Owen v. County Of Franklin, Virginia

• Decision Date: 06 March 2019
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 7:17CV00205
• Citation: 358 F.Supp.3d 545
• Parties: Jennifer OWEN, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF FRANKLIN, VIRGINIA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia

358 F.Supp.3d 545

Jennifer OWEN, Plaintiff,

v.COUNTY OF FRANKLIN, VIRGINIA, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 7:17CV00205

United States District Court, W.D. Virginia.

Signed March 6, 2019

Brittany Michelle Haddox, Terry Neill Grimes, Terry N. Grimes, ESQ., P.C., Roanoke, VA, for Plaintiff.

Jim H. Guynn, Jr., Julian Friedman Harf, Guynn & Waddell, PC, Salem, VA, Johneal Moore White, Melissa Walker Robinson, Glenn Robinson & Cathey PLC, Roanoke, VA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Glen E. Conrad, Senior United States District Judge

Jennifer Owen filed this action against the County of Franklin, Virginia (the "County") and Robert Andrew Morris. Owen asserts claims of hostile work environment and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") against the County, and related claims of assault and battery against Morris. The County has moved for summary judgment on the retaliation claim. The court held a hearing on the motion via teleconference on February 7, 2019. The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for review. For the following reasons, the motion will be denied.

Background

The following facts are either undisputed or presented in the light most favorable to Owen. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphasizing that "[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [her] favor," when ruling on a motion for summary judgment).

In December of 2013, the County hired Owen to work as a building inspector. Owen Dep. 11, Dkt. No. 109-1. Morris became the County Building Official and Owen's head supervisor in November of 2014. Morris Dep. 27, 47-48, Dkt. No. 109-15. Morris remained in that position for the duration of Owen's employment.

Within months of becoming Owen's supervisor, Morris began to sexually harass her. Id. 101. The harassment began with comments regarding the plaintiff's attractiveness, which Morris made in person and in text messages. Id. 47–48. When the comments were made at work, Owen would point to a photograph of Morris' wife and ask him to "stop." Id. 48. Rather than doing so, Morris engaged in increasingly inappropriate conversations with Owen. For instance, Morris asked Owen how she had lost her virginity. Id. 106. When Owen refused to answer his question, Morris proceeded to describe his first sexual experience in detail. Id. 106. Morris also made sexual advances via text message, asked Owen to send him inappropriate photographs of herself, offered to perform oral sex on Owen, and told Owen they were going to "do it" and "she was going to like it." Id. 123, 125, 127–28, 154–55. Owen reminded Morris that he was married with four children and asked him to "stop." Id. 126. Rather than doing so, Morris requested that Owen perform oral sex on him for his birthday. Id. 127.

In the summer of 2015, Morris began to engage in inappropriate physical contact. Id. 35. Morris touched Owen's breasts on several occasions. Id. 146; see also id. ("[H]e would come up behind me and grope me and grab me."). He also "forced [Owen] to kiss him many times," "tried to force her to feel his penis," and "placed his hand on [her] genital area" while she was driving. Id. 146–47, 150–52.

Lewis Turner, another County employee in Owen's chain of command, also made comments of a sexual nature to the plaintiff. Turner showed Owen photographs of women and ask her if she thought the women's breasts were real or fake. Id. 39. Turner also engaged in "drunk texting," during which he sent Owen inappropriate messages. Id. 42.

Owen complained to Morris about Turner's behavior, but "nothing changed." Id. 40. Instead, as the year progressed, Owen's work environment worsened, and she began to fear that Morris would hurt her or terminate her employment. Id. 71. Morris advised Owen that she would be immediately fired if he ever saw her enter the area of the building where the County's human resources ("HR") department was located. Id. 71–72.

In November of 2015, Owen made it clear that she was not going to tolerate Morris' behavior any longer. While Owen was sitting at her desk, Morris approached her from behind, placed his hands down her shirt and under her bra, and squeezed her breasts. Id. 147. In response, Owen slapped her fist on the desk and said, "That's it .... You're going to stop touching me now. No more. Leave me alone. Stop." Id.

