Otterstatter v. City of Watertown
| Decision Date | 26 October 2017 |
| Docket Number | Appeal No. 2016AP2000 |
| Citation | 904 N.W.2d 396,378 Wis.2d 697,2017 WI App 76 |
| Parties | Timothy P. OTTERSTATTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF WATERTOWN, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | Wisconsin Court of Appeals |
On behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Alan Marcuvitz, Smitha Chintamaneni, and Nicholas J. Boerke of von Briesen & Roper, S.C., Milwaukee.
On behalf of the defendant-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of Steven M. Streck and Sara K. Beachy of Axley Brynelson, LLP, Madison.
Before Sherman, Blanchard and Kloppenburg, JJ.
¶1 The City of Watertown acquired Timothy Otterstatter's property by eminent domain pursuant to a jurisdictional offer for $270,000, which was $30,000 more than the value reflected in an appraisal that had been arranged by the City and provided to Otterstatter with the City's initial offer of $240,000. Otterstatter filed this action challenging the condemnation pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 32.05(5) (2015-16), alleging that the City failed to follow Wisconsin's eminent domain law.1 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. While the summary judgment motions were pending, the City also filed an application for a writ of assistance ordering the Sheriff to remove Otterstatter from the property.2 The circuit court granted the City's summary judgment motion, denied Otterstatter's summary judgment motion, and dismissed the complaint. The court subsequently granted the City's application for a writ of assistance.
¶2 Otterstatter appeals the circuit court's summary judgment decisions, arguing that the City's jurisdictional offer to purchase the property for $30,000 more than the value established by the City's retained appraiser invalidated the acquisition because the jurisdictional offer was not "based" "upon" a proper appraisal, as required by WIS. STAT. § 32.05(2)(b).3 Specifically, Otterstatter argues that the jurisdictional offer was invalid for any one of three reasons: (1) the amount of the jurisdictional offer did not equal the appraisal valuation; (2) the jurisdictional offer was not the result of negotiation; or (3) the jurisdictional offer was not the result of a new, more recent appraisal. We reject Otterstatter's argument as contrary to the plain language of the statutes governing the jurisdictional offer process and to the undisputed facts of record.
¶3 Otterstatter also appeals the circuit court's issuance of the writ of assistance, arguing that the City did not comply with all jurisdictional requirements as required by WIS. STAT. § 32.05(8).4 Specifically, Otterstatter argues that the City failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirement of providing a valid ninety-day notice to vacate. Otterstatter argues that the City was required, but failed, to first acquire title to the property before providing Otterstatter with written notice to vacate the property within ninety days, and, therefore, the notice to vacate was invalid. We reject Otterstatter's argument as contrary to the plain language of the statutes governing the notice to vacate.
¶4 Because we reject Otterstatter's challenges to the validity of the jurisdictional offer and the notice to vacate, we affirm.
¶5 The following pertinent facts are undisputed. The City5 decided to acquire Otterstatter's property as part of an airport expansion project. The City obtained an appraisal, conducted in February 2015, which valued Otterstatter's property at $240,000. In August 2015, the City sent Otterstatter a letter attaching the February 2015 appraisal, offering to purchase Otterstatter's property for $240,000, and informing Otterstatter of his right to obtain his own appraisal at the City's expense. A City representative then met with Otterstatter to discuss the City's initial offer, and Otterstatter responded that it was too low.
¶6 In September 2015, the following occurred: Otterstatter emailed the City, stating that he had decided not to "consider" the City's initial offer; a representative of the City left Otterstatter a voicemail message and emailed him, asking to discuss his email response to the City's initial offer; and Otterstatter emailed the City stating that the City's initial offer was "an embarrassment."
¶7 The City then reviewed its initial offer and Otterstatter's responses, and, in December 2015, sent Otterstatter a letter presenting a revised offer to purchase Otterstatter's property for $270,000, stating that the City desired to reach a negotiated settlement, and informing Otterstatter that the City would proceed with condemnation if no agreement was reached by January 22, 2016. The City subsequently attempted to make further contact with Otterstatter, by voicemail and email, to negotiate an agreement, but Otterstatter did not respond.
