Otero v. Longhi

• Decision Date: 09 May 2014
• Docket Number: No. 12-CV-1058 GBW/KBM,12-CV-1058 GBW/KBM
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico
• Parties: ALEX OTERO, Plaintiff, v. LANCE LONGHI and NATHAN HARGER, Defendants.

ALEX OTERO, Plaintiff, v. LANCE LONGHI and NATHAN HARGER, Defendants.

No. 12-CV-1058 GBW/KBM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

Dated: May 9, 2014

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Qualified Immunity. Doc. 26. Having reviewed the accompanying briefing (docs. 33, 34), and being otherwise fully advised, the Court finds the Motion well-taken and will GRANT it.

I. BACKGROUND

This case concerns constitutional and state tort violations that Plaintiff alleges Defendants committed against him after he entered the scene where a search warrant had just been executed. See generally doc. 1, Ex. A. On June 8, 2011, Defendants, officers with the Bernalillo County Sheriff's Department, arrived at 7545 Isleta Southwest, Albuquerque, New Mexico, to execute a search warrant related to suspected drug trafficking. Id. at ¶¶ 2, 3, 7-9. There were multiple residences on the property, allaccessible via the same shared driveway. The search warrant covered only the smaller residence located behind Plaintiff's house ("the rear dwelling"). Id. at ¶ 8, 10, 13.

Not long after Defendants executed the search warrant on the rear dwelling, Plaintiff arrived home and drove into the shared driveway. Id. at ¶ 15, 19. When Defendants saw Plaintiff, they ordered him out of his truck. Id. at ¶ 16, 20. Before Plaintiff complied, Defendants pulled him from the vehicle and to the ground. Id. at ¶ 24. Plaintiff swore at the officers, and Defendants proceeded to handcuff him. Id. at ¶ 26-27.

At some point, Defendants realized that Plaintiff was not involved in the criminal activity at the rear dwelling, and they released Plaintiff from the handcuffs. Id. at ¶ 30, 32. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff reported experiencing chest pains and his family called for an ambulance. Id. at ¶ 33, 35. He was taken to the hospital, where he remained overnight. Id. at ¶ 39. No charges were filed against Plaintiff as a result of this incident.

Plaintiff's Complaint (doc. 1, Ex. A) raises the following claims: Count I -unlawful seizure under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Count II - excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and Count III - battery and false arrest in violation of New Mexico state law.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires that a party seeking summary judgment demonstrate that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and themovant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "In our circuit, the moving party carries the burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that it is entitled to summary judgment." Trainor v. Apollo Metal Specialties, Inc., 318 F.3d 976, 979 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Hicks v. City of Watonga, 942 F.2d 737, 743 (10th Cir. 1991)) (internal quotations omitted).

Summary judgment is proper only if a reasonable trier of fact could not return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant bears the initial burden of "show[ing] that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). Once the movant meets this burden, Rule 56(e) requires the non-moving party to designate specific facts showing that "there are . . . genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. "An issue is 'genuine' if there is sufficient evidence on each side so that a rational trier of fact could resolve the issue either way. An issue of fact is 'material' if under the substantive law it is essential to the proper disposition of the claim." Thom v. Bristol Myers Squibb Co., 353 F.3d 848, 851 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted). "A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). All material facts setforth in the motion and response which are not specifically controverted are deemed undisputed. D.N.M.LR-Civ. 56.1(b).

The court must adhere to three principles when evaluating a motion for summary judgment. First, the court's role is not to weigh the evidence, but to assess the threshold issue whether a genuine issue exists as to material facts requiring a trial. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249. Second, the court must resolve all reasonable inferences and doubts in favor of the non-moving party, and construe all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 551-54 (1999). Third, the court cannot decide any issues of credibility. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255. However, if the non-moving party's story "is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for the purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). In the end, "to survive the . . . motion, [the non-movant] need only present evidence from which a jury might return a verdict in his favor." Id. at 257.

III. UNDISPUTED FACTS

1. On June 7, 2011, Defendant Longhi, a Detective with the Bernalillo County Sheriff's Department Narcotics Unit, obtained a search warrant for a residence located at 7545 Isleta Southwest, Albuquerque, New Mexico. Doc. 26, Ex. A at 1-2.

2. The property at 7545 Isleta includes three dwellings: the main dwelling, a smaller dwelling at the rear of the property, and a camper. Doc. 33, Ex. 1 at 13:11-16.

3. Plaintiff resided with his mother in the main dwelling. Doc. 1, Ex. A at ¶¶ 6, 8-10.

4. The search warrant covered only the smaller dwelling at the rear of the property. Doc. 26, Ex. A at 2; doc. 33, Ex. 2 at 6:13-17.

