Otero Carrasquillo v. Pharmacia
| Decision Date | 15 August 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV 03-1651JAF.,CIV 03-1651JAF. |
| Parties | Robur OTERO CARRASQUILLO, María T. Negrón Cedeño, and Jennifer M. Otero Negrón, Plaintiffs, v. PHARMACIA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Vilma M. Dapena-Rodriguez, Bayamon, PR, for Plaintiffs.
Carl E. Schuster, Lourdes C. Hernandez-Venegas, Maria L. Santiago-Ramos, Schuster Usera & Aguilo LLP, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.
Plaintiffs, Robur Otero Carrasquillo, María T. Negrón Cedeño, their conjugal partnership, and their daughter, Jennifer Marie Otero Negrón, bring the present action against Defendants, Pharmacia (incorrectly identified both as Pharmacia Corporation and Pfizer Pharmaceuticals) ("Pharmacia"); Zaida Sanabria in her official and personal capacities; Companies X, Y and Z; and Jane Doe and John Doe, alleging violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461. (1999 & Supp.2005) and Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, 31 L.P.R.A. § 5141 (1991 & Supp.2001). Docket Document No. 1.
On January 1, 2005, Defendants Pharmacia and Sanabria moved for summary judgment. Docket Document No. 28. Plaintiffs opposed the motion on February 25. Docket Document No. 37. Defendants filed a reply to Plaintiffs' opposition, Docket Document No. 67, and Plaintiffs filed a surreply. Docket Document No. 81.
Unless otherwise indicated, we derive the following factual summary from the complaint and the statements of fact submitted by the parties in their summary judgment and opposition motions. Docket Document Nos. 1, 28, 38, 66, 82, 92.1
Plaintiff Robur Otero Carrasquillo ("Plaintiff") is a resident of Bayamón, Puerto Rico. Plaintiff began working for Defendant Pharmacia on June 4, 1973, and was employed as a Research Associate at Defendant Pharmacia's Arecibo plant from the late 1980's until the end of his employment in November 2001.
Plaintiff María Teresa Negrón Cedeño, Plaintiff's wife, is a resident of Bayamón, Puerto Rico.
Plaintiff Jennifer Marie Otero Negrón is a resident of Bayamón, Puerto Rico, and is the daughter of Plaintiff and Plaintiff Negrón.
Defendant Pharmacia is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware.
Defendants X, Y, and Z are unnamed entities, administrators, plan sponsors, and fiduciaries that participated in the alleged misconduct and/or issued insurance policies that cover the damages claims in the present lawsuit.
Defendant Zaida Sanabria was Plaintiff's direct supervisor at Pharmacia in the Fermentation Plant during the final seven months of Plaintiff's employment.
Defendants Jane Doe and John Doe include unnamed medical personnel, independent contractors, and employees who directly or indirectly contributed, participated, and/or assisted in the alleged actions. In February 2000, Defendant Pharmacia announced the closing of the fermentation plant in Arecibo, Puerto Rico. Defendant Pharmacia always maintained a Separation Plan Package ("SPP") for its employees. The plan supplemented unemployment benefits for employees who lost their jobs due to job elimination, job restructuring, or non-performance. During a meeting for fermentation employees in September 2000, Linda Díaz, Senior Director of Human Resources for Defendant Pharmacia in Puerto Rico, informed the affected employees that they had two options: (1) apply for the SPP between April 19, 2000 and December 31, 2001; or (2) continue with the company in a different position.
In February 2001, all fermentation plant employees received a Spanish translation of the summary plan description of the SPP ("SPD"), which outlined in layman's terms the general contours of the SPP. According to the SPD, fermentation plant employees would be granted SPP benefits if they did not receive a "comparable" position within the company.
Plaintiff sought a comparable position with Defendant Pharmacia rather than the SPP benefits. Plaintiff consulted several individuals within the company, but never received a clear answer as to what kind of job he would receive or when the position would become available.