¶8 On March 1, 2016, the City sent Otterstatter its jurisdictional offer, in an amount equaling its revised offer of $270,000. The jurisdictional offer included the statement that, "The purchase price is based upon an appraisal of the Owner's property of which a copy ... has been provided to the Owner," meaning the February 2015 appraisal. The jurisdictional offer stated that if Otterstatter did not accept the jurisdictional offer within twenty days, the City would proceed with condemnation.
¶9 Also on March 1, 2016, the City sent Otterstatter a "90-Day Notice of Intended Vacation Date," informing Otterstatter that the City intended to occupy the property on June 30, 2016, and that he was required to vacate the property before that date. Otterstatter received the notice on March 2, 2016.
¶10 On March 9, 2016, Otterstatter filed this action, challenging the City's right to condemn Otterstatter's property based on the City's alleged failure to provide Otterstatter with "any appraisal upon which the Jurisdictional Offer of $270,000 is based, as required by Wis. Stat. § 32.05(2)(b)."
¶11 On April 4, 2016, the City served and recorded an award of damages under WIS. STAT. § 32.05(7).6 The City deposited the award proceeds with the Jefferson County Clerk of Circuit Court on that same date. Otterstatter purchased replacement property on April 21, 2016.
¶12 In June 2016, both parties moved for summary judgment.
¶13 Otterstatter failed to vacate his property on or before June 30, 2016, and, while the summary judgment motions were pending, the City applied for a writ of assistance ordering the Sheriff to remove Otterstatter from the property.
¶14 After briefing and oral argument on the parties' motions for summary judgment, the circuit court in a non-final order granted the City's motion for summary judgment, denied Otterstatter's motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the complaint.
¶15 After a bench trial on the writ of assistance, the circuit court issued the writ effective September 19, 2016. Otterstatter vacated the property on September 26, 2016.
¶16 The circuit court entered a final judgment memorializing its decisions on summary judgment and on the application for a writ of assistance. Otterstatter appeals.
¶17 On appeal, Otterstatter challenges the circuit court's decisions on the motions for summary judgment regarding the validity of the jurisdictional offer and on the application for a writ of assistance regarding the validity of the ninety-day notice to vacate. We address and reject each challenge in turn.
¶18 Otterstatter appeals the circuit court's summary judgment decisions regarding the validity of the jurisdictional offer, arguing that the City's jurisdictional offer to purchase the property for $270,000, which is $30,000 more than the value reached by the City's retained appraiser, was not "based" "upon" the City's appraisal and therefore the acquisition violated Wisconsin eminent domain law. Specifically, Otterstatter argues that the jurisdictional offer was not "based" "upon" the City's appraisal for any one of three reasons: (1) the amount of the jurisdictional offer did not equal the appraisal valuation; (2) the jurisdictional offer was not the result of negotiation; or (3) the jurisdictional offer was not the result of a new, more recent appraisal. We begin with the standard of review and the applicable law; then we address Otterstatter's arguments and explain why they fail.
¶19 We review a circuit court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Chapman v. B.C. Ziegler and Co., 2013 WI App 127, ¶ 2, 351 Wis.2d 123, 839 N.W.2d 425. Summary judgment "shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." WIS. STAT. § 802.08(2).
¶20 Otterstatter's argument requires that we interpret a statute, which presents a question of law that we also address de novo. Juneau Cty. v. Associated Bank, N.A., 2013 WI App 29, ¶ 15, 346 Wis.2d 264, 828 N.W.2d 262. The purpose of statutory interpretation is to discern the intent of the legislature. Id., ¶ 16. When we interpret a statute, we begin with the statute's plain language, because we assume that the legislature's intent is expressed in the words it used. Id. ; State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶ 45, 271 Wis.2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. "Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or special definitional meaning." Kalal, 271 Wis.2d 633, ¶ 45, 681 N.W.2d 110. We interpret statutory language in the context in which it is used, in relation to the language of surrounding or closely related statutes, and in a reasonable manner, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results. Id., ¶ 46.
¶21 This appeal concerns the condemnation of property for an airport, which is governed by the procedures set forth in WIS. STAT. §...
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