Overnite Transp. Co. v. McDuffie

• Decision Date: 10 November 2005
• Docket Number: 2030367.
• Parties: OVERNITE TRANSPORTATION COMPANY v. J.R. McDUFFIE.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

933 So.2d 1092

OVERNITE TRANSPORTATION COMPANY v. J.R. McDUFFIE.

2030367.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

November 10, 2005.

Certiorari Denied January 20, 2006 Alabama Supreme Court 1050267.

Joseph H. Driver and Brett A. Ross of Carr, Allison, Pugh, Howard, Oliver & Sisson, P.C., Birmingham, for appellant.

Jonathan W. Gathings of Jonathan W. Gathings & Associates, Birmingham, for appellee.

MURDOCK, Judge.

Overnite Transportation Company ("Overnite") appeals from a judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court in a case brought under the Workers' Compensation Act, Ala.Code 1975, § 25-5-1 et seq. The primary issue presented is whether the trial court erred in requiring Overnite to pay for certain medical treatments for J.R. McDuffie. Overnite also argues that the trial court's determination that it was in contempt, and its award to McDuffie of $5,000 in attorney fees based on that finding, was in error.

McDuffie originally filed this case on October 10, 1997, as a claim for benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act because of an alleged injury he sustained arising out of and in the course of his employment with Overnite. During the pendency of that lawsuit, McDuffie requested that Overnite provide him a list of four doctors from which to choose a new treating physician, see § 25-5-77(a), and, after receiving the list from Overnite, he selected Dr. John Hackman from the list as his authorized treating physician.

On February 10, 2000, Dr. Hackman sent a letter to McDuffie referring him to Dr. Edwin Kelsey for pain management. In pertinent part, that letter read:

"This letter will serve as a referral to Dr. Edwin Kelsey, . . . for pain management. . . .

"Because of your continuing discomfort, you have requested referr[al] to Dr. Edwin Kelsey. You can use this letter as a referral and go ahead and schedule an appointment to see Dr. Kelsey."

On February 24, 2000, counsel for Overnite wrote to counsel for McDuffie regarding McDuffie's request for pain management. Counsel for Overnite wrote that it did not appear to him that the pain management McDuffie sought was related to his work injury. Counsel questioned the validity of Dr. Hackman's referral to Dr. Kelsey, describing the referral as having been done in a "backhanded sort of way." In spite of this, counsel wrote, Overnite had agreed to allow McDuffie to obtain pain-management treatment. Overnite did not authorize McDuffie to see Dr. Kelsey, however. Instead, it authorized him to see Dr. Ronald Moon. Counsel for Overnite concluded his February 24, 2000, letter: "I emphasize that . . . the treatment by Dr. Edwin Kelsey . . . is [not] authorized by Overnite."

Pursuant to Dr. Hackman's referral, and in spite of the letter from counsel for Overnite, McDuffie began seeing Dr. Kelsey for pain management. Dr. Kelsey prescribed medication for McDuffie, for which Overnite paid.

The trial court approved a settlement of the case on October 10, 2000. In pertinent part, the settlement provided:

"The parties have made known to the Court that they have reached a compromised agreement to settle this claim, subject to the approval of this Court, for the sum of $95,000.00 as a full and complete settlement of any and all claims for workers' compensation benefits, including temporary total disability and permanent partial or permanent total disability benefits with the defendant remaining liable to the plaintiff for future medical benefits as required by the Workers' Compensation Act of Alabama which was in effect at the time of said accident."

(Emphasis added.)

In August 2001, Overnite, apparently realizing for the first time that it had been paying for medications prescribed to McDuffie by Dr. Kelsey, stopped paying for those medications and for travel expenses associated with treatment by Dr. Kelsey. Overnite also denied McDuffie's claim for a personal mobility vehicle that Dr. Kelsey had prescribed for him. In a letter from Overnite's counsel to McDuffie's counsel dated November 12, 2001, counsel wrote that "Overnite Transportation is not obligated to provide Mr. McDuffie with the motorized scooter which he believes he requires because it has not been indicated by an approved physician."

On May 2, 2003, McDuffie filed a motion to require Overnite to pay the medical costs and the travel costs (i.e., mileage reimbursement) associated with the treatment he had received from Dr. Kelsey. McDuffie thereafter filed his brief in support of the motion, in which he asked the court to hold Overnite in contempt for allegedly violating the terms of the parties' settlement agreement by having failed to pay for those medical costs and to order Overnite to pay a $5,000 attorney fee.