5. The intended target named in the search warrant was Connie Moya, who lived in the smaller rear dwelling and was suspected of selling illegal narcotics, particularly heroin. Doc. 26, Ex. A at 5.

6. The only access to any of the residences on the property was a long, single-lane driveway. Doc. 1, Ex. A at ¶ 13; doc. 34, Ex. G at 36:1-4.

7. On June 8, 2011, Detective Longhi, Detective Harger, Sergeant Sharp, and other members of the Bernalillo County Sheriff's Department Narcotics Unit executed the search warrant for the rear dwelling at 7545 Isleta Southwest. Doc. 1, Ex. A at ¶ 8.

8. Sergeant Sharp was the on-scene supervisor. Doc. 33, Ex. 1 at 12:24-13:5.

9. Upon executing the search warrant, Defendant Longhi made contact with the target, Connie Moya, and began to question her. See generally doc. 33, Ex. 1 at 25-27.10. Moya advised the officers that her drug supplier was coming to the rear dwelling to deliver heroin. Doc. 33, Ex. 1 at 27-28; Ex. 2 at 71:1, 19-20; Ex. 5 at ¶ 8.

11. Moya showed Defendant Longhi text messages from her supplier, which indicated he would be arriving imminently. Doc. 33, Ex. 1 at 28:3-11, 48:17-22.

12. Moya described her drug supplier as a "bigger, older guy." Doc. 33, Ex. 1 at 27:15-17.

13. Defendants performed a vehicle blocking maneuver along the shared driveway and waited for Moya's supplier to arrive on the scene. Doc. 1, Ex. A at ¶¶ 14, 16; doc. 26, Ex. C-1 at 5. The vehicles displayed flashing emergency lights. Doc. 26, Exs. C-2, D & E-2; doc. 33, Ex. 1 at 39:6-19, 68:22-25, Ex. 2 at 26:17-19, 68:22-25; doc. 34, Ex. G at 73:25-74:25.

14. Plaintiff arrived at 7545 Isleta in a silver pickup truck and drove down the shared driveway. See doc. 1, Ex. A at ¶ 15; doc. 26, Ex. C-2 at ¶ 3; Ex. D at ¶ 6; Ex. E-2 at ¶ 3.

15. Plaintiff is "a larger man." Doc. 33, Ex. 2 at 47:15-17.

16. Defendants were wearing balaclavas that covered their faces, as well as clothing that had a Sheriff's insignia and displayed the word "Sheriff" on both sleeves as well as on the back. Doc. 33, Ex. 1 at 61:6-12; Ex. 2 at 9:13-25.17. Defendants ordered Plaintiff to shut off his vehicle, and ordered both Plaintiff and the male in the passenger seat to exit the truck. Doc. 1, Ex. A at ¶ 20; doc. 26, Ex. C-2 at ¶ 11.

18. The passenger of the vehicle was compliant with Defendants' orders and quickly exited the vehicle. Doc. 26, Ex. B at 1.

19. Plaintiff did not immediately shut off his vehicle or exit the truck. Doc. 26, Ex. C-2 at ¶ 11.

20. At least one officer had a gun drawn and pointed toward Plaintiff. Doc. 33, Ex. 1 at 61:15-22

21. When Plaintiff did not exit the vehicle, Defendant Longhi placed Plaintiff in an arm bar, thereby guiding him head first out of his vehicle and to the ground. Doc. 33, Ex. 1 at 64:6-66:7.

22. Once Defendant Longhi made physical contact with Plaintiff,¹ Plaintiff was swearing at the officers. Doc. 33 at 7, 9, ¶ 25, 38.

23. Once Plaintiff was out of the vehicle,² officers observed that Plaintiff had a knife clipped to his shorts. Doc. 26, Ex. C-1, C-2; Doc. 33, Ex. 2 at 83:14-84:1.24. Plaintiff scraped his knee as he reached the ground. Id. at 66:6-7.

25. Detective Harger placed two sets of handcuffs on Plaintiff. Doc. 33, Ex. 2 at 15-19.

26. Sergeant Sharp identified himself to Plaintiff as the sergeant on scene, and explained why the detectives were on the property. Doc. 26, Ex. B at 1.

27. Defendants identified Plaintiff within thirty minutes or less, concluded that he was not Moya's drug supplier, and released him from the handcuffs. Doc. 33, Ex. 1 at 68:4-13; see also doc. 1, Ex. A at ¶ 32.

28. Defendants asked Plaintiff whether he wanted them to call an ambulance for the injury on Plaintiff's knee and for his wrist. Plaintiff declined, saying he had been "banged up a lot worse than this." Doc. 26, Ex. C-1 at 5.

29. Plaintiff returned to his vehicle and drove to the side of the property, where he was able to unload at least one load of water bottles before entering the larger residence. Doc. 26, Ex. B at

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