Otmer v. People of State

Decision Date31 January 1875
PartiesDANIEL OTMERv.THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Hancock county; the Hon. JOSEPH SIBLEY, Judge, presiding.

Messrs. SCOFIELD & HOOKER, and Messrs. MARSH & MARSH, for the plaintiff in error.

Mr. B. F. PETERSON, State's Attorney, and Messrs. LANE & FINLAY, for the People.

Mr. JUSTICE CRAIG delivered the opinion of the Court:

This was an indictment against Daniel Otmer, in the county of Hancock, for the murder of one Jacob Jingst.

At the October term, 1874, of the circuit court of Hancock county, a trial was had before a jury, which resulted in a verdict of guilty against Otmer, and he was sentenced to imprisonment in the Penitentiary for a term of thirty years.

The defendant brings the record here by writ of error, and, to reverse the judgment of the circuit court, relies upon two errors.

First. That the court erred in giving instructions Nos. 5 and 7 1/2 for the people.

Second. That the verdict of the jury is not sustained by the evidence.

The fifth instruction given for the people, to which exception was taken, is as follows:

“That if the jury believe, from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant deliberately and intentionally shot Jacob Jingst on or about the 14th day of October, 1873, in Hancock county, Illinois, as said Jingst was passing along the public road, and that from the effects of such shooting the said Jingst died, as charged in the indictment, then the jury should find the defendant guilty; and in that case it matters not that such evidence is circumstantial, or made up from facts and circumstances, provided the jury believe such facts and circumstances pointing to his guilt to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”

It is said in Starkie on Evidence, vol. 1, sec. 79, “What circumstances will amount to proof, can never be matter of general definition. The legal test is, the sufficiency of the evidence to satisfy the understanding and conscience of the jury. On the one hand, absolute, metaphysical and demonstrative certainty is not essential to proof by circumstances. It is sufficient if they produce moral certainty to the exclusion of every reasonable doubt; even direct and positive testimony does not afford grounds of belief of a higher and superior nature.”

While the jury have no right to acquit upon trivial suppositions and remote conjectures, yet they should not “condemn unless the evidence exclude from their mind all reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.”

Although the instruction was carefully drawn, yet the latter clause of it was calculated to mislead the jury.

The jury may have believed the facts and circumstances pointing to defendant's guilt were proven, and yet they may not have regarded the facts and circumstances so proven sufficient to satisfy their understanding and conscience of the defendant's guilt, but notwithstanding this, they were told by the instruction it was their duty to convict.

Before the jury could be justified in returning a verdict of guilty, they should have believed the facts and circumstances pointing to defendant's guilt proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and that these facts and circumstances in proof were sufficient to establish upon the defendant the crime of which he was charged, beyond such doubt.

Instruction No. 7 1/2, complained of, was as follows:

“The court instructs the jury that, if they believe from all the evidence, that the defendant has knowingly sworn falsely in regard to any material point in this case, they ought to disregard his testimony on all material points, excepting so far as he is corroborated by other evidence in the case.”

The word “ought,” as here used, means, in its ordinary sense, to be held or bound in duty or moral obligation.

We understand it to be a rule of law, well settled, that the jury are the sole judges of the weight to be given to the testimony of each witness. It is also the...

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20 cases
  • People v. Gray
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • October 25, 1911
    ...77 Ill. 25. It is the duty of the court to determine the competency of testimony, but never its credibility. That is for the jury. Otmer v. People, 76 Ill. 149;Haines v. People, 82 Ill. 430;Lynch v. People, 33 Colo. 128, 79 Pac. 1015;Dunn v. People, 29 N. Y. 523, 86 Am. Dec. 319, and note; ......
  • Ragland v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • December 14, 1939
    ... ... 670 (74 Am.Dec. 229); ... Kaufman v. State, 49 Ind. 248; Howard v ... State, 50 Ind. 190; Line v. State, 51 Ind. 172; ... Miller v. People, 39 Ill. 457; Otmer v ... People, 76 Ill. 149; Stuart v. People, 42 Mich ... 255, (3 N.W. 863); Com. v. Choate, 105 Mass. 451; ... State v ... ...
  • Spicer v. the People.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • August 31, 1882
    ... ... Johnson, 89 Ill. 537.In criminal cases where the evidence is conflicting, the instructions must be accurate: Swan v. The People, 98 Ill. 610; Otmer v. The People, 76 Ill. 149; Gulliver v. The People, 82 Ill. 146.Where the erroneous instruction has a tendency to mislead, it is not cured by the ... In a case like this, where to say the least, the evidence was very conflicting, it is essential that the instructions should accurately state the law, and that they should in no wise mislead the jury, and though the instructions given on the part of the defense may be correct, yet this will ... ...
  • Delong v. Giles
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • May 31, 1882
    ...on account of his business, that being a question for the jury alone, cited The President, etc., v. O'Malley, 18 Ill. 407; Otmer v. The People, 76 Ill. 149; Roach v. The People, 77 Ill. 25; Martin v. The People, 54 Ill. 225; Chittenden v. Evans, 41 Ill. 251; Shaw v. The People, 81 Ill. 150.......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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