Overlock v. Ruedemann

• Citation: 147 Conn. 649,165 A.2d 335
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Decision Date: 08 November 1960
• Parties: Willard J. OVERLOCK, Administrator (Estate of Jayne RUEDEMANN), et al. v. Barbara A. RUEDEMANN. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 335

165 A.2d 335

147 Conn. 649

Willard J. OVERLOCK, Administrator (Estate of Jayne RUEDEMANN), et al. v. Barbara A. RUEDEMANN.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Nov. 8, 1960.

Morgan P. Ames, Stamford, for plaintiffs.

Richard F. Oburchay, Bridgeport, with whom was David J. Sullivan, Jr., Bridgeport, for the defendant.

Before BALDWIN, C. J., and KING, MURPHY, MELLITZ and SHEA, JJ.

BALDWIN, Chief Justice.

This reservation from the Superior Court poses the question whether an unemancipated minor child can be held to respond in damages for negligence which proximately caused injury to one sister and death to another, both being unemancipated minors also. ¹ The named plaintiff sues as administrator of the estate of Jayne Ruedemann, the deceased unemancipated minor sister of the defendant. In a second count, Carol Ruedemann, another unemancipated minor sister, sues through her father to recover for personal injuries.

A summary of the facts stipulated is as follows: On October 12, 1958, in the morning, Jayne, aged twelve years, together with Carol, aged fourteen years, and Barbara, aged seventeen years, were going to church in their father's automobile. Barbara was driving. The automobile went out of control and crashed into a utility pole, throwing Jayne through the windshield and causing her death, and injuring Carol. The parties have stipulated that Barbara's negligence in the operation of the automobile was the proximate cause of the death of Jayne and the injury to Carol, neither of whom was chargeable with contributory negligence. It was further stipulated that if a judgment enters in favor of the plaintiff administrator, the damages would be assessed at $11,000, and if a judgment enters in favor of the plaintiff Carol, the damages would be assessed at $1,500.

It should be stated at the outset of our discussion that the cause of action asserted by the administrator for the decedent Jayne is one which accrued to the decedent and has survived to her personal representative by reason of General Statutes, § 52-555. Floyd v. Fruit Industries, Inc., 144 Conn. 659, 668, 136 A.2d 918, 63 A.L.R.2d 1378; Chase v. Fitzgerald, 132 Conn. 461, 467, 45 A.2d 789, 163 A.L.R. 247. A cause of action for wrongful death would be considered, in some jurisdictions, an entirely new and independent cause of action and therefore not within the rule, invoked by analogy by the defendant here, that a parent cannot maintain an action against an unemancipated son or daughter. See Oliveria v. Oliveria, 305 Mass. 297, 300, 25 N.E.2d 766; Mass.Ann.Laws c. 229, § 2 (Sup.1959); Kaczorowski v. Kalkosinski, 321 Pa. 438, 445, 184 A. 663, 104 A.L.R. 1267; Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 12, § 1601 (1953). In this state, the right of action for wrongful death, including ante-mortem elements of damage, and the right of action for nonfatal personal injuries rest on substantially the same basis and can be considered together.

It has long been the law in this state that an unemancipated minor cannot maintain an action for negligence against his parent. Mesite v. Kirchenstein, 109 Conn. 77, 82, 145 A. 753. He can, however, maintain an action against his parent's employer for the negligence of his parent while acting in the course of his employment. Chase v. New Haven Waste Material Corporation, 111 Conn. 377, 382, 150 A. 107, 68 A.L.R. 1497. In Shaker v. Shaker, 129 Conn. 518, 521, 29 A.2d 765, we held that a parent cannot maintain an action for negligence against his unemancipated minor child. The reasoning for these holdings can be succinctly stated by quoting from the opinion in the Mesite case, supra, 109 Conn. 84, 145 A. 755: 'The state and society are vitally interested in the integrity and unity of the family and in the preservation of the family relation. The obligation of the father, or it may be the mother, to care for, guide, control, and educate their child and the reciprocal obligation of the child to serve and obey the parent are essentials of the family relationship. Authority in the parent to require obedience in the child is indispensable to the maintenance of unity in the family. Anything which undermines this authority, brings discord into the family, weakens its government, and disturbs its peace, is an injury to society and to the state. * * * Such unseemly family discord is injurious to the public welfare, to such a degree that all the courts of this country, which have had occasion to express their opinion upon the right of the minor to maintain such an action, have declared that the exercise of this right is against sound public policy.' See also Silverman v. Silverman, 145 Conn. 663, 666, 145 A.2d 826.

Fortified by this reasoning, the defendant argues that public policy forbids the maintenance of the action in the instant case. In Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 47, 89 A. 889, 52 L.R.A.,N.S., 185, we held that a married woman could recover damages from her husband for an assault committed upon her by him. In Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 587, 131 A. 432, 44 A.L.R. 785, we allowed a wife to recover damages from her husband for injuries caused her by his negligent operation of his automobile, in which she was a passenger. The defendants in both of these cases argued that the act of 1877; Public Acts 1877, c. 114, § 1, presently General Statutes, § 46-9; concerning the property rights of married women should not be construed to allow actions founded on tort between husband and wife. They urged that such a construction would imperil the marriage contract and therefore run contrary to good public policy. See 142 Rec. & Briefs, back of [147 Conn. 653] p. 14; 292 Rec. & Briefs 65. We said in the Brown case, supra, 88 Conn. 48, 89 A. 891: 'In the fact that the wife has a cause of action against her husband for wrongful injuries to her person or property committed by him, we see nothing which is injurious to the public or against the public good or against good morals. This is the usual test for determining whether a statute or a contract is against public policy.' In the Bushnell case, supra, 103 Conn. at page 587, 131 A. 433, we said: 'Such a situation [the injury of the wife through the ordinary negligence of her husband] falls * * * within the broad principle of liability announced in the Brown case. That principle has not been questioned since, and the dangers from it which we then refused to regard as substantial have not in fact made themselves manifest.' It is true, as stated in the Mesite case, supra, 109 Conn. 86, 145 A. 755, that the decision in the Brown case was based upon the interpretation of the 1877 statute. The Brown case did, however, present the question whether the maintenance of tort actions between spouses was contrary to public policy. A narrow interpretation of the statute, an interpretation which would have denied a right of action sounding in tort, was urged on grounds of public policy, and the court refused to find that public policy ran contrary to the maintenance of such an action. There would seem to be more force to the argument that a lawsuit between husband and wife is contrary to public policy than that a lawsuit between sisters...