Owen v. Williamson, Civil Action No. 1:96cv259 (N.D. Miss. 4/__/1998)

• Decision Date: 01 April 1998
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 1:96cv259.
• Parties: BILLY K. OWEN, PLAINTIFF, v. WILLIAM M. WILLIAMSON, In His Individual Capacity, DEFENDANT.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi

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BILLY K. OWEN, PLAINTIFF, v. WILLIAM M. WILLIAMSON, In His Individual Capacity, DEFENDANT.

Civil Action No. 1:96cv259.

United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Eastern Division.

April __, 1998.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Presently before the court is the "Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, For Summary Judgment" (Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment).¹ Finding the motion for summary judgment only partially well-taken, this court shall grant it in part and deny it in part.

• Factual and Procedural Background

At approximately 3:00 p.m. on March 19, 1996, the Defendant Sgt. William M. Williamson, a trooper employed by the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol, was proceeding east on Highway 78 in DeSoto County, Mississippi, when he observed a tractor trailer truck proceeding west on Highway 78 at what he determined was an excessive rate of speed. Sgt. Williamson crossed the median, then pursued the truck and signaled for it to stop. The driver of the truck was the Plaintiff Billy K. Owen. After Mr. Owen stopped his truck on the shoulder of the highway, Sgt. Williamson stopped his patrol car in front of the truck. Mr. Owen did not wait for Sgt. Williamson to approach his truck, but stepped out of it to meet Sgt. Williamson halfway between the vehicles. Sgt. Williamson told Mr. Owen that he was proceeding at the speed of 78 miles per hour in a 70 mile-per-hour zone. Mr. Owen said that he did not realize he was speeding and that he had set his cruise control at 70 miles per hour. Mr. Owen's version of the subsequent events is as follows:

He informed me that obviously my cruise control was wrong and I told him it could be, but it was a new truck. It had just be checked out. And he informed me that I seemed — it seemed to be that I was going to be the arguing type and he wasn't going to argue with me, that I could argue with the judge. And I told him that I wasn't there to argue with him and he was the guy with the ticket book. If he said I had a ticket, I had a ticket. He said, that's exactly what you're going to get. And I told him that — he already had my license. I said, I'm going to get my jacket out of the truck. I said, better yet, I'm just going to get in the truck and sit. You have my license. Whenever you get through writing the ticket, I'll get out and get it. . . . I turned and started to the truck and he told me that I wasn't getting in the truck, I was getting in the backseat of his car, but before I got in the car, to put my hands on the back of his car. I did and he searched me and he made me get down on the ground face down. He found a small caliber .22 pistol in my right front pocket as he was searching me before he made me get down on the ground. He removed it from my pocket, threw it over to the side. He got very belligerent, very — went into hysterics, made me get down on the ground face first. . . .

Deposition of Billy K. Owen, pp. 23-24. During this encounter, Mr. Owen's wife Cynthia, who is not a party to this action, sat watching the men from inside the truck. According to her, when Sgt. Williamson ordered Mr. Owen to put his hands on the back of the car, Sgt. Williamson "sort of shoved" Mr. Owen. Deposition of Cynthia Owen, p. 26. Mrs. Owen also claims that when Sgt. Williamson found Mr. Owen's pistol, Sgt. Williamson "kneed" Mr. Owen in the back. Deposition of Cynthia Owen, p. 27. According to Mr. Owen, after Mr. Owen got down on the ground, Sgt. Williamson "kicked [Mr. Owen] in the side." Deposition of Billy K. Owen, p. 44. While Mr. Owen was lying face down on the ground, Sgt. Williamson handcuffed him, put a gun to his head and threatened to shoot him. Deposition of Billy K. Owen, p. 46; Deposition of Cynthia Owen, p. 29. Sgt. Williamson also ordered Mrs. Owen, who had exited the truck, to sit on the ground. Shortly thereafter, Sgt. Williamson placed Mr. Owen in the back of his patrol car and commenced the drive to the DeSoto County Jail. Before reaching the jail, however, Sgt. Williamson released Mr. Owen so that Mr. Owen could resume driving the tractor-trailer truck, which Mrs. Owen did not appear to have the adequate training to drive herself. Sgt. Williamson also released Mr. Owen so that he could attend to a gasoline leak in his patrol car.

