Our Lady of Peace, Inc. v. Morgan

• Citation: 832 S.E.2d 15,297 Va. 832
• Decision Date: 30 August 2019
• Docket Number: Record No. 180736
• Parties: OUR LADY OF PEACE, INC. v. Barbara MORGAN, Administrator of the Estate of Gertrude Austin, Deceased, et al.
• Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

297 Va. 832

832 S.E.2d 15

OUR LADY OF PEACE, INC.

v.Barbara MORGAN, Administrator of the Estate of Gertrude Austin, Deceased, et al.

Record No. 180736

Supreme Court of Virginia.

August 30, 2019

Joseph M. Rainsbury (Nancy F. Reynolds; LeClairRyan; Woods Rogers, on briefs), Roanoke, for appellant.

E. Kyle McNew (T. Vaden Warren, Jr. ; Jessica Philips; MichieHamlett; Warren Firm; Royer, Caramanis & McDonough, on brief), Charlottesville, for appellee Barbara Morgan.

No brief filed by appellee Martin Matthews Martin.

PRESENT: All the Justices

OPINION BY JUSTICE D. ARTHUR KELSEY

A nursing assistant molested and raped an 85-year-old resident at a nursing home. The administrator of the resident’s estate sued the nursing assistant and the nursing home. The jury returned a verdict against both defendants. On appeal, the nursing home argues that the trial court erred in holding, prior to trial (and also by instructing the jury at trial), that the nursing assistant had committed the molestation and rape while acting within the scope of his employment. The nursing home also contends that the trial court made erroneous evidentiary rulings regarding the admissibility of expert testimony. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the final judgment and remand the case for retrial.

I.

In 2015, the Administrator of the Estate of Gertrude Austin ("the Estate") filed a complaint against a nursing assistant, Martin Matthews Martin, and Our Lady of Peace, Inc., the nursing home at which Martin worked. In 2013, Austin was a resident at Our Lady of Peace. At that time, "she was weak, ill, partially paralyzed, helpless, and unable to cry out for help." 1 J.A. at 2. As a nursing assistant, Martin’s duties included, among other things, undressing residents, changing their undergarments and diapers, as well as bathing them. See id. To perform these tasks, Martin had access to the residents’ rooms and could pull a privacy curtain around a resident while performing his duties.

One morning in August 2013, Martin "entered Gertrude Austin’s room and undertook to provide care to her with the door closed and the privacy curtains drawn, with no one else present in the room except Gertrude Austin’s disabled roommate." Id. at 3. At that time, Austin was bedridden, non-communicative, and nourished by a feeding tube. Martin allegedly entered the room with the intent to perform his assigned duties. See id. Once there, while "performing his duties ... in the course and scope of his employment ..., Martin engaged in wrongful conduct that included, but was not limited to, raping" Austin as she lay incapacitated on her bed. Id. (emphasis added). In addition to rape, Martin’s wrongful conduct included "acts of touching, sexually abusing, and molesting" Austin. Id. at 4. At some point, another employee entered the room, briefly observed some aspect of this conduct, and later (how long was in dispute) reported what she saw to an on-call supervisor.

The Estate filed suit against Martin and Our Lady of Peace.¹ Against Our Lady of Peace, the Estate asserted various theories of recovery: (i) vicarious liability under respondeat superior principles for Martin’s assault and battery; (ii) negligent hiring and retention of Martin; (iii) negligent operation of the nursing home; (iv) special-relationship liability arising out of Our Lady of Peace’s negligent failure to protect Austin from sexual assault; (v) negligence liability arising out of an assumption of tort duties; and (vi) negligent training, management, and supervision of Our Lady of Peace’s employees. The Estate also sought punitive damages.

Among Our Lady of Peace’s responsive pleadings was a plea in bar challenging the Estate’s allegations of respondeat superior liability for Martin’s molestation and rape of Austin. At the plea-in-bar hearing, Our Lady of Peace called its Executive Director as its only witness. She offered no testimony or documentary evidence describing any factual aspect of Martin’s molestation and rape of Austin. Instead, she generally described Our Lady of Peace’s policies and practices, the regulations to which it was subject, the role of nursing assistants, Martin’s employment record, and the medical and daily-activity assistance provided to Austin.

