Outley v. City of Chi.
| Decision Date | 10 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 13 CV 1583,13 CV 1583 |
| Parties | MICHAEL OUTLEY, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, PAUL MAZUR, Individually, ALAN STARK, Deputy Commissioner of the Department of Water and Individually, and THOMAS POWERS, Commissioner of the Department of Water and Individually, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Michael Outley's third amended complaint against the City of Chicago and individual defendants Paul Mazur, Alan Stark and Thomas Power alleges discrimination on the basis of race as well as retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 (Dkt. #48.) Defendants now move to dismiss the third amended complaint in part pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendants argue that 1) some of Outley's claims are beyond the scope of his EEOC charges, 2) some of his claims are time-barred, 3) he failed to state a valid claim of retaliation, 4) he failed to properly plead claims against the city, 5) the Equal Protection Clause does not protect against retaliation, 6) the individual defendants cannot be sued under Title VII, § 1981 or § 1983, and 7) punitive damages cannot be brought against the city. (Dkt.#53.) For the reasons set forth herein, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part. The defendants' motion to strike Outley's oversized brief is denied.
Michael Outley, an African-American man, began working for the City of Chicago in 1987, as an operating engineer in the Department of Aviation. In 1993, he transferred to the Department of Water Management as an operating engineer. The Department of Water Management oversees approximately eleven pumping stations and two filtration plants. Soon after his transfer, Outley began to serve as Acting Assistant Chief Operating Engineer at the Lexington pumping station. In 1994, Outley applied for the posted position of Chief Operating Engineer and was denied the promotion. In 1998, Outley received a promotion to a permanent position of Assistant Chief Operating Engineer, a position he had been filling in an acting capacity for five years. In each of the years 2010, 2011 and 2012, the City of Chicago posted announcements for the position of Chief Operating Engineer in the Department of Water Management, and each year Outley applied.
The application process included a multiple choice test, a technical exam and an oral interview related to the technical aspects of the position. Outley passed each portion of the application process every year, and satisfied all the requirements for the promotion. Yet, he never received the promotion. Meanwhile, since 2010, six Caucasian applicants with fewer qualifications and less experience were promoted to Chief Operating Engineer. In fact, at the time Outley filed his third amended complaint, all of the Chief Operating Engineers within the Department of Water were Caucasian. Outley alleges that defendants acted willfully and in bad faith in their failure to promote him.
In October 2012, Outley filed a complaint with the city's human resources department, alleging that he had been denied a promotion because of his race. His immediate supervisor, defendant Mazur, was informed of his complaints and met with human resources regarding the allegations. Following this meeting, Mazur asked Outley to submit proof of a medical condition, which he did. Nonetheless, Mazur requested a pre-disciplinary hearing for insubordination, alleging that Outley had failed to provide the requested proof. Following these events, on October 12, 2012, Outley filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that he had been denied a promotion on the basis of race.
Less than a month later, Mazur again accused Outley of insubordination, along with "failure to perform work" and "conduct unbecoming" regarding an incident that allegedly occurred on September 11, 2012, and requested another pre-disciplinary hearing. (Dkt. 48 at 5.)
Outley requested to work on Thanksgiving Day in 2012 and was denied an overtime opportunity. Several days later, on December 2, 2012, the EEOC sent Outley a right to sue letter. On December 13, Mazur requested a third pre-disciplinary hearing for "insubordination, violation of safety protocols and violation of a written directive." (Id.) At the time Outley filed his complaint he had not yet had a disciplinary hearing or received any disciplinary action based on Mazur's three pre-disciplinary hearing requests. These requests remain pending.
In March 2013, an Assistant Chief Operating Engineer, Chris Houlihan, made racially charged and intimidating threats to Outley. Houlihan told Outley that he had been transferred to the Lexington pumping station to intimidate and threaten Outley. Shortly afterwards, Outley was transferred against his wishes to the Mayfair pumping station, and then transferred to the Jardinepumping station. He requested to be returned to the Lexington station, and his request was ignored by defendants.
On May 9, 2013, Outley filed a second charge with the EEOC, alleging retaliation based on his complaints to human resources and the EEOC. The EEOC sent him a right to sue letter on his second charge on August 13, 2013. Finally, Outley filed a third charge on October 25, 2013 with the EEOC, again alleging retaliation, after the City of Chicago conducted an administrative investigation. He received a right to sue letter based on that charge in January 2014.
Outley alleges that defendants have shown a pattern and practice of discrimination and retaliation against him. He alleges that defendants acted willfully and in bad faith and seeks compensatory damages, prejudgment interest, attorneys' fees and costs.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp, 128 F.3d 1074, 1080 (7th Cir. 1997). In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court takes as true all facts in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Dixon v. Page, 291 F.3d 485, 486-87 (7th Cir. 2002). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must not only provide the defendant with fair notice of the claim's basis but must also establish that the requested relief is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. That is, the allegations in the complaint must be "enough toraise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. At the same time, the plaintiff need not plead legal theories; it is the facts that count. Hatmaker v. Mem'l Med. Ctr., 619 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. ---, 135 S. Ct. 346, 346, --- L. Ed. 2d --- (2014) (per curiam) ( ).
Defendants argue that Outley's failure to promote claims, with the exception of the October 2012 instance referenced in his first charge, should be dismissed because they are beyond the scope of his EEOC charges. Generally, "a Title VII plaintiff cannot bring claims in a lawsuit that were not included in her EEOC charge." Cheek v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1994). This exhaustion requirement has two purposes: to promote resolution of the dispute by settlement and to ensure that defendants receive adequate notice of the charges against them. Id.; see also Peters v. Renaissance Hotel Operating Co., 307 F.3d 535, 550 (7th Cir. 2002). Courts must keep in mind, however, both the goals of Title VII and the fact that EEOC charges are generally submitted without legal counsel. Cheek, 31 F.3d at 500. A Title VII plaintiff is not required to allege in an EEOC charge each and every fact that supports his or her complaint. Welch v. Cook County Clerk's Office, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1038 (N.D. Ill. 1999). Rather, additional claims must be "reasonably related to the allegations" included in theEEOC charge. Id. "This standard is a liberal one." Teal v. Potter, 559 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2009). The claims are sufficiently related if the allegations describe the same conduct and involve the same individuals. Id.; see also Lacy v. Americtech Mobile Comm. Inc., 965 F. Supp. 1056, 1063-64 (N.D. Ill. 1997) ()
Here, Outley's October 12, 2012 EEOC charge alleged that defendants failed to promote him based on his race. The prior instances of failure to promote (1994, 2010 and 2011) are allegations of the same conduct by the same individuals and are therefore within the scope of Outley's first EEOC charge.
To establish a plausible Title VII claim for retaliation, a plaintiff must allege (1) that he participated in a protected activity, (2) that he suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) that there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Culver v. Gorman & Co., 416 F.3d 540, 545 (7th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). It is...
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