Owen v. Yale

• Decision Date: 14 June 1889
• Citation: 75 Mich. 256,42 N.W. 817
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: OWEN v. YALE.

42 N.W. 817

75 Mich. 256

OWEN v. YALE.

Supreme Court of Michigan

June 14, 1889

Appeal from circuit court, Huron county.

John W. Bennett, (Martin Crocker and T. M. Crocker, of counsel,) for appellant.

Winsor & Snover, (Hatch & Cookley, of counsel,) for appellee.

CAMPBELL J.

Complainant as owner and grantee of lands formerly owned by Francis Crawford, now deceased, filed this bill to quiet his title against the claim of dower of defendant, once his wife, who as he claims, had relinquished her dower by a voluntary arrangement during her former husband's life-time. The court below decreed to complainant the relief prayed, and defendant appeals.

In 1878, on January 22d, defendant, proceeding under the act found in section 6291, How. St., filed a bill in the circuit court for the county of Washtenaw against Crawford, then her husband, for maintenance. The bill relied on what it charged as desertion, and also a failure to suitably provide for and maintain her. It did not set out such a period of desertion as would be ground for a divorce by itself, and it did not contain such charges of "grossly or wantonly and cruelly" failing to provide for her as to be a foundation for divorce under the general laws. It also set out that Mr. Crawford had filed a bill for divorce against her, and had discontinued it without her consent. Mr Crawford put in an answer, fully meeting all the allegations, and setting up counter-grievances. The case went to a hearing, but the record put in does not show what the proofs were. But it shows a consent upon a stipulation confirmed by the court, from which this appears: On the hearing the judge announced that he would grant a divorce, and suggested that the parties agree on the alimony to be granted complainant, and its manner of payment. Thereupon a decree was agreed upon which, in the first place, granted a divorce for desertion, with leave to both parties to remarry, and then granted a gross sum of $20,000, alimony, "the same to be in full of all claims of sad complainant against said defendant or his property," and payable $10,000 at or before the filing, of the decree, and the remaining $10,000, with annual interest, at or before the husband's death, at his option, to be secured by mortgage as set forth, and on the lands therein described. The evidence showed that Mrs. Crawford expressly authorized her counsel to enter this decree, and understood its effect. It was therefore a consent decree in the full sense of the term, and within the power of her counsel to agree upon. The money was paid to and received by her, and the mortgage accepted and disposed of by her. It is...