Owendale-Gagetown School Dist. v. State Bd. of Ed.
| Citation | 317 N.W.2d 529,413 Mich. 1 |
| Decision Date | 31 March 1982 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 64193,OWENDALE-GAGETOWN,No. 9,9 |
| Parties | , 3 Ed. Law Rep. 384 SCHOOL DISTRICT, Plaintiff-Appellant, and Ronald Erickson, Ronald Good, Jack Laurie, Ronald Reinhardt, Jack Brinkman, Joseph Warrack, Donald Cummins, and Leona LaFave, Added Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant-Appellee, and Keith J. Goslin, et al., Intervening Defendants-Appellees. Calendar |
| Court | Supreme Court of Michigan |
James F. Schouman and Mark W. Chessman, Dearborn, for plaintiff-appellant and added plaintiffs-appellants.
Gerald F. Young, Richard Gartner, Asst. Attys. Gen., for defendant-appellee.
Robert E. Kleeb, Howell, for intervening defendants-appellees.
Plaintiffs are appealing the holding of the Court of Appeals, 92 Mich.App. 719, 285 N.W.2d 435, that when property is detached from one school district and added to another, the matter need not be approved by a vote of the school tax electors of the district from which it is removed unless the parcel involved exceeds 10% of the latest taxable valuation of the transferor school district. The issue is one of statutory construction. We conclude that the Court of Appeals decision accords with the plain meaning of Sec. 461 of the School Code of 1955 1 and that the legislative intent underlying the statute is not so clearly contrary as to justify a departure from a literal reading of the statutory language.
The intervening defendants in this case petitioned the Huron and Tuscola Intermediate Boards of Education to transfer their property from the Owendale-Gagetown School District to the Cass City School District. Their petition was denied on May 11, 1975, and they appealed to the State Board of Education. On May 19, 1976, the State Board reversed the decision of the intermediate boards and ordered that the property be transferred as requested.
The Owendale-Gagetown School District petitioned the Ingham Circuit Court to review the decision of the State Board of Education. It alleged, inter alia, that Sec. 461 of the School Code of 1955 required a vote of its school tax electors and that approval of the transfer by the State Board of Education was an abuse of discretion. The school district briefed only the former issue, and in its behalf noted that a prior transfer to the Elkton-Pigeon-Bay Port School District constituted 8.4% of the valuation of the Owendale-Gagetown School District. By adding that transfer to the present transfer of 9.2% of the latest taxable valuation of the district, a total of 17.6% of the valuation of the district would be lost by these two transfers. Thus, Owendale-Gagetown argued, since the present transfer, when added to the prior transfer, would exceed the 10% valuation mentioned in Sec. 461, a vote by the school tax electors of its district was required. The Ingham Circuit Court agreed and reversed the State Board of Education's approval of the transfer.
The State Board of Education appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed on August 15, 1977, holding that the Owendale-Gagetown School District lacked standing to challenge the property transfer. This Court denied the school district leave to appeal.
On October 11, 1978, the Ingham Circuit Court granted a motion by the school district to add as plaintiffs resident electors from the district. The circuit court also granted a motion to intervene by those seeking to transfer out of the Owendale-Gagetown School District. Relying on its previous interpretation of Sec. 461 of the School Code of 1955, the Court again reversed the State Board of Education's approval of the intervening defendants' petition to transfer from the district.
The State Board of Education appealed. On October 1, 1979, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the circuit court. It held that Sec. 461 required a vote of the electors only when the area involved in a single transfer exceeded 10% of the latest taxable valuation of the school district. This Court granted leave to appeal.
The pertinent statute provided:
M.C.L. Sec. 340.461; M.S.A. Sec. 15.3461. (Emphasis added.)
Plaintiffs contend that the italicized portion of this statute must be construed so as to require a vote of the electors of the transferor district for any property transfers after 10% of the school district's property value has been transferred.
As plaintiffs concede, a literal reading of the statute does not favor their position. The phrase "area to be detached" is to be construed. Both the phrase itself and its context clearly point to the area involved in a single transfer. By identifying the area as that which is "to be detached", the statute cannot easily be read to have applied to that which already had been detached. Further, the statute, prior to using the phrase, stated:
"The county board of education may, in its discretion, detach territory from 1 district and attach it to another when requested to do so by a resolution of the board of any district whose boundaries would be changed by such action, or when petitioned by not less than 2/3 of the resident owners of the land to be transferred." M.C.L. Sec. 340.461; M.S.A. Sec. 15.3461.
