Owen v. Burlington Northern and Santa Fe RR Co.

Decision Date24 March 2005
Docket NumberNo. 73621-9.,73621-9.
Citation153 Wash.2d 780,108 P.3d 1220
CourtWashington Supreme Court
PartiesJean M. OWEN, as Personal Representative of the Estates of Glenn and Margie Nelson, deceased, and Jean M. Owen, personally, Petitioner, v. BURLINGTON NORTHERN AND SANTA FE RAILROAD COMPANY, a Washington corporation, Defendant, City of Tukwila, a municipal corporation, and State of Washington, Respondents.

Brenda Louise Bannon, Brian Paul Russell, Seattle, for Petitioner.

Mark Conlin Jobson, Olympia, for Respondents.

Daniel Brian Heid, City of Auburn, Auburn, Charles Craig Parker, Thomas Sean Sheehan, Seattle, for Amicus Curiae City of Seattle.

Daniel Brian Heid, City of Auburn, Auburn, Charles Craig Parker, Seattle, for Amicus Curiae King County and Wash. Ass'n of Municipal Attys.

Debra Leigh Williams Stephens, Bryan Patrick Harnetiaux, Spokane, for Amicus Curiae Wash. State Trial Lawyers Ass'n Foundation.

CHAMBERS, J.

¶ 1 Glenn and Margie Nelson were killed in a car-train collision at a railroad grade crossing in Tukwila, Washington. Their daughter, Jean Owen, brought a wrongful death action against the State of Washington, Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railroad Company, and the city of Tukwila on behalf of her parents. Burlington Northern settled and on summary judgment, the action against both the city and the State was dismissed by the King County Superior Court. Division One of the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the suit against the State but reversed the order dismissing the city of Tukwila. Owen petitioned this court for discretionary review of the dismissal of the suit against the State, and the city of Tukwila cross-petitioned for review of the Court of Appeals' reinstatement of Owen's claim against it. We denied Owen's petition for review and accepted the city of Tukwila's cross-petition for review on September 5, 2003. We conclude that there are genuine and material facts as to whether the roadway was maintained in a reasonably safe condition for ordinary travel. Therefore, we affirm the Court of Appeals, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTS

¶ 2 The fatal accident occurred at the intersection of South 180th Street and a set of Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railroad Company (BNSF) railroad tracks in Tukwila, Washington. Three sets of railroad tracks intersect South 180th Street near the site of the accident. The eastern and middle sets of tracks are owned by BNSF, and the western set of tracks is owned by Union Pacific. West of the railroad tracks, South 180th Street intersects with 72nd Avenue South and the West Valley Highway. Both intersections are controlled by traffic signals. There is a crown in the road as it intersects with the railroad tracks, which allegedly limits westbound drivers' view of the traffic signals and any approaching trains. South 180th Street is a heavily traveled four lane road, and the three railroad tracks that intersect it are also heavily used by high-speed trains.

¶ 3 Glenn and Margie Nelson, ages 75 and 76, were traveling west on South 180th Street during Friday rush hour traffic. When the flow of traffic came to a halt due to the Tukwila traffic signals west of the railroad crossings, several vehicles, including the Nelsons', were stopped in the railroads' right of way. The truck in front of the Nelsons' vehicle was stopped on the eastern set of tracks when the truck's driver was alerted by a passenger that a train was approaching. The truck moved forward off the tracks and into safety. Unfortunately, as the truck pulled forward, so did the Nelsons' vehicle. After the Nelsons' vehicle pulled forward, the railroad light and bell signals activated and an automatic gate came down behind the Nelsons' vehicle, indicating a train was approaching within 20 seconds. The Nelsons tried to move forward and off the tracks, striking the truck in front of them. The truck, however, was already touching the vehicle in front of it and could not move any farther forward. The train struck the Nelsons' vehicle, instantly killing Margie in the passenger seat. Glenn, who was in the driver's seat, died later at the hospital.

¶ 4 In her second amended complaint, Owen makes several allegations of negligence by the city of Tukwila, ranging from failing to maintain South 180th Street in a safe condition, to failing to provide adequate warning of the dangers posed by the railroad crossings, to failing to adjust traffic control devices to prevent the dangers posed by the railroad crossings.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 5 Tukwila presented two arguments in support of its motion for summary judgment. Tukwila's main argument was that the claims against it should be dismissed because the decedents' "own conduct removes the [decedents] from the class of persons to whom the city owes a duty." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 835; see also CP at 143 ("[S]ummary judgment should be granted because [decedents'] failure to exercise ordinary care for their own safety removes them from any duty owed by the City."). Additionally, Tukwila argued that it was not liable for damages arising from the accident because it had complied with all statutes, ordinances, and the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (2d ed. 1988) (MUTCD).

¶ 6 The trial court granted Tukwila's motion for summary judgment and issued an order dismissing all of the plaintiffs' claims against Tukwila. In summarizing its reasoning, the trial court stated: "I'm simply not persuaded that a reasonable jury could find under the facts and circumstances here ... that there was any negligence by the City of Tukwila." CP at 403-04.