As a result of these actions, Mr. Owen filed the present action against Sgt. Williamson in his individual capacity. Mr. Owen seeks relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 and various state law tort theories. At this juncture, Sgt. Williamson has moved for the entry of summary judgment as to Mr. Owen's claims.

• Discussion

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The burden rests upon the party seeking summary judgment to show to the district court that an absence of evidence exists in the non-moving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986); see Jackson v. Widnall, 99 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1996); Hirras v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 95 F.3d 396, 399 (5th Cir. 1996). Once such a showing is presented by the moving party, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate, by specific facts, that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986); Texas Manufactured Housing Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Nederland, 101 F.3d 1095, 1099 (5th Cir. 1996); Brothers v. Klevenhagen, 28 F.3d 452, 455 (5th Cir. 1994). Substantive law will determine what is considered material. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see Nichols v. Loral Vought Sys. Corp., 81 F.3d 38, 40 (5th Cir. 1996). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see City of Nederland, 101 F.3d at 1099; Gibson v. Rich, 44 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1995). Further, "[w]here the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see City of Nederland, 101 F.3d at 1099. Finally, all facts are considered in favor of the non-moving party, including all reasonable inferences therefrom. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254; Banc One Capital Partners Corp. v. Kneipper, 67 F.3d 1187, 1198 (5th Cir. 1995); Taylor v. Gregg, 36 F.3d 453, 455 (5th Cir. 1994); Matagorda County v. Russell Law, 19 F.3d 215, 217 (5th Cir.1994). However, this is so only when there is "an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994); Guillory v. Domtar Industries Inc., 95 F.3d 1320, 1326 (5th Cir. 1996); Richter v. Merchants Fast Motor Lines, Inc., 83 F.3d 96, 97 (5th Cir. 1996). In the absence of proof, the court does not "assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts." Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (emphasis omitted); see Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 111 L. Ed. 2d 695 (1990).

• Claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1983

Under § 1983,

[a] police officer who, acting under color of state law, subjects a United States citizen to a deprivation of his constitutional rights is liable for damages to the injured party. The Supreme Court has read § 1983 in harmony with general principles of tort immunities and defenses rather than in derogation of them.

Thus, a police officer may interpose a defense of qualified immunity when faced with a § 1983 action.

Petta v. Rivera, 133 F.3d 330, 333 (5^th Cir. 1998).

Here, Sgt. Williamson contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity against all of Mr. Owen's § 1983 claims. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, p.1. "A police officer is entitled to claim the cloak of qualified immunity `unless it is shown that, at the time of the incident, he violated a clearly established constitutional right.'" Mangieri v. Clifton, 29 F.3d 1012, 1015 (5^th Cir. 1994) (quoting Spann v. Rainey, 987 F.2d 1110, 1114 (5th Cir.1993).

Assessing the defense of qualified immunity is a two-step process. First, using currently applicable constitutional standards, [the court] determine[s] whether the plaintiff has alleged the violation of a clearly established constitutional right. If so, [the court] then decide[s] if the defendant's conduct was objectively reasonable, because even if an official's conduct violates a constitutional right, he is entitled to qualified immunity if the conduct was objectively reasonable.

Nerren v. Livingston Police Dep't, 86 F.3d 469, 473 (5^th Cir. 1996) (citations and quotations omitted). This court will assess the affirmative defense of qualified immunity regarding each of Mr. Owen's constitutional claims. Where qualified immunity does not apply, this court will further assess whether there is no genuine issue as to any material fact on the merits of that claim.

• False Arrest

One of the constitutional violations Mr. Owen asserts is "arrest without probable cause." Second Amended Complaint, ¶ IX. "The right to be free from arrest without probable cause is a clearly established constitutional right." Mangieri, 29 F.3d at 1015 (describing "Fourth Amendment right to be free from false arrest"). However, "[t]here is no cause of action for `false arrest' under section 1983 unless the arresting officer lacked probable cause." Fields v. City of South Houston, Tex., 922 F.2d 1183, 1189 (5^th Cir. 1989) (quoting Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368, 372-73 (4^th Cir. 1974)). Whether an officer had probable cause depends on whether, at the time of the arrest, the "facts...