The territory the county board may have detached was that identified either in a resolution of the boards of affected districts or in a petition of the landowners seeking the transfer. Thus, when the statute later referred to "the area to be detached", the only area which it was specifying was that which would be identified in such a resolution or petition. To conclude that this language refers to the areas involved in all prior petitions or resolutions that had resulted in transfers would contravene its clear and unambiguous meaning.
Ordinarily, this conclusion would render further interpretation of the statute unnecessary. Legislative intent controls statutory construction, and, in ascertaining such intent, the Legislature must be presumed to have intended the meaning expressed by the language it has chosen. When that language is clear and unambiguous, no further interpretation is necessary. Dussia v. Monroe County Employees Retirement System, 386 Mich. 244, 191 N.W.2d 307 (1971); City of Grand Rapids v. Crocker, 219 Mich. 178, 189 N.W. 221 (1922). There is, however, an exception to this fundamental rule of statutory construction that arises when a literal reading of the statutory language "would produce an absurd and unjust result and would be clearly inconsistent with the purposes and the policies of the act in question." Salas v. Clements, 399 Mich. 103, 109, 247 N.W.2d 889 (1976).
Plaintiffs argue that this is a case in which a literal reading would circumvent the legislative intent. Pointing to the fact that a school district could be destroyed by many transfers of less than 10%, the plaintiffs argue that what cannot be accomplished directly in one large transfer, without approval of its electors, should not be permitted to occur indirectly through many small transfers.
We, however, cannot agree that the legislative intent is so clear as to justify a departure from the statutory language. While the present situation may not have been intended or considered by the Legislature, the interpretation which plaintiffs advocate also seems unlikely to have been within the legislative intent. Plaintiffs' interpretation would require a vote of the school tax electors for any transfer--no matter how small or how far in the future--after the 10% limitation had been reached by prior transfers. It does appear clear that the Legislature did not intend to require voter approval for relatively minor property transfers.
Additionally, plaintiffs' interpretation would require the courts to fill gaps left by the legislative silence regarding how the 10% valuation should properly be computed on a cumulative basis. Specifically, the question would arise in circumstances in which property transferred out of the district later changes its value in comparison with the rest of the district. Suppose a transfer represented 8% of the entire district's taxable valuation at the time of the transfer, but subsequently would represent only 5% of the district's valuation if it were valued as part of the district. If a later petition seeks to transfer 3% of the latest taxable valuation of the district, the question whether the prior transfer is to be treated as 5% or 8% would be determinative of whether the 3% transfer would need to be approved by the voters. The statute's absence of any formula suggests the Legislature never envisioned that the 10% limitation would be treated on a cumulative basis. The fact that the courts would be asked to fill such gaps as this further indicates that plaintiffs' concerns should be more properly addressed to the Legislature.
The strong competing interests at stake in this case also make it difficult to...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
WPW Acquisition Co. v. City of Troy
... ... Bishop, Assistant Attorney General, for the Attorney General and the State Tax Commission ... Bauckham, Sparks, Rolfe, Lohrstorfer ... personal property not exempt by law except for taxes levied for school operating purposes. The legislature shall provide for the determination ... See School Dist. No. 9, Pittsfield Twp., Washtenaw Co. v. Washtenaw Co. Bd. of ... 14. Plaintiffs also cite Owendale-Gagetown School Dist. v. State Bd. of Ed., 413 Mich. 1, 317 N.W.2d 529 (1982), ... ...
-
Franks v. White Pine Copper Div., Copper Range Co.
... ... 1, 9, 345 N.W.2d 184 (1984); Owendale-Gagetown School Dist. v. State Bd. of Ed., 413 Mich. 1, 8, 317 N.W.2d 529 (1982); ... ...
-
Selk v. Detroit Plastic Products
... ... DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, and Michigan State Accident Fund, ... Defendants- Appellants, ... Second Injury Fund, ... Owendale-Gagetown School Dist. v. State Bd. of Ed., 413 Mich. 1, 317 N.W.2d 529 (1982) ... ...
-
Boyd v. W.G. Wade Shows
... ... over all controversies arising out of injuries suffered outside this state where the injured employee is a resident of this state at the time of ... See Owendale-Gagetown School Dist. v. State Bd. of Ed., 413 Mich. 1, 8, 317 N.W.2d 529 (1982) ... ...