Outdoor Sports Corp. v. American Federation of Labor, Local 23132

• Decision Date: 15 January 1951
• Docket Number: No. A--55,A--55
• Citation: 78 A.2d 69,29 A.L.R.2d 313,6 N.J. 217
• Parties: , 29 A.L.R.2d 313 OUTDOOR SPORTS CORP. v. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR, LOCAL 23132 et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 217

6 N.J. 217

78 A.2d 69, 29 A.L.R.2d 313

OUTDOOR SPORTS CORP. v. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR, LOCAL 23132 et al.

No. A--55.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued Dec. 4, 1950.

Decided Jan. 15, 1951.

Thomas L. Parsonnet, Newark, argued the cause for appellants (Parsonnet, Weitzman & Oransky, Newark, attorneys).

Norbury C. Murray, Newark, argued the cause for the respondent.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

OLIPHANT, J.

This appeal is here on our own motion. It is from an interlocutory injunction entered in the Chancery Division restraining the defendant from:

(A) Picketing with or without signs or placards at Ruppert Stadium, Wilson Avenue and Avenue K, Newark on any evening or afternoon whereon any race meet is scheduled to be held by the plaintiff.

(B) Interfering in any manner at any time with any person desiring or intending to participate in any capacity, or to patronize any of said race meets of plaintiff, and from attempting to persuade any of them from so doing.

(C) Representing in any manner to prospective patrons of or contestants in any of said race meets to be held by plaintiff that any labor dispute or that any dispute involving employer-employee relation exists between plaintiff and any of said defendants or members of defendant organizations or implying that plaintiff is unfair to union labor.

On May 5, 1950 respondent, without notice, obtained an order to show cause with an ad interim restraint, why an injunction should not issue against picketing and similar activities on the part of the appellants. Pursuant to notice to the appellants the matter was heard on May 25, 1950 and witnesses for both sides were examined and cross-examined. The interlocutory injunction was entered July 14, 1950.

The respondent corporation had arranged to conduct for a profit a series of meets for races between stock car automobiles during the racing season from May to September, 1950, at the Ruppert Stadium at Wilson Avenue and Avenue K in Newark. It had leased the stadium and had invested a substantial amount of money in the race track. It entered into a contract with the National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc. (hereafter referred to as Nascar) whereby the respondent agreed to permit as entries to its races only owners, drivers and mechanics licensed or approved by Nascar. With the consent of Nascar, a similar agreement was also entered into with the Atlantic Stock Car Racing Club, Inc. (hereafter referred to as Atlantic).

The car owners, drivers, and mechanics who enter or participate in the races conducted by the respondent are not its employees or the employees of Nascar or Atlantic. Only members of these two associations are allowed to drive at this particular track. For their participation in the events they receive shares in the purses which are paid to Nascar and Atlantic and by them divided among the various races on each day. There was a flat purse of $2,000 apparently for each day. This purse was divided among the contestants in the same proportion according to the finishing position in each race but the tail enders received no remuneration.

The owners and drivers are under no obligation to race if they do not want to but they are permitted to file an entry and commit themselves to come and race at the meet. The entries close about an hour before race time.

Neither the plaintiff, Nascar nor Atlantic provide for any unemployment compensation or social security or workmen's compensation for any of the owners, drivers or mechanics who participate in the races. Nascar provides insurance for its members covering medical and other expenses resulting from racing accidents, to which plan the drivers, racers and mechanics contribute, but not the promoters.

The defendant union is composed of owners, drivers, and mechanics who are or have been members of Atlantic and who are also members of the defendant Metropolitan Auto Racing Association, Inc. (hereafter referred to as Metropolitan), which in turn is affiliated with some twelve similar associations. Metropolitan is still an actual operating corporation and though while heretofore all negotiations for participation in the races were made by an agent appointed by it, the present arrangement is that negotiations with the promoters who operate the tracks will be carried on through the union and its officers.

