Oviedo v. Jago
| Decision Date | 21 January 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 86-3109,86-3109 |
| Citation | 809 F.2d 326 |
| Parties | Arthur J. OVIEDO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Arnold R. JAGO, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Thomas S. Douglas (argued), Lydy, Moan & Douglas, Toledo, Ohio, for petitioner-appellant.
Connie J. Harris, Asst. Atty. Gen., Columbus, Ohio, James A. Carr, Beverly Yale, Thomas O'Connell (argued), for respondent-appellee.
Before GUY, Circuit Judge; EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge; and EDGAR, District Judge. *
Petitioner, Arthur J. Oviedo, appeals the district court's dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner seeks habeas relief based on a constitutional challenge to the procedures followed at the hearing before the Ohio Juvenile Court where it was determined that petitioner should be tried as an adult. For the reasons set forth below, the decision of the district court denying relief is affirmed.
In November, 1980, petitioner was involved in the beating and stabbing death of a bar employee. Petitioner was arrested and charged with murder. Although petitioner did not actually wield the knife, he participated in the beating. Since he was only 17 years old at the time of his arrest, he was brought before the Ohio Juvenile Court.
Pursuant to Rule 30 of Ohio Rules of Juvenile Procedure, a hearing was held in which it was determined that there was probable cause to believe that petitioner committed the crime and that the crime would constitute a felony if committed by an adult. The juvenile court ordered petitioner to submit to a series of physical and mental examinations, as is required by Rule 30, in order to determine whether the youth should be tried as an adult. Following the examinations, a hearing was held in which the juvenile court found that petitioner was not amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile system. Therefore, the juvenile court judge ordered petitioner to be bound over to the Ohio Court of Common Pleas to be tried as an adult.
Petitioner was tried as an adult and convicted of murder by a jury. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for fifteen years to life. The Ohio Court of Appeals rejected a variety of constitutional challenges brought by the petitioner and affirmed his conviction. Ohio v. Oviedo, 5 Ohio App.3d 168, 450 N.E.2d 700 (1982). The Ohio Supreme Court denied petitioner's request for leave to appeal. Having exhausted his state law remedies, petitioner filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The case was referred to a magistrate who found that petitioner's constitutional rights were violated because the decision to transfer him was made solely on the basis of the arguments of the attorneys. No witnesses were called and no evidence was formally admitted at the bindover hearing.
Ohio Rule of Juvenile Procedure 30(C) prohibits the transfer of a case unless the juvenile court finds that "the child is not amenable to care or rehabilitation" in a juvenile facility. Rule 30(E) sets forth five factors which the court "shall" consider in making this determination:
1. The child's age and his mental and physical health;
2. The child's prior juvenile record;
3. Efforts previously made to treat or rehabilitate the child;
4. The child's family environment; and
5. School records.
The magistrate found that although the juvenile court had considered these factors, the petitioner's due process rights were violated because the juvenile court did not formally receive the reports into evidence. Therefore, the magistrate recommended that the state be ordered to release the petitioner within 90 days unless a hearing was held at which such evidence could be formally admitted and properly considered.
The district court rejected the magistrate's recommendation and denied petitioner's request for habeas relief. The district judge concluded that the failure to formally admit evidence did not amount to a federal constitutional violation.
In Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966), the Supreme Court recognized that a hearing to determine whether a juvenile should be tried as an adult was a "critically important" stage; and therefore, the proceedings "must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment." Id. at 562, 86 S.Ct. at 1057. However, the Supreme Court also stated, "We do not mean by this to indicate that the hearing to be held must conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing...." Id. Thus, although the Supreme Court made it clear that juveniles are entitled to some minimal level of procedural safeguards, such as legal representation and the development of a reviewable record, the Court did not specify the exact nature of the constitutional requirements of due process at a transfer hearing.
In the instant case, the juvenile court judge orally announced his decision to transfer petitioner's case to the adult court system. In rejecting petitioner's challenge to the sufficiency of this ruling, the Ohio Court of Appeals set forth a detailed summary of the evidence considered by the juvenile court judge. 1 Based on its review of the record, the Ohio Court of Appeals reached the factual conclusion that the juvenile court judge had fully considered all of the factors set forth in Ohio Juv.R. 30. This finding by the Ohio Court of Appeals is entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d).
Therefore, having determined that the juvenile court complied with the substantive requirements of the state law, the limited issue before this court is whether petitioner's due process rights were violated by the juvenile court's reliance on facts and information not formally introduced into evidence.
In Keener v. Taylor, 640 F.2d 839 (6th Cir.1981), this court refused to issue a writ of habeas corpus where petitioner claimed that the Ohio Juvenile Court should have made more specific findings regarding its decision to transfer his case to the adult court system. This court found that petitioner's complaint was based solely on a dispute over state procedural issues and therefore, "did not rise to a constitutional level warranting federal habeas corpus relief." Id. at 843. Likewise, in the instant case, petitioner contends that the transfer hearing was procedurally defective because the juvenile court failed to comply with the formal rules of evidence. 2
Whether or not the Ohio Juvenile Court complied with the procedural requirements of Ohio law is not a matter for this court to decide on a petition for habeas corpus relief. Bell v. Arn, 536 F.2d 123 (6th Cir.1976). The federal habeas court does not act as an additional state appellate court to review a state court's interpretation of its own law or procedure. Combs v. Tennessee, 530 F.2d 695 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 954, 96 S.Ct. 1731, 48 L.Ed.2d 198 (1976).
In the instant case, petitioner was represented by c...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Crawford v. Woods, CASE NO. 2:14-CV-13499
...of state law and the federal courts will not intervene in such matters. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); Oviedo v. Jago, 809 F.2d 326, 328 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005) ("a state court's interpretation of state law, including one announced o......
-
Hayes v. Gray, Case No. 5:17-CV-2035
...objection to being sentenced under O.R.C. §2907.02(A)(1)(b) because it is not cognizable on federal habeas review); Oviedo v. Jago, 809 F.2d 326, 328 (6th Cir.1987) ("The federal habeas court does not act as an additional appellate court to review a state court's interpretation of its own l......
-
Henry v. Balcarel, Case No. 17-cv-13362
...of state law and federal courts will not intervene in such matters. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); Oviedo v. Jago, 809 F.2d 326, 328 (6th Cir. 1987). Habeas relief does not lie for perceived errors of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Similarly, to the e......
-
Maclean v. Secor, Civ.A. No. 93-2383.
...unpublished opinion has "persuasive" or "precedential" value on a material issue. See 6th Cir. Rule 24(b) (cited in Oviedo v. Jago, 809 F.2d 326, 329 n. 3 (6th Cir.1987) (following unpublished decision)); 10th Cir. General Order of Nov. 29, 1993, Suspending 10th Cir. Rule 36.3 until Dec. 31......