¶ 7 The Court of Appeals quickly and appropriately disposed of Tukwila's primary argument that it did not owe any duty to the Nelsons. Owen v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R., Inc., 114 Wash.App. 227, 232-33, 56 P.3d 1006 (2002). After noting that a municipality's duty to maintain its roadways reasonably safe for ordinary travel is owed to all persons, whether fault-free or negligent, id. (quoting Keller v. City of Spokane, 146 Wash.2d 237, 249, 44 P.3d 845 (2002)), the appellate court held evidence of the Nelsons' negligence does not "excuse the City from its duty" and does not "justify the order of dismissal." Owen, 114 Wash.App. at 233, 56 P.3d 1006. The Court of Appeals also reasoned that the MUTCD1 imposed duties upon Tukwila, Owen, 114 Wash.App. at 234-35, 56 P.3d 1006, and held that Owen had raised an issue of material fact with respect to Tukwila's duty under the MUTCD, reasoning that "a reasonable jury could conclude [based upon the evidence in the record] that unusual circumstances were present at the crossing, requiring more than normal signage and warnings to prevent motorists from being trapped in the path of an approaching train." Id. at 238, 56 P.3d 1006. Accordingly, the order dismissing Owen's claims against Tukwila was reversed. Id. at 242, 56 P.3d 1006.

¶ 8 The Court of Appeals did not reach whether, as a matter of law, the roadway was inherently dangerous or misleading. Id. at 240, 56 P.3d 1006. Nor did the Court of Appeals reach proximate cause. Id. The appellate court below declined to reach these issues because Tukwila did not raise the former issue in its motion for summary judgment and abandoned the latter issue on appeal. Id. at 240-41, 56 P.3d 1006. We granted the city's petition for review.

ANALYSIS

¶ 9 First, we emphasize that the question before us is whether Owen has produced sufficient evidence of the city's negligence, and not any question of the potential comparative fault of the Nelsons. It is well established that Tukwila owes a duty to all travelers, whether negligent or fault-free, to maintain its roadways in a condition safe for ordinary travel. See Keller, 146 Wash.2d at 249,

44 P.3d 845. Owen alleges a breach of that duty and a resulting injury. Any negligence on the part of the decedents is irrelevant to whether a material question of fact regarding the alleged breach of Tukwila's duty survives summary judgment. That is not to say that any negligence on the part of the decedents is irrelevant to the cause of action and may be raised by the city when appropriate. See RCW 4.22.005.

¶ 10 We also emphasize our standard of review. We review summary judgment orders de novo and perform the same inquiry as the trial court. Hisle v. Todd Pac. Shipyards Corp., 151 Wash.2d 853, 860, 93 P.3d 108 (2004). We examine the pleadings, affidavits, and depositions before the trial court and "take the position of the trial court and assume facts [and reasonable inferences] most favorable to the nonmoving party." Ruff v. King County, 125 Wash.2d 697, 703, 887 P.2d 886 (1995) (citing Hartley v. State, 103 Wash.2d 768, 774, 698 P.2d 77 (1985)). Owen is the nonmoving party. Thus, all facts and reasonable inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to her. See id. Summary judgment is proper if the record before the trial court establishes "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." CR 56(c).

¶ 11 We first examine the duty, if any, of the city. Today, governmental entities are held to the same negligence standards as private individuals. See Keller, 146 Wash.2d at 242-43,

44 P.3d 845. Liability for negligence does not require a direct statutory violation, though a statute, regulation, or other positive enactment may help define the scope of a duty or the standard of care. Cf. Bauman v. Crawford, 104 Wash.2d 241, 244-45, 704 P.2d 1181 (1985). The MUTCD provides at least some evidence of the appropriate duty. See RCW 47.36.030; WAC 468-95-010; see also Kitt v. Yakima County, 93 Wash.2d 670, 611 P.2d 1234 (1980).

¶ 12 Tukwila acknowledges that it has a duty to provide reasonably safe roads and this duty includes the duty to safeguard against an inherently dangerous or misleading condition. A city's duty to eliminate an inherently...

To continue reading

Request your trial
333 cases
  • Budd v. Kaiser Gypsum Co.
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • February 22, 2022
    ...or other positive enactment may help define the scope of a duty or the standard of care.’ ") (quoting Owen v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe R.R. Co., 153 Wash.2d 780, 787, 108 P.3d 1220 (2005) ). But the WAC provisions at issue governed how employers run their worksites, they did not regulate Ka......
  • Larson v. Snohomish Cnty.
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • December 6, 2021
    ...CR 56(c). We view all facts and reasonable inferences in light most favorable to the non-moving party. Owen v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co., 153 Wash.2d 780, 787, 108 P.3d 1220 (2005).a. CPA Claims 15 ¶72 The Larsons contended below that the Private Defendants violated the CPA by conduct......
  • Kosovan v. Omni Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • October 5, 2021
    ...judgment.’ " Swank v. Valley Christian Sch. , 188 Wash.2d 663, 685, 398 P.3d 1108 (2017) (quoting Owen v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co. , 153 Wash.2d 780, 788, 108 P.3d 1220 (2005) ).¶ 87 Here, the USAA letter and Praxis’ conduct upon learning that Kosovan had not been made whole by the t......
  • Wilkinson v. Chiwawa Cmtys. Ass'n, Non-Profit Corp.
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • April 17, 2014
    ...conclusion, questions of fact may be determined as a matter of law.” Id. at 49–50, 203 P.3d 383 (citing Owen v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R., 153 Wash.2d 780, 788, 108 P.3d 1220 (2005)). In determining the drafter's intent, we give covenant language “its ordinary and common use” and will not......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT