Otero v. Dart
| Decision Date | 18 October 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 12 C 3148 |
| Parties | BRIAN OTERO, Plaintiff, v. THOMAS J. DART, Sheriff of Cook County, and COOK COUNTY ILLINOIS, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge:
Defendants Thomas J. Dart ("Dart") and Cook County Illinois (collectively, the "Defendants") move to dismiss Plaintiff Brian Otero's ("Otero") claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(b)(1) or to strike under Rule 12(f). For the following reasons, the Court grants the motion in part and denies it in part.1
Otero alleges the following facts in support of his claims, which the Court accepts as true for the purpose of this motion. On November 23, 2009, the Chicago Police Department arrested Otero for an alleged burglary. Otero was charged with burglary and held in Cook County Jail pending trial because he could not afford to make bail. (Id.) Otero stood trial for burglary July 18-21, 2011 and was found "not guilty" on all charges. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 24.) Oterohad no outstanding warrants at the time of the acquittal. (Id. ¶ 25.) After the acquittal, Defendants placed Otero in handcuffs and transported him back to Cook County Jail for processing. (Id. ¶ 27.) Defendants detained Otero in the "bullpen" at Cook County Jail for approximately twelve hours while Defendants completed the procedure to process Otero for release. (Id. ¶ 29.) Defendants have a policy or practice to hold individuals in custody pending the completion of a check for warrants and holds (the "Unlawful Detention Policy"). (Id. ¶ 32.) While in the bullpen, an inmate punched and pummeled Otero about the face and body after Otero informed the inmate that he had been acquitted. (Id. ¶ 30.)
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the allegations regarding subject matter jurisdiction on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 443-44 (7th Cir. 2009); United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 946 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012). "Where jurisdiction is in question, the party asserting a right to a federal forum has the burden of proof, regardless of who raises the jurisdictional challenge." Craig v. Ontario Corp., 543 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2008).
"A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chicago Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). "The issue is not whether a plaintiff willultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." AnchorBank, FSB v. Hofer, 649 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Pursuant to Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must "give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957)).
"In evaluating the sufficiency of the complaint, [courts] view it in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, taking as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and making all possible inferences from the allegations in the plaintiff's favor." AnchorBank, 649 F.3d at 614. "To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face . . . A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Indep. Trust Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 665 F.3d 930, 934-35 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)). "The complaint 'must actually suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, by providing allegations that raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'" Id. at 935 ). "[A] plaintiff's claim need not be probable, only plausible: 'a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.'" Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (internal quotation omitted)). "To meet thisplausibility standard, the complaint must supply 'enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence' supporting the plaintiff's allegations." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
"Rule 12(f) provides that a district court 'may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.'" Delta Consulting Grp., Inc. v. R. Randle Const., Inc., 554 F.3d 1133, 1141 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)). Motions to strike pursuant to Rule 12(f) are usually discouraged. See Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 903 (7th Cir. 2012). Motions to strike are appropriate, however, if they serve to expedite litigation. See Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 1294 (7th Cir. 1989); see also Talbot v. Robert Matthews Distrib. Co., 961 F.2d 654, 664 (7th Cir. 1992) (). District courts have considerable discretion to strike allegations under Rule 12(f). See Delta, 554 F.3d at 1141-42. "The party moving to strike has the burden of showing that the challenged allegations are so unrelated to plaintiff's claim as to be devoid of merit, unworthy of consideration, and unduly prejudicial." E & J Gallo Winery v. Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 247 F. Supp. 2d 979, 982 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (citation and internal quotation omitted).
On April 27, 2012, Otero filed a one count complaint against Thomas Dart, the Sheriff of Cook County, and Cook County Illinois. (Compl. ¶¶ 34-41.) Defendants jointly filed Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and/or Strike the Plaintiff's Complaint. (R. 16, Mot. to Dismiss.) Defendants' argue (1) Otero has failed to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2)Otero lacks standing to seek equitable relief; and (3) Otero cannot assert substantive claims against Cook County, which is an essential party only for the purposes of indemnification. (Id.) The Court addresses these arguments in turn.
Otero alleges that Defendants have a "policy or practice of unlawfully detaining, holding in custody or imprisoning free citizens following a trial or other proceeding at which the citizen is found not-guilty or otherwise acquitted" in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 36.) Defendants move to dismiss on the basis that Otero has not sufficiently alleged facts to demonstrate that a custom or policy by either Sheriff Dart or Cook County caused injuries of a "constitutional magnitude." (Mot. to Dismiss at 4.) The Court disagrees.
Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, "subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Where, as here, the Section 1983 defendants are public entities,2 the plaintiff must demonstrate both an underlying deprivation of a federal right, and that the deprivation "was caused by an official policy or custom." Sow v. Fortville Police Dep't, 636 F.3d 293, 301 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978)).
A plaintiff may establish that a governmental entity's policy caused a violation of his constitutional rights through one of three ways. A governmental entity may be liable under Section 1983 if the alleged constitutional violations were caused by: (1) an official policy adopted and promulgated by the entity's officers; (2) a governmental practice or custom that, though not officially authorized by law or express policy, is widespread and well settled so as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law; or (3) an act by an official with final policymaking authority where that act is in conformity with, or in the creation of, governmental policy or rules that essentially have the force of law. See Thomas v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff's Dept., 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690); Valentino v. Vill. of S. Chi. Heights, 575 F.3d 664, 674 (7th Cir. 2009)). Otero alleges that Defendants' policy or practice of holding in custody or imprisoning citizens after their acquittal "is so widespread, permanent and well settled that it constitutes a custom or usage with the force of law." (Compl. ¶ 8.)
Otero asserts that the Unlawful Detention Policy violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights because Defendants detained him for an unreasonable length of time and in an unreasonable manner after Defendants no longer had probable cause or any right to detain him. (Id. ¶ 32.) Specifically, Otero alleges that the Unlawful Detention Policy led to twelve hours of unlawful detention, during which he sustained physical injuries from a beating in the bullpen. (Id. ¶¶ 29,...
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