Outley v. City of Chi.

• Decision Date: 11 January 2019
• Docket Number: Case No. 13 C 1583
• Citation: 354 F.Supp.3d 847
• Parties: Micheal OUTLEY, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal Corporation, Thomas Powers, Alan Stark and Paul Mazur, Individually, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

354 F.Supp.3d 847

Micheal OUTLEY, Plaintiff,

v.CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal Corporation, Thomas Powers, Alan Stark and Paul Mazur, Individually, Defendants.

Case No. 13 C 1583

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed January 11, 2019

Calvita J. Frederick, Calvita J. Frederick & Associates, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

Rena M. Honorow, Susan Margaret O'Keefe, Rebecca Miriam Gest, City of Chicago, Law Department, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

U.S. District Judge Joan H. Lefkow

Micheal Outley brings this action against the City of Chicago and individual defendants Thomas Powers,¹ Alan Stark,² and Paul Mazur³ alleging employment discrimination based on race, as well as retaliation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. , and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1981. After a motion to dismiss Outley's fourth amended complaint (dkt. 118), four counts remain.⁴ Specifically, Outley brings Title VII claims for racial discrimination (count I) and retaliation (count II) against the City, which have been limited to conduct that occurred after December 17, 2011,⁵ and § 1981 (count III) and § 1983 (count IV) claims against the City and the individual defendants, where count IV has been limited to conduct that occurred after February 28, 2011.⁶ (See dkt. 160.) Defendants now move for summary judgment on all remaining counts.⁷ (Dkt. 195.) For the reasons stated below, the motion is granted.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment obviates the need for a trial where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). To determine whether any genuine fact issue exists, the court must pierce the pleadings and assess the proof as presented in depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits that are part of the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In doing so, the court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of proving there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In response, "[a] party who bears the burden of proof on a particular issue may not rest on its pleadings, but must affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual allegations, that there is a genuine issue of material fact which requires trial." Day v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. , 987 F.Supp. 1105, 1109 (N.D. Ind. 1997) ; see also Insolia v. Philip Morris Inc. , 216 F.3d 596, 598 (7th Cir. 2000). If a claim or defense is factually unsupported, it should be disposed of on summary judgment. Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323–24, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

LOCAL RULE 56.1

Unless otherwise noted, the facts set out below are taken from the parties' Local Rule 56.1 statements, and are construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. The court will address many but not all of the factual allegations in the parties' submissions, as the court is "not bound to discuss in detail every single factual allegation put forth at the summary judgment stage." Omnicare, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc. , 629 F.3d 697, 704 (7th Cir. 2011). In accordance with its regular practice, the court has considered the parties' objections to the statements of facts and includes in its opinion only those portions of the statements and responses that are appropriately supported and relevant to the resolution of this motion. Any facts that are not controverted as required by Local Rule 56.1 are deemed admitted.

Preparation of this opinion has been made particularly difficult by Outley's counsel's failure to comply with Local Rule 56.1 in responding to the statement of material facts and preparing a statement of additional facts. This court's standing order directs counsel to read Malec v. Sanford , 191 F.R.D. 581 (N.D. Ill. 2000) and Buttron v. Sheehan , 2003 WL 21801222 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 4, 2003), which detail the oft-occurring pitfalls encountered when preparing summary judgment filings. Outley's counsel has apparently not recently reviewed Malec or Buttron , since Outley's submissions run afoul of the helpful guidance in those cases: (1) a response to a movant's statement of facts is neither the place for argument nor additional facts that do not actually dispute the factual statement; (2) the paragraphs in a statement of facts should be short and not argumentative or conclusory; (3) paragraphs also must contain specific references that support the factual allegation, and the specific references provided should not be so voluminous that they send the court on a wild goose chase nor should they rely on inadmissible material such as hearsay; and (4) "supporting documents submitted with a motion that are not referred to in the statement of facts will be ignored." See Malec , 191 F.R.D. at 583– 87 ; Buttron , 2003 WL 21801222, at *1–6. The motion could likely have been granted by simply rejecting Outley's Local Rule 56.1 submissions. The court has done its best, however, to winnow the facts to those supported by the record to resolve the case on the merits.

