MEMORANDUM OPINION
(Granting Respondent's Motion to Dismiss)
Jason Merritt Overby, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("§ 2254 Petition," ECF No. 1) challenging his convictions in the Circuit Court of Powhattan County ("Circuit Court") of two counts of first-degree murder and two counts of use of a firearm in the commission of murder. Overby contends that he is entitled to relief on the following grounds:
1. Trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to renew a request for a change of venue following voir dire. (§ 2254 Pet. 16.)
2. Appellate counsel failed to raise the Circuit Court's denial of Overbey's motion for a change of venue. (Id. at 17.)
3. Appellate counsel failed to raise the Circuit Court's denial of Overbey's plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. (Id. at 18.)
4. The Circuit Court erred when it denied Overbey's motion to suppress statements he made to law enforcement. (Id. at 19.)
5. The Circuit Court erred when it overruled Overbey's objection and admitted autopsy pictures of the victims. (Id. at 20.)
6. The Circuit Court erred when it denied Overbey's request that the jury be instructed on voluntary manslaughter. (Id. at 22.)
7 The evidence was insufficient to prove that Overbey acted with premeditation in killing the victims. (Id. at 24.)
Respondent concedes that Overbey exhausted each of the above claims. Respondent moves to dismiss on the grounds that Overbey's claims 5 and 6 are not cognizable on federal habeas and the remaining claims lack merit. For the reasons that follow, the Motion to Dismiss will be granted.
I. APPLICABLE CONSTRAINTS UPON FEDERAL HABEAS REVIEW To obtain federal habeas relief, at a minimum, a petitioner must demonstrate that he is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") further circumscribes this Court's authority to grant relief by way of a writ of habeas corpus. Specifically, "[s]tate court factual determinations are presumed to be correct and may be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence." Gray v. Branker, 529 F.3d 220, 228 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). Additionally, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a federal court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus based on any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudicated claim:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The Supreme Court has emphasized that the question "is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410(2000)). Given this standard, the decisions by the Virginia courts hold a prominent place in this Court's opinion.
Overbey fails to raise a federal constitutional violation in conjunction with Claim 5 and 6. He raises these claims merely as violations of state law, which fails to provide a basis for federal habeas corpus relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) ("We have stated many times that 'federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.'" (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990))). Accordingly, Claims 5 and 6 will be dismissed.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence In order to provide factual context for Overbey's remaining claims it is appropriate to first address and reject his claim that the evidence was insufficient to prove he acted with premeditation. A federal habeas petition warrants relief on a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence only if "no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979). The relevant question in conducting such a review is whether, "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 319 (citing Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362 (1972)). The critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is "whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 318.
The Court of Appeals of Virginia aptly summarized the evidence of Overbey's guilt as follows:
[T]he evidence proved that on May 22, 2011, Moore and Mann were working at a farm owned by Moore's father. Appellant also worked at the farm. Appellant was an avid hunter, and he frequently had firearms in his vehicle. On the morning of May 22, 2011, appellant and Moore had a disagreement. At approximately 1:00 to 2:00 p.m., Moore and Mann were working on a haybine near the shop area of the farm. Phil Knabe worked at the farm and was cutting hay with Moore's father near the main house. Knabe testified he heard three gunshots. Knabe was not suspicious because sometimes the men would target practice and hunt on the farm. Approximately ten minutes after the gunshots, Knabe saw appellant drive past him in his truck and leave the farm. Knabe testified appellant had a good relationship with Moore, but he frequently argued with Mann. At approximately 3:00 p.m., Moore's father left the hay field because he did not see any activity at the shop area. Moore's father found Moore and Mann dead on the ground near the haybine.
Angela Skelton lived in a rental house on the farm, and she was employed as a bookkeeper for the farm. Skelton testified at approximately 11:00 a.m. she heard Moore yelling, but she did not know who he was fighting with. At approximately 2:00 p.m., Skelton heard three gunshots coming from the shop area, but did not investigate because the men would frequently target practice. There were two quick shots, a pause, and a third shot. Skelton testified appellant's relationship with Moore was good, but appellant had trouble getting along with Mann. Skelton testified approximately four or five weeks prior to the shooting, she saw Moore in the shop and Moore told her that he had to keep appellant and Mann separated. Skelton testified she said to appellant that she heard he was having a bad day and appellant stated he was going to shoot Mann.
Detective Jeff Searfoss took photographs of the victims and of the scene. Moore was wearing work gloves, and a hammer was near his feet. Moore's body was near the haybine. Moore died from a gunshot wound to the back of his head. Mann's body was nearby, he sustained two gunshot wounds to his head, and he had been shot at close range. One of Mann's wounds was consistent was Mann being on the ground when shot. The medical examiner was unable to determine the sequence of the shots; two shots were buckshot, and one shot was birdshot.
Amelia County Deputy Ian McDonald and two additional deputies went to appellant's residence in Amelia County, where McDonald handcuffed appellant. Approximately twenty to thirty minutes later, Detective Jason Tackett from Powhatan County arrived and saw appellant handcuffed and seated in McDonald's vehicle. Tackett told appellant he was investigating a shooting and asked if appellant was willing to go to the sheriff's office to talk about the shooting. Appellant replied, "I don't haveanything to say without a lawyer." Tackett closed the door of the vehicle and walked away from McDonald's vehicle.
McDonald testified after Tackett walked away from appellant, appellant stated three times, "They got me for murder." Later, Deputy Smith transported appellant to the Powhatan Correction Center. As Smith left appellant at the center, he wished appellant good luck, and appellant stated, "You know what the F. I did."
The evidence showed that approximately five weeks prior to the shooting, appellant threatened to shoot Mann after an altercation. Appellant had a history of not getting along with Mann. On the morning of the shooting, Moore and appellant had an altercation. Later, while Moore and Mann worked on a haybine, appellant shot both men in the back. Appellant shot Mann at close range and at least once while Mann was on the ground. Appellant inflicted mortal wounds with a rifle, which created an inference he acted with premeditation. Based upon a review of the circumstances in this case, there was sufficient evidence supporting the jury's determination that appellant acted with premeditation.
(ECF No. 10-2, at 4-6.) As noted by the Court of Appeals, the evidence amply demonstrates that Overbey acted with premeditation in killing Moore and Mann. Accordingly, Claim 7 will be dismissed.
III. Alleged Ineffective Assistance of Counsel To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a convicted defendant must first show that counsel's representation was deficient, and, second, that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To satisfy the deficient performance prong of Strickland, a convicted defendant must overcome the "'strong presumption' that counsel's strategy and tactics fall 'within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.'" Burch v. Corcoran, 273 F.3d 577, 588 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). The prejudice component requires a convicted defendant to "show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding...
