Otey v. Best

• Decision Date: 23 June 1982
• Docket Number: No. 81-2222,81-2222
• Parties: Harold LaMont OTEY, Appellant, v. Donald BEST, Acting Director; Robert Parratt, Warden, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 1231

680 F.2d 1231

Harold LaMont OTEY, Appellant, v. Donald BEST, Acting Director; Robert Parratt, Warden, Appellees.

No. 81-2222.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted June 17, 1982.

Decided June 23, 1982.

Berry, Anderson, Creager & Wittstruck, Robert B. Creager, Lincoln, Neb., for appellant.

Paul L. Douglas, Atty. Gen., J. Kirk Brown, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lincoln, Neb., for Donald Best and Robert Parratt, appellees.

Before ROSS, Circuit Judge, and STEPHENSON and HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judges.

HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge.

Appellant Harold LaMont Otey, an inmate at the Nebraska State Penitentiary under a sentence of death, brought an action against prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that a prison regulation prohibiting inmates subject to the death penalty from attending corporate worship services ¹ impermissibly infringed on his first amendment right to free exercise of religion. After a trial to the district court ² upon stipulated facts, the court entered judgment in favor of appellees. We affirm.

Appellant, who resides in an administrative segregation unit known as "F" Gallery, is a member of the Muslim (Islamic) faith. He requested permission to attend a weekly Jumah prayer service in the penitentiary chapel with other adherents of Islam in the general inmate population. His request to participate in Jumah prayer, which is an integral part of the Muslim faith, was denied on the basis of the challenged regulation. Appellant, however, has been allowed visits by a Muslim Imam (religious leader) and has been provided with special meals during the holy month of Ramadan, requested religious literature, and national Muslim broadcasts.

On appeal appellant advances three grounds for reversal. He initially asserts that the district court erred in failing to apply a strict scrutiny standard of review when it assessed the constitutionality of the Nebraska prison regulation. In addition, he disputes the court's finding that prison officials established that allowing inmates under a sentence of death to mingle with the general prison population would create a considerable security risk. Finally, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial. We address each of these contentions in turn.

Turning our attention to appellant's first point on appeal, we conclude that the district court applied the proper standard in reviewing the prison regulation at issue. In determining the threshold question of the appropriate standard the trial court relied on St. Claire v. Cuyler, 634 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1980), in which the court addressed, inter alia, the validity of a prison policy prohibiting inmates residing in segregated units from attending religious services. The court in that case articulated a standard of review derived from a sound reading of the decisions in Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974), Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 53 L.Ed.2d 629 (1977), and Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). It stated:

(Prison officials need) only to produce evidence that to permit the exercise of first amendment rights would create a potential danger to institutional security.... Once the state has met its burden of going forward with the evidence, the courts must defer to the expert judgment of the prison officials unless the prisoner proves by 'substantial evidence ... that the officials have exaggerated their response' to security considerations, Pell, 417 U.S. at 827, 94 S.Ct. at 2806, or that their beliefs are unreasonable, Jones, 433 U.S. at 128, 97 S.Ct. at 2539.

St. Claire v. Cuyler, 634 F.2d at 114-15.

Our recent opinion in Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1982), also discusses the appropriate standard for reviewing prison regulations concerned with the preservation of order and security within the prison. In Rogers the district court ordered correctional authorities to adopt a less restrictive alternative to a policy prohibiting Muslim inmates from wearing prayer caps and robes outside prayer services despite its finding that the prohibition was " 'a reasonable method of preventing the concealment of contraband.' " Id., at 1215. In rejecting the test employed by the court we stated:

While in general we agree with the district court that limitations on (first amendment) rights should be no greater than necessary to protect the governmental interest involved, Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (94 S.Ct. 1800, 1811, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974), we believe that, especially when the maintenance of institutional security is at issue, prison officials ordinarily must have wide latitude within which to make appropriate limitations. In this instance, the prison officials have explained the purpose of their policy of prohibiting the wearing of caps and robes outside prayer meetings; they urge that such attire makes it too easy to conceal contraband. We find this explanation eminently reasonable, particularly in view of the fact that operating personnel is limited.

Id. at 1215. We also quoted with approval from Sweet v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, 529 F.2d 854, 863 (4th Cir. 1975):

'Prison authorities ... may adopt any regulations dealing with the exercise by an inmate of his religion that may be reasonably and substantially justified by considerations of prison discipline and order. So long as the prison authorities provide the inmate with a reasonable opportunity for the exercise of his religious tenets in a form that is substantially warranted by the requirements of prison safety and order, there is no violation of the inmate's constitutional rights.'

Rogers v. Scurr, at 1215; see Sharp v. Sigler, 408 F.2d 966 (8th Cir. 1969). In light of our decision in Rogers and the other cases, we conclude that the district court did not err in refusing to apply a strict scrutiny standard when it assessed the constitutionality of the Nebraska prison regulation. ³

Appellant also challenges the district court's finding that the restriction on the right of free exercise was based upon a justifiable concern for...