During the following months, Plaintiff was upset by a number of events within the plant. The company denied Plaintiff's request to attend a seminar in St. Louis, Missouri. His new supervisor, Defendant Sanabria, was more critical than previous supervisors of his work product and made frequent comments that Plaintiff perceived as unprofessional, derogatory or dismissive. Plaintiff also witnessed his fermentation plant co-workers receiving their new assignments long before he received his new assignment.
On August 27, 2001, Plaintiff received a designation letter indicating that effective January 2, 2002, he would be assigned to the Quality Control Microbiology Laboratories as a Microbiologist III. He was instructed that due to business needs and the closing of the Fermentation Area, he was to continue in his then-current position until the end of December 2001.
Because Plaintiff perceived the new position as a demotion, on November 5, 2001, Plaintiff handed a letter — dated October 31, 2001 — to Defendant Sanabria indicating that "after months of extensive evaluation, financial planning, and also due to personal reasons" and in light of "[m]any unpredictable situations," he had decided to change his "original decision regarding [his] future with Pharmacia" and accept the SPP. Docket Document No. 28, Exh. 22.
Prior to receiving Plaintiff's letter, neither Díaz nor Defendant Sanabria were aware of Plaintiff's intention to accept the SPP. Díaz immediately contacted Julie Uebler, who was Díaz' SPP contact at Defendant Pharmacia's Corporate offices. Uebler said that since Plaintiff had already been assigned a comparable position, he was no longer SPP-eligible. Díaz conveyed this message to Defendant Sanabria, who conveyed it to Plaintiff on November 12, 2001.
Plaintiff then prepared another letter directed to Carmen Calcaño, Human Resources Manager, further inquiring about his SPP eligibility and questioning Uebler's decision. As he delivered the letter to Calcano's assistant on November 12, 2001, he collapsed. After regaining consciousness, he spoke with Calcaño for approximately two hours in her office regarding his future with the company. He returned to work the next day, November 13, 2001, but it was Plaintiff's last day of active employment with Defendant Pharmacia. Subsequently, he was admitted to the hospital for a back operation, and was hospitalized for several weeks.
From December 2001 until May 2002, Plaintiff received salary continuation benefits pursuant to Defendant Pharmacia's short-term disability ("STD") plan, whereby he received 100% of his annual salary. As of June 2002, Plaintiff began receiving long-term disability ("LTD") benefits, which amounted to 60% of his annual salary.
On June 8, 2003, Plaintiffs filed the present complaint. Docket Document No. 1. Defendant Pharmacia filed a summary judgment motion on January 19, 2005, arguing that their handling of the SPP with regard to Plaintiff did not violate ERISA, that the Commonwealth claims of breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent inducement, and negligent/intentional infliction of emotional distress are preempted by ERISA, and, finally, that the invasion of privacy claim should be dismissed. Docket Document No. 28.2
Motion for Summary Judgment Standard under Rule 56(c)
The standard for summary judgment is straightforward and well-established. A district court should grant a motion for summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). A factual dispute is "genuine" if it could be resolved in favor of either party, and "material" if it potentially affects the outcome of the case. Calero-Cerezo v. United States Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir.2004).
The moving party carries the burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, though the burden "may be discharged by `showing'-that is, pointing out to the district court-that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The burden has two components: (1) an initial burden of production that shifts to the nonmoving party if satisfied by the moving party; and (2) an ultimate burden of persuasion that always remains on the moving party. See id. at 331.
The non-moving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). Summary judgment exists "to pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and assess the proof in order to determine the need for trial." Euromodas, Inc. v. Zanella, 368 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir.2004) (citing Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 794 (1st Cir.1992)).
Defendant Pharmacia first argues that it complied with ERISA's standards, meriting dismissal of Plaintiff's ERISA claims. Defendant then argues that ERISA preempts the Commonwealth law causes of action. As to the federal claims, with one small exception, we agree that Defendant Pharmacia did not violate ERISA. With one further exception, we also agree that Plaintiff's Commonwealth law claims are preempted by ERISA.
"ERISA is a `comprehensive and reticulated statute,' which Congress adopted after careful study of private retirement pension plans." Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 510, 101 S.Ct. 1895, 68 L.Ed.2d 402 (1981) (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension...
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