Owen contends that Morris' demeanor subsequently changed. He became "cold" and "mean," and imposed restrictions on the plaintiff. Id. 155. For instance, Morris told Owen that she was no longer allowed to bring food from home or exercise during her lunch break, and that she would be required to go out to eat with "the guys." Id. 157. Morris also made Owen return her work vehicle. Id. 158.

On February 5, 2016, Morris and Turner met with Owen in a conference room. Id. 61. During the meeting, Morris presented the plaintiff with a bulleted list of alleged reasons to terminate her employment. Id. He advised Owen that should could either quit her job or be fired. Id.

After meeting with Owen, Morris asked Patricia Barnes, an HR official, to prepare a "Notice of Intent to Terminate" letter. Barnes Dep. 42, Dkt. No. 109-2. The letter advised Owen that she would have three days to respond to the proposed course of action before Morris made a final decision. Notice of Intent to Terminate, Dkt. No. 109-7.

Owen met with Barnes after work that same day in Barnes' office. Owen Dep. 65. During the meeting, Owen told Barnes that Morris had made sexual advances toward her and that she had rejected his advances. Id. 65–66. Owen also indicated that the asserted reasons for her proposed termination were "fabrications" and that Morris was retaliating against her for "standing up for [her]self after months of him molesting [her] and telling him to stop." Id. 63.

At the conclusion of the meeting, Barnes told Owen that she would investigate the alleged misconduct. Id. 76. However, Barnes noted that Morris was a "golden child" and that she did not believe the County "would ever do anything about him."Id. 76. Barnes also warned that Owen would "never work for another municipality again" if she decided to pursue a complaint against Morris. Id.

Morris had knowledge of Owen's meeting with Barnes. See Morris Dep. 107 ("I know HR had a meeting with Ms. Owen .... It was after hours."). After the meeting, Barnes spoke to several employees regarding Owen's allegations. There is a dispute in the record as to whether Barnes questioned Morris. See Barnes Dep. 29 ("I spoke to ... Barbara Mills, Lewis Turner, [and] Kenny Altice."); but see Position Statement 4, Dkt. 109-19 ("Ms. Barnes conducted a preliminary investigation to determine if there was any evidence to substantiate Ms. Owen's statement. Ms. Barnes interviewed Mr. Morris, Mr. Turner, and other members of the Developmental Services Department.").

On February 10, 2016, Morris terminated Owen's employment. In a Notice of Termination issued that same day, Morris advised Owen that the employment decision was based on the following violations of HR Administrative Policy No. 2.50: abuse of County time for personal business; insubordination or failure to follow a supervisor's instructions; leaving the work site during work hours without permission; and unauthorized use or misuse of County property. Notice of Termination, Dkt. No. 109-8.

Procedural History

Owen filed the instant action on May 8, 2017, after exhausting her administrative remedies with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Owen filed an amended complaint on July 14, 2017. In Count I of the amended complaint, Owen claims that she was subjected to a sexually hostile work environment in violation of Title VII. In Count II, Owen claims that her employment was terminated in retaliation for "complaining about the harassment and hostile work environment." Am. Compl. ¶ 40, Dkt. No. 16. In Count III, Owen asserts claims of assault and battery against Morris.

On November 30, 2018, the County moved for summary judgment on the retaliation claim. The court held a hearing on the motion on February 7, 2019. The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for review.

Standard of Review

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In deciding whether to grant a motion for summary judgment, the court must "view[ ] the facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 873 (4th Cir. 2013). To withstand a summary judgment motion, the non-movant must produce sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in her favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

Discussion

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee "because [the employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful practice by this subchapter," or "because [the employee] has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing" under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The first part of this statute is known as the "opposition clause," while the second is referred to as the "participation clause." Villa v. CavaMezze Grill, LLC, 858 F.3d 896, 900 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Owen's retaliation claim is premised on the opposition clause.

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation in violation of Title VII, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that she engaged in protected activity; (2) that her employer took a materially adverse action against her; and (3) that a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the materially adverse action. EEOC v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397, 405–06 (4th...