Ottenheimer Publishers, Inc. v. Employment Sec. Administration

• Decision Date: 10 July 1975
• Docket Number: No. 182,182
• Citation: 340 A.2d 701,275 Md. 514
• Parties: OTTENHEIMER PUBLISHERS, INC. v. EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ADMINISTRATION.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 514

275 Md. 514

340 A.2d 701

OTTENHEIMER PUBLISHERS, INC. v. EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ADMINISTRATION.

No. 182.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

July 10, 1975.

David M. Tralins, Baltimore (Allan H. Fisher, Jr. and Fisher & Fisher, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

Diana G. Motz, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE, ELDRIDGE and O'DONNELL, JJ.

ELDRIDGE, Judge.

This case concerns the sufficiency of a notice given to an employer, as required by the Unemployment Insurance Law, Maryland Code (1957, 1969 Repl. Vol.), Art. 95A, § 7(d), informing the employer of a former employee's eligibility for unemployment benefits.

Ottenheimer Publishers, Inc., employed Joan Scherr for several months on a part-time basis. The employment relationship was terminated on August 11, 1971, when Ms. Scherr informed Ottenheimer that she was not able to work on a full time basis as requested. Subsequently Ms. Scherr filed a claim for unemployment benefits. As requested by the Employment Security Administration, Ottenheimer filed termination information setting forth the reason for her termination as inability to work on a full time basis.

A 'Nonmonetary Determination' notice was sent to Ottenheimer and to the claimant on August 26, 1971. The notice is divided into four sections with headings printed vertically in the left-hand margin to identify each section. The first section, labeled 'Claims Examiner's Determination,' begins with a printed sentence stating: 'I determine that the claimant is disqualified for the following cause:'. Below this are listed three columns of reasons for disqualification with boxes to check off the appropriate reasons for disqualification in particular cases. The reasons checked on the form are: 'Able and Available-4(c)'; 'Referral or Job Refusal-6(d)'; and 'Severance Pay-6(i).' Explanations printed on the reverse side of the form referring to provisions side of Unemployment Insurance Law indicated that the claimant was disqualified for not being available for full time work, for refusing to accept suitable work, and for receipt of severance pay.

Below the boxes is a space where a further explanation of the claims examiner's determination can be written. In this space, written in longhand, is the following (emphasis supplied):

'You were terminated by Ottenheimer Publishers because you were unable to accept full-time employment. Under the Md. U. I. Law you are held to have refused an offer of suitable work without good cause. Benefits are denied. In addition, you received one week's severance pay which under the Md. U. I. Law is a bar to benefits. Benefits are denied.'

Below this is a smaller subsection of printed sentences with blanks for dates to be filled in. This subsection states:

'The following disqualification is imposed

From-

Week of-_ _ and until you earn 10 weekly benefit amount (_ _)

From-

Week of-8-11-71 and 4 weeks ending 9-11-71

From 8-12-71 to 8-21-71'

The next section is labeled 'Appeal Rights' and contains two short paragraphs. The first paragraph is preceded by the word 'CLAIMANT' in bold face and explains where and when an appeal may be filed, in addition to certain obligations of the claimant. The second paragraph, labeled 'EMPLOYER AND CLAIMANT' in bold face, contains a single printed sentence stating: 'The last date for filing an appeal is 9-7-71.'

After the expiration of the appeal period, Ottenheimer received a notice that two payments had been made to Ms. Scherr and that its Experience Rating Account had been charged for these benefits. Ottenheimer's president sent several letters to the Employment Security Administration protesting the charge to Ottenheimer's Experience Rating Account and asserting that Ottenheimer had received a notice that benefits had been denied to Joan Scherr. Ottenheimer sent a copy of the August 26, 1971, notice to the Administration. The Employment Security Administration replied that the disqualification was only 'from week ending August 11, 1971 and four weeks ending September 11, 1971.' This is an apparent inconsistency with the notice itself which appears to state that the disqualification is from the week of August 11 and not the week ending August 11. There was also no explanation of the second disqualification imposed from August 12, 1971, to August 21, 1971.

Ottenheimer appealed the charging of its accout to the Executive Director of the Employment Security Administration, raising the issues of the merits of Ms. Scherr's claim and the adequacy of the notice. However, the Executive Director refused to take any testimony on the merits of the claim or to consider the adequacy of the notice to inform Ottenheimer of the claimant's eligibility for benefits. The only issue considered was whether the benefits paid to the claimant were properly chargeable to Ottenheimer's Experience Rating Account, and the Executive Director decided that the payments were properly chargeable. This decision was affirmed upon appeal to the Board of Appeals, which also limited review to the issue of the chargeability of Ottenheimer's account for benefits already paid to Ms. Scherr.

Having exhausted its administrative remedies, Ottenheimer then appealed to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, where it again raised the issue of the adequacy of the notice. The court held that the Nonmonetary Determination notice was not ambiguous and upheld the Board of Appeals' decision. From that decision, Ottenheimer appeals to this Court.

Ottenheimer argues that the Nonmonetary Determination notice of August 26, 1971, was ambiguous and misleading, effectively denying the employer its right to notice and a hearing. More particularly, Ottenheimer contends that the two statements that benefits are denied, and the first sentence of the notice which states that the claimant is disqualified, led it to believe that no benefits were to be paid. This belief was reinforced by the section labeled 'Appeal Rights,' which appeared to be addressed to the claimant, giving the appearance that only the claimant would desire to appeal the determination. The appellee contends that the subsection which begins, 'The...