Others v. Others

• Decision Date: 21 April 1887
• Citation: 83 Va. 232,2 S.E. 36
• Parties: Seamster and others v. Blackstock and others.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

2 S.E. 36

(83 Va. 232)

Seamster and others

v.Blackstock and others.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

April 21, 1887.

1. Judgment—Jurisdiction—Collateral Attack.

A widow brought suit in the county court for the sole purpose of having dower assigned her in her deceased husband's lands; the heirs at law, who were infants, being made defendants. The court not only directed an assignment of dower, but, sua sponte, decreed a sale of the residue of the land belonging to the heirs. Held that, the court having exceeded its jurisdiction, the decree of sale was void, and might be collaterally attacked.

2. Judgment—Res Adjudicata—Dismissal of Petition.

The fact that one of the heirs filed a petition in the case subsequently to the decree, alleging errors in the proceedings, and attacking the validity of the decree and sale, and that the court dismissed the petition, does not render the matter res adjudicata, and prevent the heir from afterwards attacking the decree collaterally.¹

3. Same—Void Decree—Sale of Land—Partition.

Where the interest of each heir exceeded in value $300, the county court could not, under Code Va. 1860, p. 581, § 3, decree a sale of land for partition.

Appeal from circuit court, Halifax county.

W. R. Barksdale and H. Edmunds, for appellants.

John W. Riely, for appellees.

Richardson, J. This was an action of ejectment in the circuit court of Halifax county, to recover possession of a certain parcel of land situate therein. The defendants pleaded not guilty, and gave notice of equitable defenses under the provisions of sections 20 and 21 of chapter 131 of the Code of 1873. The jury returned a special verdict, upon which judgment was entered for the plaintiffs; whereupon the defendants obtained a writ of error and supersedeas.

The plaintiffs, the defendants in error here, are the heirs at law of William Blackstock, who died intestate in 1861, and they claim as such heirs. The defendants claim through and under one Allen Conner, now deceased, who purchased the land in controversy, under a decree of the county court of Halifax county, in 1862. No conveyance, however, appears to have been made to the purchaser, or ordered by the court. The sale was made in a certain chancery suit, which was brought in the said county court in 1862, by the widow of the said William Blackstock, deceased, for the sole purpose of having assignment of her dower in the lands of her said deceased husband. At the time the suit was brought, and when the sale above mentioned was made, the heirs at law of the decedent were infants, and they were made defendants to the bill. The single object of the suit was the assignment of the widow's dower in the land mentioned in the bill. The court, however, not only directed that dower be assigned, but, apparently sua sponte, decreed a sale of the residue of the land, which was made to Conner as aforesaid, who duly paid the purchase money in full. The money, except the share of one of the heirs, was subsequently invested, under an order of the court in confederate securities, and, of course, was lost by the result of the war. The principal question presented for decision is as to the effect of the proceedings in the said chancery suit. The defendants relied on the record of those proceedings, upon the trial in the court below, as evidence in part of an equitable title on their part, which they insisted constituted a bar to the plaintiff's recovery. The circuit court, however, held otherwise, and gave judgment on the special verdict for the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs, the defendants in error, contend, on the other hand, that the record so relied on by the defendants, the plaintiffs in error here, is without any effect in the present action, for two reasons, to-wit: (1) Because the provisions of the Code, above mentioned, do not apply to judicial sales, but only to contracts of sale made directly by "a vendor" to "a vendee, " who acts without the compulsion of an order or decree of a court; (2) because the decrees and proceedings relied on are void.

Passing by the first of these questions as unnecessary to be decided, we will consider the second.

It is an elementary principle in our jurisprudence that jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties is essential to the conclusiveness of a judgment or decree, and, though a court may obtain jurisdiction rightfully, yet its decrees may be void, because in the progress of the cause it has exceeded its jurisdiction. The adjudged cases furnish numerous examples of this kind. Thus, where a bill is filed to sell a certain lot, and a decree is entered for the sale of another and different lot, not named in the bill, and to which the bill has no relation, such decree, as respects the last-mentioned lot, is a nullity. This principle is illustrated by the case of Wade v. Hancock, 76 Va. 620. In that case it was held that, in summary proceedings under the ninth section of chapter 76 of the Code of 1873, the circuit courts of the state have jurisdiction to appoint, change, and remove church trustees, but not to determine how they shall administer their trusts; and accordingly the judgment complained of was held void, because in pronouncing it the court had exceeded its jurisdiction. In delivering the opinion of the court, Burks, J., cites with approbation the case of Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, in which this question is discussed with much learning and ability by Mr. Justice...