Overnite's brief in opposition to McDuffie's motion asserted that Overnite should not have to pay for treatment that it did not authorize and that the assessment of an attorney fee was unjustified because there was no evidence indicating that Overnite had acted in bad faith or had willfully disobeyed a court order.

The trial court held a hearing on McDuffie's motion and, on October 14, 2003, entered an order requiring Overnite to pay for the medical and travel expenses sought by McDuffie (including the cost of the personal mobility vehicle), finding Overnite in contempt for violating the order approving the settlement agreement and ordering Overnite to pay $5,000 in attorney fees to McDuffie.

After Overnite filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment, the trial court entered a revised order amending the language of the first order by: (1) deleting the finding of contempt; (2) deleting the $5,000 attorney-fee award; and (3) allowing McDuffie's counsel 30 days to submit proof of a reasonable attorney fee. Overnite appealed from this revised order.

Thereafter, this court determined that the trial court's order was not a final, appealable order under Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., in that the order failed to resolve all of the claims presented by McDuffie. Specifically, the trial court's order, as amended, failed to address McDuffie's claim that not only should Overnite be responsible for the cost of his treatment by Dr. Kelsey, but that Overnite also should be held in contempt for having refused to accept responsibility for that cost. Accordingly, this court reinvested the trial court with jurisdiction to enable it to address the contempt claim. In response, the trial court entered an amended order holding Overnite in contempt and awarding McDuffie $5,000 in attorney fees as a sanction for that contempt.

On appeal, Overnite contends that the trial court erred when it ordered Overnite to pay McDuffie's unpaid medical expenses related to his treatment by Dr. Kelsey. Overnite also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in holding it in contempt for not having paid those expenses.

Our standard of review in workers' compensation cases was prescribed by the Legislature in Ala.Code 1975, § 25-5-81(e)(2). We recently set forth that standard, as well as the other applicable presumptions:

"When this court reviews a trial court's factual findings in a workers' compensation case, those findings will not be reversed if they are supported by substantial evidence. § 25-5-81(e)(2), Ala.Code 1975. Substantial evidence is `evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.' West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989). Further, this court reviews the facts `in the light most favorable to the findings of the trial court.' Whitsett v. BAMSI, Inc., 652 So.2d 287, 290 (Ala. Civ.App.1994), overruled on other grounds, Ex parte Trinity Indus., Inc., 680 So.2d 262 (Ala.1996). This court has also concluded: `The [1992 Workers' Compensation] Act did not alter the rule that this court does not weigh the evidence before the trial court.' Edwards v. Jesse Stutts, Inc., 655 So.2d 1012, 1014 (Ala.Civ.App.1995). However, our review as to purely legal issues is without a presumption of correctness. See Holy Family Catholic School v. Boley, 847 So.2d 371, 374 (Ala.Civ.App.2002) (citing § 25-5-81(e)(1), Ala.Code 1975)."

Reeves Rubber, Inc. v. Wallace, 912 So.2d 274, 279 (Ala.Civ.App.2005). Additionally, we review a finding of civil contempt under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gilbert v. Nicholson, 845 So.2d 785, 791 (Ala.2002).

With respect to the trial court's order requiring it to pay McDuffie's unpaid medical expenses related to his treatment by Dr. Kelsey, Overnite argues that, under Ala.Code 1975, § 25-5-77(a), an employer is only liable to pay for medical treatment rendered by a treating physician that it has authorized. Because it expressly refused to authorize McDuffie's treatment by Dr. Kelsey, Overnite argues that it cannot be required to pay for that treatment or for the medications prescribed by Dr. Kelsey.

Section 25-5-77(a) indicates that the employer shall make the initial choice of a physician who shall be authorized to treat the employee. The statute also provides that the employer shall be responsible for paying the costs of "reasonably necessary" medical treatments for the employee. Accordingly, the employer is responsible for paying for the treatment choice made by the authorized treating physician so long as that choice falls within the parameters of what is "reasonably necessary" to treat the employee. See Ex parte Southeast Alabama Med. Ctr., 835 So.2d 1042, 1046 n. 4 (Ala.Civ.App.2002).¹ This principle has been applied repeatedly in cases in which the "treatment" recommended by the authorized physician is a treatment to be administered by a second physician.

For example, in Jasper Community Hospital, Inc. v. Hyde, 419 So.2d 594 (Ala. Civ.App.1982), the employee's Alabama physician referred her to the Campbell Clinic in Memphis, Tennessee. This court concluded that the employee's "treatment at the Campbell Clinic in Memphis,...