Shortly before the filing of the complaint in this cause the union agents demanded that the respondent sign a written contract with the appellant, American Federation of Labor, Local 23132, which would require (a) that the respondent deal with the Labor Union as bargaining agent for the race participants, (b) that none but members of the Metropolitan and the defendant union be permitted to participate in the races, (c) that the purses be paid over to the union for distribution, (d) that the purses be divided among the participants according to the union rules, (e) that the purses constitute 40% Of the gate receipts rather than an amount fixed by the respondent, (f) that the races be conducted under the rules of the union rather than under the rules of Nascar or Atlantic, (g) that the participants pay to a benevolent fund to be administered by the Union $1 per participant per race and that this amount be matched by the plaintiff. Several meetings were held at which attempts were made to negotiate a contract but they all failed because the respondent contended the race drivers and owners were not its employees even though it was admitted that other employees of the respondent who performed services in the operation of the stadium were union members.

The respresentative of the union flatly stated to the respondent and its officers that if they were not willing to negotiate and recognize the union and use the union members on the race track that they would be picketed and that the picket line would cause the union workers in the stadium to stay away from their work. Efforts would be made to keep other drivers and cars from coming in and that they would make sure that the race meet would not be held with them picketing since they expected that the other American Federation people employed would not cross the picket line. A dead line was fixed at which the contracts should be signed or the picketing start. Truatt, the union delegate, admitted that he told the respondent that that was what would probably happen in this case. He disarmingly testified that he did use the words 'that we would tie up the stadium. In fact, I did use that because I said that 'you leave us with no other recourse other than the attempting to force economic pressure.' But I didn't use it in the way of meaning that we would tie it up, because our Unions don't proceed along them lines.' In this posture of affairs the respondent applied for the ad interim restraint and the interlocutory injunction above mentioned.

The trial court in its order found (1) that the union demands, if granted, would require the respondent to breach its contracts with Nascar and Atlantic, (2) but that if the union demands were refused and its threats carried out the holding of races by the respondent would be hampered or even prevented, thereby causing great financial loss, (3) that no adequate remedy was available at law, (4) that none of the defendants or those they represent had any right or interest in the races, (5) that no labor dispute existed within the meaning of R.S. 34:12--1, N.J.S.A., or R.S. 2:29--77.8, N.J.S.A., (6) that an injunction was necessary in order to protect the rights of the plaintiff. On the basis of these findings the restraints above set out, were included in the interlocutory injunction appealed from.

The first point of the appellant is that P.L.1941, Chap. 15 as amended by R.S. 2:29--77.1 et seq., N.J.S.A., prohibits the issuance of an injunction on the facts of this case.

At the outset it should be stated that it has been held that R.S. 2:29--77.1 et seq., N.J.S.A., is essentially procedural in its provisions. Isolantite, Inc. v. United Electrical, etc. Workers, C.I.O., 132 N.J.Eq. 613, 29 A.2d 183, (E. & A. 1942), and for this reason its procedural provisions were incorporated by reference in Rule 3:65--9. Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 74 A.2d 406 (1950). The various acts and rights of employees, which are declared by R.S. 2:29--77.2, N.J.S.A., as a matter of public policy, to be lawful, were all lawful prior to the enactment of the statute and the statute is merely declaratory of the existing substantive law at the time. Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. United Electrical, etc. Union, C.I.O., 139 N.J.Eq. 97, 49 A.2d 896 (E. & A. 1946). It should be noted that Section (e) of R.S. 2:29--77.1, N.J.S.A., provides that the giving of publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in any labor dispute must be without fraud or violence, or by any other method not involving fraud or violence, and not in violation of any other law of the State of New Jersey.

The appellants' argument is that the limitations of the statute apply to this cause since the appellants and respondent are in the 'same business' and that there is a 'labor dispute' within the meaning of that phrase as defined in the act. The appellant quotes and argues that R.S. 2:29--77.8, N.J.S.A., provides, Inter alia, that 'A case shall be held to involve or to grow out of a labor dispute when the case involves persons who are engaged in industry, trade, craft, employment, or occupation * * * regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.'

We can agree that a primary relationship of employer and employee is not required to make the benefits of the act available to the disputants and that under certain facts and conditions, it is available to disputants who are employees of independent contractors or customers or persons associated with or connected to the primary disputants because of a unity of interest in the terms...