Oullette v. Ledoux.

• Decision Date: 05 January 1943
• Parties: OULLETTE v. LEDOUX.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

30 A.2d 13

OULLETTE

v.LEDOUX.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Jan. 5, 1943.

Suit in equity by Marie Oullette, by her conservator, against Henri L. Ledoux for return of the purchase price of realty conveyed to plaintiff. Decree for plaintiff, and defendant brings exceptions.

Case discharged.

Bill in equity, for the return of the purchase price of real estate in Nashua conveyed to the plaintiff prior to the appointment of the conservator.

The court (Blandin, J.) found that she was “not mentally competent” to make the purchase, that the purchase price was $2,000 above its “real value” of $3,500, and that the defendant in the exercise of ordinary care would have learned that she was thus incompetent. He owed her no fiduciary duty, exercised no undue influence over her, and was put on no “special inquiry regarding her mental condition”. A decree was entered that the purchase price be returned by the defendant upon the reconveyance to him of the property.

The defendant excepted to the denial of its motions for a dismissal of the bill, and took other exceptions stated, so far as material, in the opinion, which also states further facts.

Edward J. Lampron, of Nashua, for plaintiff.

Karl E. Dowd, Hamblett & Hamblett and Robert B. Hamblett, all of Nashua, for defendant.

ALLEN, Chief Justice.

I. The statute, R.L. c. 370, § 13, requiring that in a case in which the superior court tries all issues, the decisions, on request of either party, shall be in writing and shall state the facts found and rulings of law, demands, in respect to facts, only essential findings supporting the decision, “*** it is the facts that are to be reported and not the evidence” (Burnham v. McQuesten, 48 N.H. 446, 451), and no summary or statement of the evidence on which the findings are based is directed. If the conclusions on the issues of fact on which the decision is based are reported, it is enough. These conclusions have been found or are necessarily by the decree. No question of requests for special findings is here presented.

The defendant's position that the finding of the plaintiff's mental incompetence was “a mere statement of a conclusion” and “not a finding of fact” has no merit and deserves scant notice. A state of mind is a fact as a matter of reality, as much as any other physical feature. If it is the “announcement of a standard”, it is a finding of fact that the standard has been attained.

He also presents, in support of this branch of the case, the court's failure to be specific in striking out a portion of a witness' testimony. Granting the obscurity of the ruling in showing division between the testimony retained and that stricken out, the issue is not one of fact but of the effect of a ruling. The evidence retained depends upon the construction to be given the ruling, to be later considered.

II. The plaintiff's mental incompetence having been found, the finding that in ordinary care the defendant would have been aware of it is immaterial. Equity will order restoration when a contract with a mental incompetent has been executed, even if the consideration is fair, and even if the other party has acted in good faith. As usually stated, the contract will not be voided unless restoration is possible (Young v. Stevens, 48 N.H. 133, 137, 2 Am.Rep. 202, 97 Am.Dec. 592; Sparrowhawk v. Erwin, 30 Ariz. 238, 246 P. 541, 46 A.L.R. 416, and Atlanta Banking & Sav. Co. v. Johnson, 179 Ga. 313, 175 S.E. 904, 95 A.L.R. 1440, annotations, and cases cited; Pomeroy, Eq. Juris., § 946), but if restoration can be made, equity does not have occasion to restrict the application of the common-law rule requiring that competent minds must agree in the formation of a valid contract. It therefore becomes unnecessary to rule upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the finding of the defendant's care. If the findings of mental incompetence and value, and the finding necessarily implied by the decree that restoration is possible, may be upheld, the decree is valid.

III. Upon the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the plaintiff's mental incompetence, a preliminary question arises of what part of the testimony of the specialist who examined the plaintiff was stricken out. The order seems unfortunate, as based upon an apparent misunderstanding of the rule against hearsay evidence in application to conversations carried on through an interpreter. Since the interpreter acts as agent for both parties in an interview between them, his translations are not objectionable under the hearsay rule. Commonwealth v. Vose, 157 Mass. 393, 32 N.E. 355, 17 L.R.A. 813; 116 A.L.R. annotation 800, (IV) 803. In construction of the order, taking into account the apparent reason for it, whatever the plaintiff told the specialist through the interpreter was rejected, as well as what he learned from any source of the history of the plaintiff's condition. Since his opinion was in substantial measure based upon these features of his examination, it also is considered to have been stricken out. The testimony of “his personal observation” of the plaintiff alone remains. It also seems unfortunate that the court did not have the benefit of the testimony of the parties. They were both present at the trial and so far as appears both might have testified. The appointment of a conservator over the plaintiff's estate was no ground for invocation of the statute (R.L. c. 392, §§ 25, 26) relating to testimony of a...