Overseas Educ. Ass'n, Inc. v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, s. 87-1468
| Citation | 876 F.2d 960 |
| Decision Date | 25 May 1989 |
| Docket Number | 87-1575,Nos. 87-1468,s. 87-1468 |
| Parties | 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2534, 278 U.S.App.D.C. 82, 54 Ed. Law Rep. 413 OVERSEAS EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, v. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY, Respondent. OVERSEAS EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, v. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY, Respondent. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia) |
Richard J. Hirn, with whom Ronald R. Austin, Washington, D.C., was on the brief, for petitioner.
William R. Tobey, Atty., Federal Labor Relations Authority, with whom William E. Persina, Acting Sol., Federal Labor Relations Authority, Washington, D.C., was on the brief, for respondent. Susan Berk and Jill A. Griffin, Attys., Federal Labor Relations Authority, Washington, D.C., also entered appearances for respondent.
Before SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III, STARR and BUCKLEY, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III.
Invoking the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Act, 1 the Overseas Education Association (OEA) submitted proposals to the Department of Defense Dependents Schools (DODDS) with a view to mitigating the impact of changes by DODDS in the working conditions of teachers and other professionals employed overseas. DODDS refused to negotiate with OEA on the propositions at issue here, and on each of two administrative appeals 2 the Federal Labor Relations Authority sustained the agency's position. 3 We conclude that the Authority's construction of pertinent provisions of the Act improperly restricted the scope of management's duty to bargain. Accordingly, we reverse the Authority's decisions in the respects challenged, and remand the cases for further proceedings.
The Act reflects a comprehensive effort by Congress to balance the interest of the Government in efficient operation with the interest of employees in decisions affecting them. 4 The Act declares broadly that "[e]ach employee shall have the right ... to engage in collective bargaining with respect to conditions of employment through representatives chosen by employees...." 5 This right is enlivened by an obligation on agencies and unions alike to meet and bargain in good faith. 6
Section 7106(a) of the Act, however, removes from the duty to bargain management functions which Congress deemed essential to effective conduct of agency business. 7 Union proposals that would interfere directly with an exercise of rights reserved to management by Section 7106(a) are presumptively nonnegotiable. 8 But Section 7106(b) authorizes bargaining over proposals in either of three categories, notwithstanding some intrusion on Section 7106(a) prerogatives. 9
Centrally involved in the cases before us are the Section 7106(a) reserved management right to direct work, and assign employees, and the Section 7106(b)(3) sanction of bargaining over proposals of "appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected by the exercise of any authority under [Section 7106(a) ] by ... management officials." 10 By the terms of the Act, tensions between powers asserted by management and union officials are resolved by the Authority on negotiability appeals, 11 and the Authority's decisions are reviewable by the courts of appeals. 12
DODDS, a unit of the Department of Defense, operates more than 250 schools for dependents of American servicepersons stationed in twenty countries abroad. OEA is the collective bargaining representative of all teachers, counselors and other professionals employed at these schools. 13
In 1984, DODDS administrators announced changes in work assignments of overseas personnel. Hiring of substitute teachers would be reduced; whenever possible, full-time teachers, during what otherwise would be their planning and lunch periods, would cover classes of absent teachers. Similarly, hiring of outside help to monitor lunchrooms and playgrounds would be discontinued; full-time teachers and professionals would handle these chores in lieu of planning and lunch. The teaching day would be lengthened by fifteen minutes, another class period would be added, and the semester examination period would be shortened to two days.
OEA advanced a number of proposals designed to minimize the effect--primarily, loss of planning and lunch breaks--of these changes upon teachers and professionals. 14 DODDS bargained on some of these proposals but declined to do so on others. OEA appealed to the Authority for determinations on whether the rejected proposals were negotiable. 15
Later, in 1987, DODDS modified the structure of compensatory education programs at its schools in such ways as to increase the workloads of compensatory education teachers. 16 OEA recommended three methods of easing the transition to the heavier workloads. DODDS spurned bargaining over one of these proposals, which sought more preparation time for compensatory education teachers handed additional duties. 17 OEA solicited the Authority's decision on this refusal as well. 18
In separate opinions, the Authority upheld DODDS on the proposals under review. 19 By its estimate, OEA's proposals interfered directly with management's reserved right to assign work, and therefore were nonnegotiable unless they fell within one of the categories specified in Section 7106(b). 20 OEA contended, however, that its submissions qualified for bargaining under Section 7106(b)(3) as proposals of arrangements appropriate for adversely affected employees. 21 It argued that its members were impacted, primarily because the changes wrought by DODDS forced them to perform, without additional compensation, some of their work on their own time at home.
The Authority assumed the accuracy of these representations but disposed of the union's petitions solely on the grounds that the proposals concerned no more than "the effects of management's establishing job requirements," and that "[t]he establishment of job requirements, however, does not by itself adversely affect employees." 22 Dissatisfied, the union brought the litigation here.
Our review of an agency's construction of its enabling statute is guided by the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 23 and its progeny. "First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue." 24 "If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue," 25 "that is the end of the matter, for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." 26 "The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent." 27 "If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue," 28 "the ques tion for the court is whether the agency's answer is based upon a permissible construction of the statute." 29
Our examination of the pivotal provisions of the Act, the legislative history of those provisions, and the legislative scheme leads us to conclude that Congress made clear enough the meaning to be ascribed to the words "adversely affected" in Section 7106(b)(3), and did not intend the reading the Authority gave them. Since the Authority's interpretation does not survive the first phase of the Chevron inquiry, we do not reach the second. Thus we neither defer to nor abide the decisions under review.
The Authority argues here that employees are not adversely affected by management's specification of new job requirements unless and until an adverse personnel action 30 is taken against someone for failing to perform adequately under those requirements. 31 As the Authority puts it, adverse effects within the sphere of Section 7106(b)(3) can only be unfavorable job actions such as removals, demotions and reductions in pay. 32 This position is rested, not on statutory structure, language or history, but on an extrapolation of decisions dealing with promulgation of performance standards. 33
The statutory words do not themselves import any such limit. Webster's defines "adverse" as including "acting against or in a contrary direction" or "in opposition to one's interests," 34 and "affect" as including "to produce an effect ... upon." 35 Taken together, these expansive words do not confine themselves to employees subjected to serious adverse personnel actions.
Moreover, we hardly need to do more than to examine the structure of Section 7106 to obtain a clear idea of the meaning of "adversely affected." Section 7106(a), as we have said, enumerates the prerogatives reserved to management, 36 but the immunity of these rights from the duty to bargain is "[s]ubject" to Section 7106(b)(3). 37 The latter section, in plain English, authorizes negotiation of "appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected," not by a firing, demotion or pay cut, but by "the exercise of any authority under this section by such management officials." 38 Indubitably, promulgation of new work requirements is an exercise of authority under Section 7106(a), and the Authority was badly mistaken in imposing upon "adversely affected" a circumscription that those words simply do not bear.
While we all are satisfied that the statutory text itself demonstrates the error in the Authority's construction of Section 7106(b)(3), I have also examined the legislative history, 40 and there I find abundant support for the conclusion that Congress intended the words "adversely affected" to...
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