days he missed and his false statements about his medical treatment.

LAW

On a motion for summary judgment, the movant has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, 275 (1986) ("the burden on the moving party may be discharged by `showing' ... that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case"). Under Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to "go beyond the pleadings and by ... affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d at 274. That burden is not discharged by "mere allegations or denials." Rule 56(e). All legitimate factual inferences must be made in favor of the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513-14, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 216 (1986). Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d at 273. Before finding that no genuine issue for trial exists, the court must first be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the non-movant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538, 552 (1986).

A. ADA Claim

The ADA provides in pertinent part that:

"no covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to ... the ... discharge of employees...."

42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The term "disability" is defined as:

(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities ...;

(B) a record of such an impairment; or

(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).

The plaintiff claims that he meets the definition of disability in that he has a record of impairment that substantially limited a major life activity. According to the plaintiff, the fact that Dr. Miller authorized him to remain out of work, a major life activity, provides him with such a record of impairment. The plaintiff further claims that the ADA does not require an intent to discriminate, but rather that the term "discriminate" includes "utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration ... that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability...." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3).

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, charged with the enforcement of Title I of the ADA, has enacted regulations to implement the equal employment provisions of the ADA.¹ Said regulations, found in 29 C.F.R. § 1630, set forth three factors that should be considered in determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity:

(i) The nature and severity of the impairment;

(ii) The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and

(iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)².

In applying the aforementioned factors to the plaintiff's condition, the court finds that the plaintiff does not have a record of an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. The nature and severity of the impairment is questionable. Although Dr. Miller authorized the plaintiff to stay away from work for nearly a month while the plaintiff's body adjusted to the blood pressure medication, an unusual event in itself, there is no objective evidence that the plaintiff was suffering from any ill effects of the medication. The doctor admitted that his recommendation that the plaintiff not report to work was based solely upon the plaintiff's subjective complaints. Most people suffer little or no side effects when beginning medication to control high blood pressure, especially those which would prevent normal indoor work. Even giving the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt regarding his subjective complaints, it is undisputed that the plaintiff was not house-bound with his ailments. Therefore, the nature and severity of the impairment was minimal. The duration of the impairment is likewise negligible. The condition that caused the plaintiff to miss nearly a month of work was merely temporary. The plaintiff was held out of work not because of any limitation necessitated by his high blood pressure, but rather due to complaints resulting from adjustment to the medication. Now that the plaintiff has adjusted to the medication, the expected long term impact from the plaintiff's high blood pressure is nil. All of the evidence indicates that the plaintiff has suffered no ill effects from either his blood pressure or his medication since returning to work in late July of 1993.

Other courts, in applying the terms of the ADA and similar acts, have held that high blood pressure is not a disability within the meaning of the Act. See Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-America, 869 F.Supp. 736, 744 (E.D.Mo.1994) (court found that plaintiff failed to produce any evidence that high blood pressure, unspecified angina, and coronary artery disease substantially limited one or more major life activities); Greene v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 548 F.Supp. 3, 5 (W.D.Wash.1981) (court found that neither plaintiff's borderline hypertension nor his back...