BACKGROUND

Micheal Outley, a black man, was a member of the City of Chicago's Department of Water Management (Water Department) from March 1, 1993 until August 1, 2017. (Dkt. 203, Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Material Facts ("Pl. Resp.") ¶ 1.) Defendants maintain that Outley retired effective August 1, 2017, while Outley asserts that he was constructively discharged as of that date. (Id. ) On or about December 1, 1998, Outley was promoted to Assistant Chief Operating Engineer (ACOE), and held that title until July 31, 2017. (Id. ¶ 20.)

From 2010 through 2017, Outley applied for a promotion to Chief Operating Engineer (COE) on numerous occasions, but was denied a promotion each time. (Id. ¶¶ 33–47.)

A. Hiring Procedures

The procedures used to fill the COE position were the byproduct of Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook Cty. , No. 69 C 2145, in which the City entered into a consent judgment, which was intended to "eliminate the conditioning, basing or affecting of employment with the City of Chicago on political reasons or factors while maintaining the ability of the elected officials of the City lawfully to establish, manage and direct the policies and affairs of the City." (Id. ¶ 22; dkt. 197-13 at 2.) As part of that litigation, a federal monitor was appointed to oversee the City's compliance. (Pl. Resp. ¶ 23.) Further, pursuant to an agreed settlement order, the City and the monitor devised a new hiring plan, which was approved by the court on January 18, 2008. (Dkt. 197-13 at 14–21.) On June 16, 2014, the court found that the City was in substantial compliance with the settlement order and dismissed the City as a party to the lawsuit. (Id. at 24–27.)

For the years 2010 through 2014, the hiring procedure (called the Foreman Promotional Procedure) consisted of three parts: (1) a multiple choice test of ethics, Shakman , and personnel rules; (2) a multiple choice test on technical and supervisory skills; and (3) an oral interview with questions designed to assess supervisory skills and technical knowledge. (Pl. Resp. ¶ 24.) According to the City's hiring plan, which was approved by the court in Shakman , interview questions were to be developed by the City's Department of Human Resources (HR) and Water Department, and drawn from predefined job-specific questions related to the hiring criteria for the vacant position. (Id. ¶ 26; dkt. 197-9 at 74.) Applicants for the same position were to be asked the same core interview questions, although additional follow-up questions were permitted. (Id. ) Applicants received a percentage-based score on each part of the hiring process and were required to pass each part of the procedure before moving on to the next. (Pl. Resp. ¶ 25.) The selection process for promotion occurred during a consensus meeting lead by an HR recruiter and attended by all interviewers and the hiring manager for that year. (Id. ¶ 27.) During the consensus meeting, the participants created a ranked list of all candidates who passed the three parts of the testing process. (Id. ) The applicants were ranked first based on their average total score—100% to 90% were most qualified; 89% to 80% were highly qualified; and 79% to 67% were qualified—and then by seniority as defined in the relevant collective bargaining agreement.⁸ (Id. ¶ 25) If no consensus could be reached during the meeting, the hiring manager was tasked with making the final selection decision and was required to provide written justification for the decision, which was then reviewed and approved by HR. (Id. ¶ 28.)

For the years 2015 through 2017, the Water Department moved to a two-part process, which included a written test/skills assessment and an oral interview. (Id. ¶ 29.) For those applicants who passed the test and were interviewed, a consensus meeting was held to discuss which of these applicants were best suited to fulfill the responsibilities of the position. (Id. ¶ 30.) An HR recruiter was tasked with taking notes during the meeting. (See, e.g. , dkt. 197-11 at 31, 39.) According to the selection requirements in the 2015–2017 COE job posting, interviewed candidates receiving a passing score on the written test and possessing the qualifications best suited to fulfill the responsibilities of the position were selected in seniority order according to the collective bargaining agreement. (Pl. Resp. ¶ 31.)

Outley admits that he does not know how it is...