The Estate offered no testimony or evidence during the plea-in-bar hearing. Regarding Our Lady of Peace’s plea in bar, the Estate took the position that, though the pleading "ha[d] been filed as a plea in bar, ... essentially it is a demurrer." Id. at 174. "There have been no facts provided through the plea in bar," the Estate argued, "other than Our Lady of the Peace has regulations that they have to follow." Id. (emphasis added). "It just doesn’t follow," the Estate continued, that Martin was acting outside the scope of his employment simply because he "didn’t follow those regulations." Id. The Estate repeated this point during oral argument on appeal, conceding that "what was alleged in the complaint ... was all the evidence that was before the court on the plea in bar" on the disputed issue of vicarious liability. Oral Argument Audio at 16:24 to 16:30; see also Appellee’s Br. at 6-7, 21, 28-29 (describing the absence of evidence and Our Lady of Peace’s concession on the issue).

This argument was the Estate’s main focus at the plea-in-bar hearing: "[O]ur allegation is that [Martin] was in the course and scope of the employment" and "that the burden then shifts to the defense to put on evidence that he was beyond the course and scope, and that that is a jury issue ." 1 J.A. at 174 (emphasis added). Virginia law, the Estate insisted, "has been clear that it’s a jury issue, whether or not it’s course and scope," which is why the trial court should "allow the case to proceed to the jury." Id. ; see also id. at 175 (arguing that "if the evidence leads to question and doubt," the scope-of-employment issue "becomes an issue to be determined by the jury" (citation omitted)). "I submit to you," counsel advised the trial court, "all we needed to do was plead that [Martin] was an employee and in the course and scope of his employment. And then the burden is shifted for the defense to convince a jury why he was not in the course and scope." Id. at 175. "So that’s our position," counsel concluded. Id.²

At the plea-in-bar hearing, the trial court seemed to agree with the Estate, asking from the bench after counsel for Our Lady of Peace had described Martin’s services as ending before the rape, "And for the plea in bar, how do I know that?" Id. at 172. The court then took the plea in bar under advisement. Four months later, the court issued an order denying the plea in bar along with a letter opinion explaining that it was "rul[ing] based upon the rational[e] provided in" Plummer v. Center Psychiatrists, Ltd. , 252 Va. 233, 476 S.E.2d 172 (1996), an opinion reversing a trial court’s grant of a demurrer and directing that the disputed scope-of-employment issue be resolved by the jury on remand. See 1 J.A. at 107. While citing Plummer , however, the trial court appeared to go beyond the holding in that case by ruling on the merits that "Martin’s willful and malicious acts were committed while he was performing duties at Our Lady of Peace and in execution of those services for which he was employed," id.

The order, which the Estate had proffered, expressly repeated that "Martin’s acts were committed while he was performing duties of Our Lady of Peace and in execution of those services for which he was employed," id. at 207. The order also contained this sentence: "The [c]ourt finds that Mr. Martin was in the course and scope of his employment when he committed the rape of Mrs. Austin." Id. Our Lady of Peace objected to this sentence in part because it was "not in the judge’s letter opinion." Id. at 204. In response, the court crossed out this sentence "just to make sure that the [c]ourt follows the language that was set forth in the opinion letter," id. , while leaving in the near-verbatim quotation from that prior letter opinion. See id. at 207. The pertinent portion of the order reads:

As to that Plea in Bar, the [c]ourt heard evidence and argument and finds that Mr. Martin’s acts were committed while he was performing duties of Our Lady of Peace and in execution of those services for which he was employed. The Court finds that Mr. Martin was in the course and scope of his employment when he committed the rape of Mrs. Austin.

Id.

Prior to trial, the Estate filed a motion in limine and argued that the trial court should preclude Our Lady of Peace from presenting any evidence challenging the respondeat superior finding. According to the Estate, the trial court had held, in its plea-in-bar ruling, that "the issue of course and scope of employment ha[d] been decided," and therefore, Our Lady of Peace should be precluded "from presenting any evidence inconsistent with the [c]ourt’s ruling." Id. at 117. Taking a position opposite to the one that it had taken at the plea-in-bar hearing, the Estate insisted that the scope-of-employment question did not involve an issue of fact for the jury. "It is disingenuous," the Estate argued, "for [Our Lady of Peace] to now claim the issue should be decided by a jury simply because it disagrees with the [c]ourt’s ruling on the matter." Id. at 118. The Estate did not explain how the trial court could have decided the scope-of-employment issue without having heard any evidence on it.

In reply, Our Lady of Peace correctly recalled that, before the plea-in-bar hearing, the Estate had taken the position "that whether Mr. Martin’s conduct is within the scope of employment is a jury issue that cannot be decided by the court." Id. at 123. "On brief," the Estate had contended "that a defendant’s failure to meet the burden of proof requires the scope of employment issue to be heard by a jury." Id.

The trial court granted the motion in limine, holding that the scope-of-employment issue had been properly before the court at the plea-in-bar...